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A considerable number of cases in the field of judicial review of 
administrative decisions have utilised or discussed the distinction 
between a void and voidable decision. The distinction has been 
assumed to be analogous to1hat in contract (1) and thus has fundamental 
consequences. In contract a void agreement is one which entirely 
fails to receive legal recognition or sanction, the declared will of 
the parties being wholly destitute of legal efficacy (2). Thus no 
rights, either inter partes, or third party can in principle arise 
under such a contract and it can give rise to no collateral 
consequences. Thus, at common law, the children~ of a void marriage 
are illegitimate, although the rigours of this rule have been partially 
modified by statute (3). A voidable contract, however, has all the 
characteristics of a valid contract except that its operation is 
conditional upon the election of one of the parties to set it aside, 
but ''until it is rescinded it is valid and binding" t 4). However 
in certain circumstances, the act of quashing may have retrospective 
effect. This is generally the case where a marriage is held to be 
voidable and set aside, (5) although a considerable number of exceptions 
to this have been established (6). 
Thus the crucial difference between the two types of act is the 
necessity, where the act is voidable, of a positive action which 
destroys its efficacy. · Upon this other consequences depend. 
A void decision, or act, is of course a linguistic contradiction, 
there being nothing in existence which the law can recognise as 
having legal effect. Thus the absence of what can be ·regarded as 
defining characteristics, genuine agreement, essential formalities, 
consideration, produce a void contract, whereas other defects, error, 
fraud, misrepresentation make the agreement voidable. 
In the case of administrative decisions the same basic concept 
has been used. Thus in D.P.P. v. Head [1958] 1 ALLER 692 Lord Denning 
said, of a detention order made by the Home Secretary, "If the original 
order vas void it would in law be a nullity. '!here would be no need 
for an order to quash it. It would be autanatically null and void 
without more ado. All consequences which f'lov trom it would 
similarly be void, including dealings vi tb property." ( 7) 
However in Durayapah v. Fernando [1967] 2 .ALLER 152 the Judicial 
r 
I; 
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Committee of the Pri~ Council while recognising the possibility of a 
decision being 'a complete nullity' regarded the use of the term 'void' 
as appropriate to contract only and not to the field of administrative 
law. In as far as both terms refer to an act which prima Facie bas no 
legal effect, they will for the present purpose be treated as 
synonomous vi thout however the implication that the void, voidabili ty 
distinction in Administrative Law is necessarily connected with that in 
contract. 
Recent cases have applied the consequences of the distinction, in 
a number of contexts, which are not only of practical importance but 
also of theoretical interest, as illustrations of the way logical or 
linGUistic concepts are manipulated by the Courts to achieve policy 
purposes, and in particular the extent to which the Courts are prepared 
to violate the logic of a rule or concept in order to achieve a just 
result. 
The principle consequences of the distinction recognised in these 
decisions appear to be:-
A Privative clause preventing void decisions from challenge in the 
Courts is ineffective. Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission. 
(above) t I 
The Declaration will not issue against a voidable decision 
Punton v Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance (No.2) [196g 1 ALLER 448 
A third party cannot challenge a voidable decision. 
Dur~apah v Fernando (above) 
An order ot mandamus cannot lie to a voidable decision unless it is 
tirst quashed by certiorari 
-' R v Paddington Valuation Otficer[l966]1QB 380 
A void decision c&DDot be waived. Ridge v Baldwin~964JA.c.4o. 
It may be inappropriate to appeal against a void decision 
Chapman v Earl ~968 ]2 ALLER 1214 
A voidable decision cannot be challenged collaterally 
D.P.P. v Head (above) 
Thus the distinction baa ramifications throughout the subject, and 
because it appears material to the availability of remedies, is ot some 
value as a basis tor selecting an appropriate remedy in a given 
situation, a particularly \Dltidy area ot law. 
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In these cases the consequences of the distinction have been 
applied. However express judicial pronouncements have been cautious 
and true to the pragmatic traditions of the common law have avoided 
general analysis. 
Lord Wilberforce, in Anisminic, (above) said (at 208) "There are 
dangers in the use of the word (nullity) if it draws with it the 
difficult distinction between what is void, and what is voidable, and 
I certainly dO not wish to be taken to recognise that this distinction 
exists, or to analyse it if it does." 
Similarly in Ridge v Baldwin, Lord Evershed (quoting Pollock on 
Contract 13th Ed. 48) thought that the distinction vas 'imprecise and 
apt to mislead' and in D.P.P. v Head, Lord Somerville of Harren~ said 
(1959 A.C. at 104J "The distinction between void and voidable is by 
no means a clear one. I am not satisfied that the question whether a 
man should go or not go to prison should depend upon that distinction." 
This hesitation is partly explicable by the prevalent formulary 
approach to judicial review, where attention centres upon the rules 
government the availability of a particular remedy. Thus the rules 
about remedies are treated as dominant, obscuring those governing the 
effect of the decision. Thus in R v University of Aston ex p. Roffey 
~96~ 2 ALLER 964 the Court refused, l.n its discretion to issue 
certiorari against a decision of the Board of Examiners which was held 
to be in breach of natural justice, even though this defect vas held, 
in Ridge v Baldwin to result in nullity. Had the students been able 
to challenge the decision ot expulsion by means of an action in tort , 
or contract they might have succeeded ( 8) • 
More f'undamentally there are substantial difficulties in applying 
a strict distinction between voidness and voidability and in the 
context ot administrative decisions. 
Professor Wade points out ( 9) , that since any decision hwever 
defective has, unless challenged in legal proceedings, a de facto 
effectiveness, a strict distinction between voidness and voidability is 
not apt. All decisions are in this sense voidable, and te describe a 
decision as void merely signifies that the quashing ot it has 
retrospective effect. (10). In addition, •ince turther rules as to 
such matters u locus standi might justify the Courts retusal. to 
intervene, even a 'void' decision ~ tor practical purposes remain 
valid. "Voidness is, like most legal concepts relative rather than 
absolute. " 
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This of course can be said equally or void contracts , or marriases, 
but vith the important distinction that in the case of administrative 
decisions the element of official enforcement is predominant. Executive 
machinery wi11 give effect to a decision unless legal proceedings are 
commenced against it, and the rules governing procedures for such 
attack are sufficiently restrictive to prevent exposure of even a 
complete nullity by any member of the public. Thus if A is dismissed 
f'rom public office, in unauthorised circumstances, 'lmless he asserts 
his right, his succe~sors claim, backed by executive machinery, will 
be de facto effective, and it would be unlikely that a third party with 
no locus standi could obtain an order declaring this appointment void. 
Various rules, concerning ·.aiver locus standi, limitation, the 
discretion of the Court to refuse a prerogative or equitable remedy, 
militate, at least in practice, against voidness as an absolute 
conception. 
From a juristic point of view, Wade, following Kelsen, finds a 
logical fallacy in the concept of nullity, arguing that, since in every 
case a decision of the court must be sought before the detect can be 
exposed, the courts decision is a genuine constitutive act, vhich 
establishes that 11 the decision fulfils the conditions of nullity 
determined by the legal order". Kelsen oinilarly argues, that since 
the "decision" is the referent of the collection of rules concerning 
its validity, and effect, it therefore exists, since everything 
referred to by the legal system exists within the context of that system. 
It is submitted that this approach is a distortion. To describe 
something as a void act is merely a linguistic convenience. What is 
really meant is that no act exists at all. The position is not that 
as formulated by Wade, i.e. that certain defects produce a decision with 
the characteristics of nu1lity, but can equally we11 be that the absence 
of essential requirements means that nothing has yet come into 
existence to which the law will give effect. Hence the absence of 
defining characteristics is what makes a contract void. It will be 
examined whether this is so in the case of administrative decisions. 
Thus D.M. Gordon S&\YS "Voidness represents a state of nothingness trom 
which nothing can issue, and which consequently can never acquire any 
clitferent status." (12). 
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To treat a void decision as existing merely because the language 
of a rule refers to it, is a misuse of language of the same nature as 
that involved where it is maintained that a square circle exists 
because it is possible to formulate such a concept. This distortion 
arises out of a misconception as to the :f\mction of language. Words 
do not necessarily correspond vi th entities , real or imagined, but 
depend for their meaning upon their use. Thus the only criterion 
tor determining whether something is void is to examine whether the 
rules or law give to it ~ degree of effectiveness. 
Wade's analysis can be applied to every situation since all legal 
relationships require judicial recognition in order to be effective in 
law. If the assistance of a Court is not sought, or for a procedural 
reason withheld, it is equally meaningless to describe an act as valid, 
void or voidable. It is something with which the law is not concerned, 
although in the absence of a judicial decision to the contrary, the 
de facto position will be relied upon for the purpose of other legal 
relationships. This applies to marriages and title to property as 
much as to administrative decisions. The meaning of any legal 
concept can only be elucidated in the light of the rules of law concern-
ing it (14) and thus the distinction between void and voidable has 
significance only in the context of any distinction drawn by the 
Courts betveen the two kinds of act, as to their consequences. 
In both contract and marriage, other rules, competing with those 
arising from n~ity, prevent the existence of B.n absolute concept of 
nullity, and lead to the treatment of the distinction as a relative 
matter, involving questions or degree. 
Thus under the Infants Relief Act 1874 title passes to an infant 
b'Q¥er under an 11 absolutely void" contract, and in addition a contract, 
void against the infant is binding upon the adult party. (15). 
And in the context of marriage E. S. Cohn writes (16), "The 
difference between an act which is void, and an act which is valid, is 
unlike the difference between yea and no, between effect and no effect. 
It is a difference of grade and quantity. Sane effects are produced 
vhile others are not" • 
This approach baa also been taken in the field or Admi.niatrati ve Law. 
-Akehur8t (17) like Wade, treats nullity as a relative concept, and 
Bradley (18) regards the dis•inction as misleading because it under-
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estimates the competing rules ot procedure and remedy which govern the 
actual approach of the Courts. 
"To discuss the effects of' a departure from natural justice, 
merely in terms ot whether the decision is void or voidable does not 
sufficiently reveal the variety ot the degrees of validity with which 
an administrative act m8¥ be clothed, nor the wide choice of solutions 
open to a court". 
Gerner too regards the issue as turning essentially upon the 
rules about remedies (19). 
Thus the extent to which other rules militate against a distinc-
tion between void and voidable, will torm an important part of this 
study. However two points can be made at once. Firstly despite the 
existence of' competing rules, it is necessary, both conceptually and 
for practical purposes, to decide whether a decision is a nullity, 
since rules about the effect of the decision and those about 
procedure and availability of remedies, are analytically distinct. 
Channel J in R v 1-Tilliwns 19i4 1KB.608 had this in mind when he said 
"A party may preclude himself from claimin~S the vrit" (of certiorari) 
'whether the proceedings which he seeks to quash are void or voidable. 
If they are void, it is true that no conduct of his will validate 
them, but such considerations do not affect the principles upon which 
the Courts act in grantinr; or refusing· the unit of certiorari''. 
Thus it way be open to the court to apply other consequences of 
nullity despite a rule preventing this in one particular context. 
This is shown by Webb v t.ti.nister of Housing and Local Government [}.965] 
2 ALLER. Coast Protection Legislation authorised Local Authorities 
to produce schemes tor coast protection works. If' compulsory purchase 
powers were necessary to implement such scheces, compulsory purchase 
orders could be made. A scheme and the resulting compulsory purchase 
order required confirmation by the I{inister and both were protected by 
a provision allowing review upon specified grounds within a six weeks 
time limit, after which the acts were not at any time to 'be 
questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever'.. Such a clause bad 
been held in Smith v East Ello·-e R.D.C. [1956]A.C.736 to prevent all 
challenge to a decision after the lapse of' six weeks (20). The 
applicant sought to set aside a compulsory purchase order scheme made 
""HII.H 
under the Actr,vas detective tor improper purposes and procedural 
irregularities. However as be had not challenged the scheme within 
- ,, -
' 
six weeks, it vas argued that it became unimpeachable, and thus, the 
subsequent compulsory purchase order unless vitiated by defects of 
its own, became unchallengeable even within six weeks, since the 
privative clause had made the scheme a valid one sufficient to support 
the .. compulsory purchase order. The Court of Appeal rejected this 
approach. It vas held that the original scheme vas a nullity and 
thus had no existence. The existence of a scheme vas a condition 
precedent to a compulsory purchase order, and that too vas therefore 
void. "The Ministers Order cannot breathe life into what has no 
valid existence" (per Danckverts L.J. at 776). This vas so, even 
though it vas accepted that the words or the privative clause 
prevented direct challenge to the scheme af'ter the expiry of time, and 
the same presumably would have applied had the Order been challenged 
out of time. Thus the clause vas treated as a procedural bar which 
did not prevent the application of the normal indirect consequences of 
nullity including collateral i~peacrunent. "Shall not be questioned" 
was, it is submitted, construed as referring only to direct challenge. 
Other interpretations of this case have been put forward (21), but it 
is difficult to explain the decision without reliance upon the concept 
of nullity. 
Secondly it is submitted that different considerations govern 
voidness, ana. voidability in Public La-w situations than in the field of 
contract, where the purpose of the law is primarily the ref,Ulation of 
individual relationships. Here there is no objection either logical 
or upon policy grounds to an act being void in a relative sense, 
against certain persons or in certain situations. P.owever in the case 
of decisions based upon statutory power, the nullity of a decision has 
generally signified that it is one made without jurisdiction. 'l'hus if 
a decision is void only in a relative sense, the legal position of 
individuals ~ be affected by offici ala act.ing beyond their statutory 
powers. The 'Rule of La.v' to be anything more than a cant phrase must 
at least require that aets without legislative authority shall have no 
efreet and give rise to no consequences. 
Thus it will be regarded as acceptable in principle to postulate 
an absolute concept or nullity, although this may be modified by 
competing procedural rules imposed in the public interest. 
Three broad issues will be examined. 
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Firstly the Historical basis development of the void voidable, 
distinction. 
Secondly the modern law as to which defects result in a void, and 
which a voidable decision. 
Finally the effects of distinction will be examined to determine 
whether the Courts consistently follow through the logic underlying 
the distinction, and if not, what other factors militate against this. 
Some circularity is inevitable since the Courts frequently fail 
to express whether they regard a decision as void or voidable, and 
therefore this can only be inferred from the consequences of the 
defect which the court applies in a particular case. The Courts tend 
to use the term 'void' as loosely synonamous with 'defective' and thus 
the importance of the distinction tends to be overlooked (22). 
Certain necessary consequences of nullity will be employed as pointers 
to the attitude of the Courts when examining the second issue. Later 
attention will focus upon the extent to which these are in fact 
applied. 
The field of investigation will comprise all decisions of statutory 
bodies, loosely described an administrative. However, despite the 
close connection bet-;teen this area of la~·r and that governing review of 
'inferior courts stricto sensu, decisions concerning ordir.ary courts of 
law (23) will be used only by way of analogy. The distinction drawn 
by Fry L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Rociety v 
Parkinson[l892]1QB at 446-7, between Courts and other judicial bodies, 
based upon formality of procedure will be employed, despite the lack 
of precise criteria for separating courts from other decision making 
organs. Lord Esher's description of a 'court' as abo~ of persons 
that have the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals' (24) 
vill be regarded as too vide. 
Where possible, decisions affecting the use and ownership of land 
vill be employed. Not only is this an important area ot a&ninistrat-
ive decision making power, but a.J.so involves situations that well :. -- . 
illustrate the problems inherent in the distinction between voidness and 
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
The historical development of the distinction between voidness and 
voidability can be traced by distioguishin£~: the three periods, pre-
seventeenth century; seventeenth and eighteenth centurie~1 nineteenth 
century. It is proposed that the modern period be considered to 
commence with Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1~1!>] AC 120 where the 
House of Lords recognised, probably for the first time, thut admini~trative 
convenience could sometimes prevail over both private rights and Common 
Law standards. 
Before the seventeenth century no clear distinction had been drawn 
between voidness and voidability. lioldsworth (h.E.L. 7th Ed. Vol. I 213) 
shows that in medieval times a challenge to a d~cision was not 
distinguishable frCICl a personal or quasi criminal action against the 
judge. I'£aitlar,d states that "the idea of a compla.int against a 
judgement which is not an accusation against tLe judge is not easily 
formed (P & r.; ii 665). By the fourteenth century, however, the King's 
Bench was reviewing the decisions of inferior courts, by means of the 
writ of error, thE precursor of certiorari (1). Consequently the 
notion of a voidable decision can be regarded as prior, both logically 
and historically, to a void decision. It vas realised at this time 
that original proceedings bad to be determined before new could be taken. 
"One shall not have a writ of error before the original writ 
between the parties be determined, and they be vi thout day". { 2) 
Further, the face of the record rule was essential to writ of error 
proceedings. "A complainant could only succeed if be could point 
out an error in the record (3)". Writ of error, therefore, ley 
only to courts of record, and of these only to courts which followed 
the c.:41DU0n law. This limitation had an important effect on the 
development of certiorari in the seventeenth century. Courts of 
record, however, exercised many powers which would not be entrusted to 
administrative agencies, the Sew~ Commissioners in particular exercising 
a characteristic mixture of judicial aclministrati ve and legislative 
powe_r and playing an important part in the development of judicial. 
review (4). 
The notion that a decision can be null and void vas recognised as 
early as the fifteenth century. In Bowser v. Collins (1482) Y.B. 
22 Ed. IV 30 pl. 11 it vas recognised that no decision made by a 
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Court outside its jurisdiction could be res ijudicata becaune it was a 
nullity ab initio. Pigott pointed out that a writ of error would be 
inappropriate because the judgement could be challenged collaterally 
without being formally quashed. "If their patent does not give them 
power and authority it is non judice. A man shall have a traverse to 
a matter of record and also to a matter of fact in order to avoid such 
a record when the court has no jurisdiction". 
Two points are important here. Firstly, the el!lergence of a 
distinction between void and voidable was linked with the distinction 
between direct and collateral attack. The inconsistencies to be found 
in later years can be partially traced to the need to sho~ lack of 
juris<iiction in order to ground an action in tort. Secon:dly nullity 
vas equated with lack of jurisdiction, and with the result that different 
considerations governed challenge where the defect was not regarded 
as affecting jurisdiction. 'l'bus for defects within jurisdiction writ 
of error, and, (although some doubt exists on this point (5)) certiorari, 
was the appropriate remedy (6}. Rubinstein (7) &haws that as writ of 
error lay only to bodies giving judgements according to the canmon law 
it is likely that certiorari, being in effec·t similar to writ of 
error was developed to cover situations where neither collateral attack 
nor error were appropriate. However whatever the position was as to 
remedies for non-jurisdictional defects it is clear that the record 
could only be challenged where lack of jurisdiction was alleged {6}. 
From the beginning of the seventeenth century an increase in 
legislation in response to the social and economic changes of the 
-sixteenth· century meant a corresponding increase in the number of 
and powers of bodies charsed with decision maldng powers. The 
El.izabethe.n Poor Lalrs had given extensive powers to the Overseers of 
the. Poor and Justices of the Peace. Inc reased interest in nood 
control meant that increased powers were given to the S~er Commissioneers 
to enforce private duties, and to undertake new works. As well as this, 
a multitude of Courts, local and institutional such as that of the 
College of' Physicians made the traditional reJ:ledy of an action for 
damages against ofticians unsatisfactory as a hindrance to efficient 
govermnent. In 1616 the Pri'vy Council, Bacon being Attorney General, 
acting under prerogative powers forbade judicial interference with the 
Sewer Commissioners with reference to actions for trespass and false 
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imprisonment. However, in 1688 the prerogative conciliar courts, 
which bed exercised a jurisdiction corresponding to a droit 
administratif (9) vere abolished, ar.d revie'\i of the executive was 
left, as it is n~, to the ordinery Courts. As e result of this two 
developments increased the significance of the distinction between 
void and voidable decisions. 
Firstly a rule governinc actions in tort vas esteblished, pre-
serving a compramice between f'reedom of executive action end individual 
riE;hts ( 10) • The Harshalsec Case ( 1612) 10 Co I~ep 6e6 fonr.s a 
convenient landmark. Ar. action for false intprisonment we.s bl"6\igllt 
against officers of the Harshalsea Court who juatified themselves by 
an order of that Court on the bo.nis of a judgerner.t in assumpsit. 
Council argued (~706) that "admitting the court hc.a no jurisdiction, 
yet the proceeding in it (being a court of record), is not void, but 
voidable by unit of error". Coke however stated in unequivoca.l 
teres that lack of jurisdiction makes a decision a nullity ar.d permits 
ana action in tort, and also that no action lies "vhen a court has 
jurisdiction and proceeds inverse ordine" (at 76a). ThUE nullity, was 
linked witb lack of jurisdiction, and the consequences of nullity in 
permitting collatero.J attack ::nadc clear. Earlier decisions had sometimes 
proceeded upon the lnses of the inviolability of the record. In Rookes 
case 1598 it was held that even where jurisdiction was QUestioned the 
record could not be contradicted, but that Courts not of record could be 
subject to full review of legality (ll). 'l'his of course militates 
&Bainst a distinction based upon jurisdiction and nullity, and is 
inconsistent with decisions such as BcJBer v. Collins (nbove). 
However the principle in the Marshalsea case vas extended to 
Courts not of record, and later to all inferior tribtmals. Thus in 
the Exeter College Case, Phillips v. Bury (1692) Holt KB 715 Holt 
made it clear that if a person has judicial paver, his judgement, 
(of expulsion)" must have some effect to make a vacancy be it never 
so wrong (at 725). 
The Marshalsea principle has two aspects. In one sense it 
protects officials since their decision, if within jurisdiction 
cannot be collaterally challenged, but in another, it protects 
individuals, since i:t it is alleged that jurisdiction is lacking, 
the record affords no protection since it can be contradicted (13). 
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Indeed every point of jurisdiction vas required to be set out on the 
record. 
The second development vas the emergence of the prerogative 
writ certiorari to quash invalid decisions. Precisely how and 
when certiorari beca.t~e a general remedy in respect of administrative 
action is uncertain. Henderson would regard 1535 - 1680 as the relevant 
period (14) and Rubinstein traces the evolution of the writ from its 
origin as a means of obtaining information trom inferior tribunals 
as a result of the removal of their records to the Council and the 
Kings Bench~ to its modern fUnction of quashing the decision even where 
no formal record exists, as a develoJIIlent during the seventeenth century 
although, even during the fifteenth and sixteenth century certiorari 
being closely connected with the writ of error had been used as a 
means of review (15). 
However in Groenvelt v. Burwell 1700 1 Ld Raym 454 it was held 
that certiorari lies to "any court erected by statute" and will quash 
the proceedings of inferior bodies that have exceeded their jurisdiction. 
It can also be interred from this case that certiorari like writ of·error, 
could quash decisions for defects not affecting jurisdiction, although 
these must appear on the record. 
Holt in dealing with a complaint against the College of Physicians, 
held that, although writ of error would not lie ahce the jurisdiction 
vas not a common law one~ the party "bath as good a remed_v as a writ 
of error" in certiorari (at 469) • 
After this it was clearly established that certiorari lay for 
jurisdictional defects (16) .although here the implications of nullity 
were not, it appears, tully recognised, since as late as 1735 in R v. 
Oulton (Cas. t Hard 159,) it was held that the record could not be 
contradicted to prove a jurisdictional defect. 
limitation vas soon foresaken (17). 
However this 
The probable reason for the emergence of certiorari in the 
Seventeenth Century vas partly the need to find a new remedy after 
the abolition of the conciliar courts, and the increase in 
administrative powers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
and partly the need to provide tor situations which were covered, 
neither by the Marshalsea rule, which prevented collateral review 
of voidable decisions, nor by the writ of errors, which vas limited 
to common law courts of record. Thus certiorari was the only available. 
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remedy in respect of voiUable decisions of statutory bodies which were 
not constituted as Courts of Record. Nevertheless certiorari also 
was used to set aside decisions outside jurisdiction and it was in 
these terms that the remeey developed during tl1e eigi1teenth century. 
'r.uis dual :f'unction of certiorari, emphasised in Groenvelt v. Burnwell 
(10) contributes towards the confusion between the notions of void 
and voidable in administrative law, since in certiorari cases it 
was seldom necessary to distinguish between jurisdictional and other 
defects, and consequently little attempt was made to formulate a 
consistent theory detenaining vhich defects went to jurisdiction. 
It was only in 1951 in ex parte Shaw (1952) 1 Kh 33& that the dual 
role of certiorari was formally recognised as applicable to administrative 
tribuna.l.s (19). 
However in the context of tort actions there were several 
authorities dealing wit!1 this question. ·and the origins of a 
consistent formula for determining which defects went to jurisdiction 
can be detected. Thus in the Marsnalsea case, jurisdiction was 
treated as a matter of the right person determining the right subject 
matter, and in Terry v. Hm1tingdon 1668 Hardres 4&0 en action in 
Trover against the Excise Commissioners concerning an alleged mistake 
of fact, it was held that jurisdictional 1ilnits involveli place, person 
anu subject matter, anc't that any mistake as to these results in 
nullity. However in Gahan v. r.:aungay (1793) 1 Ridge L & S 20, 
although the vein and voidable distinction was insisted upon, 
jurisdiction was simply equated with '·authority to decide". 
Already the language used to imprecise enough to allow considerable 
uncertainty as to what amounts to a jurisdictional defect. In the 
Marshalsea ce.se, "subject matter'' referred to cause of action. while 
in Baggs Case 11 Co Pep 936, Colts included compliance with natural 
justice, and "sufficient cause", as necessary to the jurisdiction of 
a Corporation to disenfranchise a citizen (28). In Papillon v. 
Buckner Hardress 478 the notion of the Jurisdictional fact was applied. 
It was held that, altho\18h a wrong decision that a man vas a bankrupt 
~ make "all void" an erroneous finding by the Commissioners of Excise 
that certain liquors were "strong waters", did not allow an action in 
conversion.:;.~.. ·· 
Generally therefore, before the nineteenth century the distinction 
between void and voidable has been maintained in the context of 
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collateral proceeQings. lloldsworth says that "from tile cleys of the 
year books until the present day this diatinctiou between an abuse 
of jurisclictiou and an absence of jurisdiction has been maintained'' 
(21). 
This we.s not the position in certiorari cases. fartly because 
of the twofold scope of certiorari mentioned above, snt: partly; 
because of the n.eeu to overco111e privative cla~es, wi:licll af'ter about 
1670 appeared in variow; statutes in order to restrict judicial 
reviev by certiorari (22), the Courts extended the concept of 
jurisdictiou to include any error of law, in the light of tl1e rule 
established in n v. J.ioreley (1760) 2 Burr 104jJ that a privative 
clause clid not protect jurisclictiona.l defects. A further factor 
:from the second half of ~.:.he eighteenth century was that, if 
jurisdiction was questioned, the record was not conclusive. n1us 
Henderson {23) shows thu.t "the Courts appear to have equated 
juriGdiction with legality, and reviewed any objection based upon 
the language pf the statute by certiorari • whether or not it appears 
on the face of the record". And Rubinstein, referring to the evasion 
of privative clauses says "This simple expedient was too tempting for 
the judges w:no zealously guarded their supervisor/ jurisdiction over 
inferior tribWlals, and vho never considered conceptual cla:rity to be 
of primary importance '' ( 24). 
Uy the nineteenth century the distinction ·oetween void and 
voidable had been established in principle, but its application was 
obscured by the extension of the concept of want of jurisdiction in 
certiorari cases, to cover, potentially all reviewable defects. 
During the nineteenth century three developments further 
obscured the distinction. 
Firstly the Summary Jurisdiction Act lB48 greatly diminished 
the opportunity for review of decisions of magistrates courts for 
defects within jurisdiction, since it dispensed with the need to 
give full reasons for a decision providing only for a short formal 
record of conviction. The scope for review of error of law by 
certiorari vas limited to defects appearing in the record, but ''the 
face of the record spoke no longer; it vas the inscrutable face of 
a sphinx"(25). The formula contained in this act was applied to 
other statutory bodies, and resul. ted in a position where certiorari 
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became associated only with jurisdiction defeats, and as Lord Denning 
pointed out in Ex· P Shaw[1952] 1 KB at 348 its scope seemed to be 
forgotten in respect of' error _within jurisdiction (26). 
Seco~ the Writ of' Error was abolished by successive stages 
during the nineteenth centu.r.y, and as a result defects which had 
served as justification :fbr the issue of this reme~, in partiC\llar 
l!.'ITOr in Fact, were no lo~~ger utilised by the Courts, alt:Uuugh 
Gordon argues that certiorari original]¥ la-y for Error ci..ri Fact 1 
and that this nono..jurisdictional grolllld for review should therefore 
remain part Of the law. This view will be examined below (27 ). 
The result of these two factors was that lack of' juriadbtion 
became in- practice the only ground tor review. Naturally enough 
the Courts broadened still fUrther the class of' jurisdictional 
defects in order to preserve the power of review. 
This results in the concept of' jurisdiction losing its original 
significance 1 that is as a factor limit in€ judicial review, and 
became, in the words ot Frankfurter J. 'a verbal coat of' two mm:zy-
colours'. (28) 
)lore partiC\llarl.y, the link between jurisdiction and nullity 
was ~aY.ened, since the categories of' ,tlll'isd.ictional defects no\': 
included defects which earlier decisions had treated as voidable 
only. This applied partic.ularly to the ru.les of' natural justice 
(29) 1 and resulted in the modern view that some defects although 
amounting to ultra vi.,es are voidable only (30 ). 
The third development, perhaps by w~ of react ion against this 
extension of the concept of' jurisdiction, was the establishment: 
in a limited mmber of case.s, of an a priori theory of' jurisdiction 
based upon the mrrow notion of capaoit)' to enter the inquiry (31 ). 
This approach, similar to but narrower than the approach taken 
in earlier oases imrolving collateral attack treats the question 
of jurisdiction as determinable at the commencement ot the inquir.v 
am. thus regards ~ defect arisiDg at some later stage as DOt 
jurisdictional. This precludes the more important modern grounds 
for review fJrom being juriedictional., in particular, ahRence of 
na"turai justice, and abuse of' discretion. As a result the theory 
has an importam bearing upon the modern olaseif1oation of ultrA. 
vives (32), 8lld the distinction between voidl:less and voidabili't7• 
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In so far as this theo:cy purports to dietillguish between an erroneous· 
decision and one lacking jurisdiction it is acceptahle, but in that 
it goes fUrther and excludes the majo1•ity of grounds for review 
which are likely to arise in practice, it Hill be suggested that it 
is conceptual~ injustified and in practice too restric~ive. A 
signif'ioaut element in &.r\Y attempt to elucidate the modern law 
governing the effect of invalid decisioru; must be that th"' complex 
procedural requirements imposed by modern sUb.ttes and the largo amount 
of discretionary power entrusted to officials, require attention to 
be given to a much wider and more subtle re.nge of defects than were 
possible inthese earlier cases. In view of this, the historical 
precedentc: while valuable to elucidata broad principles, should not 
be relied upon to B.I\Y greater e:ctezrt. 
Conclusion 
It bas been attempted to show, firstly that the distinction 
between void and voidable decisions has a firm historical foundation, 
and that therefore it is misleading to regard the issue as involving 
a recent iq>ort of ideas from the law of contract (33). 
Secondly, it h1W been shown that the dint:!nc+.ion is linked 
with that between jurisdictional defects, and e:-rora within juris-
diction, aud thirdly that, like other aopects of judicial revie\·11 
this has developed in the formula.Iy context of particular remedies 
and means of review. There is an analogy between adminidrative law, 
even in modern times,' and the ear~ development of the law of contract 
out of particulai• f~l'UIB of action. 
Finally the ·notion of jurisdiction hae not been consiGt<ml:ly 
or exhaustive]¥ anal.ysed. The development of different remedies, 
and pressures trom changing ins·titutions and difiering legEI.ative 
and judicial policies, have affected the avnilal:Uiv of remedies and 
the classification of defects both of which predotermino the limi~s 
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PART II. THE CATEGORIES OF INVALIDITY 
-------------·----·-------
Historically the distinction between voidness, and voidability 
has corresponded with that between jurisdictional and other defects. 
This remains true today (1) since the ultra vires doctrine would be 
meaningless it a decision Which is ultra vires or outside jurisdiction 
were not to be regarded as a nullity. 
The rationale of jurisdiction has been explained by Diplock L. J. 
in Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1967] 2 .ALL.ER at 
993 (2). Jurisdiction means the power, conferred by statute to 
make a determination that will be recognised as effective by the 
executive branch of government, Who will be obliged to enforce it. 
Thus the power to make a decision is in this sense, no different from 
any other kind of power, involving an ability, conferred by law, to 
produce an alteration in a legal relationship. If the power does 
not exist, or it necessary conditions of its exercise are lacking, it 
cannot give rise to ettecti ve consequences. Any action taken in 
reliance upon a purported exercise or such paver would therefore be 
wrongtul, as lacking legal justification. To maintain that a 
decision can be ultra vires and yet have even a limited degree of 
effectiveness is a self contradictory proposition. 
act is ipso facto a nullity. (3) 
An ultra vires 
From this mu&t be distinguished a decision which is 'wrong'. 
The terms 'right' and 'wrong' have no objective significance in 
this context. A 'right' decision: is simply one to which effect 
must be given, because it is made by a person who possesses the 
statutory paver to produce such a decision. However a decision can 
be treated as 'wrong' if machinery exists by means ot which another 
person is entitled in specified circumstances to substitute his 
decision tor the one concerned, where the statute allows the executive 
to give ettect to the substituted decision. This situation arises 
vbere an appeal is provided. Here the original decision is effective 
unless and until another decision is substituted. Thus it is at most 
voidable. strictly the person authorised to make a aubs1!_ituted 
deci•ion cannot do this unless the original decision is in existence, 
and thus the two spheres, ot review, baaed upon the power ot the High 
Court to keep interior bodies vithin their jurisdiction (4), and ot 
appeal are separate. 
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In order to discover what defects affect the jurisdiction of 
a trib\Dl&l it is necessary to determine which defects are treated 
by the Courts as resulting in nullity. If a decision is voidable 
then ex hypothesi the tribunal has jurisdiction. It a decision 
is a nullity in the strict sense then conversely it is idle to 
regard the tribunal as having jurisdiction to make it. It however 
the Courts do not apply the consequences of nullity at all in this 
area of law, that is, it a decision without statutory authority is 
given even a limited and relative effect, it would be difficult to 
maintain that every exercise of power depends upon statutory authority. 
It is generally maintained that judicial review depends almost 
exclusively upon the ultra vires doctrine. (5) This can only be 
supported if all reviewable defects produce nullity, or it those 
that do not produce nullity can be explained as exceptional cases. 
Since authority to decide is generally conferred by statute, 
any kind of limit vbatsoever can be imposed by the statute upon the 
jurisdiction of the body concerned. However the categories of 
jurisdictional defect are rarely so specified ( 6) , and where they 
are not, it is open to the Court to determine which defects produce 
an ultra vires decision. In doing so, the overiding consideration 
in a system governed by statutory sovereignty must be the terms of 
the relevent legislation. Subject to this it is sUbmitted that no 
a priori conceptual formula can be produced which distinguishes 
jurisdictional 1'ram other detects. Arly kind of limitation can be 
placed upon a tribunals' power to decide, a limitation as to sphere 
of reasonableness, being no less logical than one as to procedure, 
persons or subject matter. It has been seen that the limits of 
jurisdiction and so of the Courts pavers of review have fluctuated 
between the Seventeenth Century and today. (Chap. 2 above) 
This refiects the changing attitude of Parliament and the Courts to 
the question of the extent to vbich judicial control over governmental 
powers should _be allowed. 
Henclerson ( T) outlines the relevent poliey considerations 
"1. '!here must be seneral standards of conduct and purpose 
for govermaent officials as well as tor private citizens ••• 
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2. It must be possible for the individual vhose activity 
or property is affected by Government action to test 
Whether Government Officials have applied those general 
standards properly. In our society a Court of general 
jurisdiction is the testing place so that, broadly 
speaking the same criteria of legality are applied .•••• 
to citizen and official alike. 
3. Sane kinds of decision must be lett to the final 
determination of the administrative officials ••.••• In 
modern society there is, and must always be room tor 
administrative discretion. 
It is therefore necessary to employ the ultra vires doctrine, 
assuming, without prejudice, that this is the main justification for 
judicial review, as a means to allow an administrative official to 
be secure against potential judicial intervention in respect of every 
error he may make, since this renders any independent authority Which 
he might possess, merely nominal. (8) (The establishment of a general 
right of appeal as opposed to reviev, raises different considerations 
and is, in principle, more acceptable.) At the same time the notion 
of jurisdiction must serve as a basis to allow the Court to intervene, 
vhere minimum standards of conduct are departed from, as well as vhere 
the express terms of a statute are violated. 
This is both a policy problem, to justif'y judicial reviev by 
distinguishing betveen problems justiciable by a general tribunal and 
those which should be lett to be dealt vith vithin the administration 
itself and a conceptual one, since it is necessary to provide clear 
and general rules to distinguish between decisions which the law will 
recognise, and those which, violating minimum standards of legality, 
the Executive will not be permitted to enforce. Rubinstein &8\Y'S ( 9) 
11Hothing is more conspicuous than the failure of English Law to evolve 
a consistent jurisdictional doctrine •••••• even elementary principles 
are subject to contlicting or irreconcilable vieva." 
Changes in judicial and legislative attitudes to governmental 
pavers and discretions, (10) and the reluctance of the Courts to 
attach the drastic consequences of nullity to ostensibly valid and 
bona fide decisions ( 11) have conditioned the Courts' treatment of 
the definition of jurisdiction, to such an extent that the nOtion 
has become, as shown above, (chapter 2) a 'coat of many colours'. 
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..Jnder the existing system of administrative law, the limits of 
judicial reviev can be altered by two devices, either by extending 
or curtailing the categories of jurisdictional defects, or by 
applying restrictive rules about remedies many of those available 
being discretionary. Failure to make explicit · which of these 
approaches is being utilized in a given situation, and to link 
the rules about remedies with those about the nature and effect of 
defective decisions have caused turther confUsion in distinguishing 
between void and voidable decisions (12). 
The majority of writers, and judicial pronouncements upon the 
subject of jurisdiction do not postulate e.n a priori farD1liJa which 
distinguishes between jurisdictional and other defects. Thus 
Yardley finds it unnecessary to sub classi:f'y the various grounds 
for judicial review (13) and both C:arner and Wade simply list the 
categories of reviewable defect under the general head of ultra 
vires (14}. Similarly in Anisminic v Foreign Compensation 
Conmdssion the House of Lords listed the main grounds of judicial 
review, describing them as jurisdictional, and as resulting in nullity. 
Lord Wilberforce (at 207) regarded these as ''certain fundamental 
assumptions which necessarily underlie the remission of power to decide, 
such es the requirements that a decision must be made in accordance 
with principles of natural justice and good faith". 
Thus the limits to jurisdiction can be imposed by means of 
judicial as well as legislative restraints. Even in cases where 
the express statutorJ requirements as to persons and subject matter 
are violated, the clearest examples of jurisdictional defects, it is 
still open to the Court to decide whether personal qualifications 
are directory or mandatory, and in particular whether sub-delegation 
is permissible, and if so to what extent ( 15) and where subject 
matter is in question to determine whether the tribunal itself is 
entitled to determine the limits of its sUbject matter (16). 
The authorities are agreed however that defects classifiable merely 
:::s error, do not affect jurisdiction. The rationale of this has 
been explained by Lord Summer in R v Nat Bell Liquors (above) on the 
basis that power to determine must include freedom to err or it 
would be nugatory, and the princ:i.ple vas restated by the House of 
Lords in R v.Governor of Brixton Prison ex p. Armah [1968] A.C 192 
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where Lord Reid said (at 234) "If a magistrate or any other tribunal 
has jurisdiction to enter on the inquiry and to decide a particular 
issue he does not destroy his jurisdiction by reaching a wrong decision". 
Nevertheless the distinction between error and jurisdiction is, as the 
decision in Anisminic bas recently shown by no means a precise one. 
In a wide sense any defect constitutes an error, but normally errors 
of' law in the sense of' misapplication of evidence or application of 
wrong criteria and errors of f'act are regarded as outside the 
jurisdictional principle (17). However in Anisminic it vas held by 
the House of Lords that the application of' a wrong criterion to elucidate 
the te:nn "successor in title" although itself' an error of' lav,resul.ted 
in a statutory tribunal exceeding its jurisdiction, since in treating 
a person as a successor in title who vas in the opinion of' the Court 
not a successor in title, the tribunal had based its decision upon an 
irrelevant factor, and so departed beyond its prescribed subject matter. 
This reasoning potentially extends the categories of jurisdictional 
defect to include any error of construction (18). Similarly although, 
in the absence of an appeal, error of' fact as such is not reviewable 
the Courts are prepared to set aside a decision where the tribunal bas 
erred as to a f'act relevant to its prescribed subject matter (19). It 
has been found difficult to distinguish this class of reviewable "facts'', 
(although many of these are upon closer analysis really questions of lav, 
being applications of statutory definitions ) from facts which affect 
"merits" and which are therefore within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
This matter will be discussed below. (See Chapter 7J 
Finally the Courts exercise review as opposed to appeal jurisdiction 
in respect of patent error of lav. Occasionally this has been taken to 
mean that this class of' defect is jurisdictional ( 20) , but this view is 
contradicted by the greater weight of authority which treats patent 
error as a exceptional ground for review, ( 21) • 
These specific problems will be examined below, but in this context 
it is sUbmitted that they militate against any conceptual explanation 
of jurisdiction which can at the same time provide useful policy guidance. 
However tvo attempts have been made to provide a theory of 
jurisdiction, both of which have innuenced the attitude of the judiciary 
and which therefore constitute a turtber complicating factor in any 
attempt to distinguish between void and voidable decisions. 
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The first is that of Dr. Rubinstein (22) who postulates a 
definition of jurisdiction-based upon the notion of ostensible 
authority. If a decision is apparently within the scope of its 
statutory authority then it should, at least prirua facie be given 
validity because this is rele.ted to ''the predictable capb . ..:ity of 
ordinary people tc- make a correct appreciation of the situation". 
(23) Conversly, a decision will be outside jurisC..iction where "the 
error committed by the tribunal is so manifest a departure frotn the 
authority of the statute that reasonable men actinr. in r,ood faith could 
not believe it to be within the scope of that authority". 
The rationale of this is obvious, and can be supported to same 
extent by analogy with the doctrine of apparent authority in Agency. 
However the elerr.ent of public interest in the limitation of statutory 
powers distinguishes the two situations, and it s clear that this 
doctrine is not reflected by the majority of authority in as far as it 
purports to provide a test of general appliction. Thus in Anisminic 
a decision \6.8 held to be void as a result of a defect caused by a 
highly technical error of construction and the question of ostensible 
authority was not referred to in deciding whether what was done 
constituted a "determination" for the purpose of a privative clause. 
Nevertheless in isolated groups of cases where the question of 
nullity has arisen, some support is to be found for this principle, 
particularly in situations where the extreme consequences of null.i ty 
would cause inconvenience. 
Thuo in Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C. [1956] A.C. 736, where a 
privative clause purported to prevent a decision from being challenged 
in the Court, the House of Lords refused to review a decision taken as 
a result of fraud on the ground that it was protected by such a clause. 
Lord Radcliffe however thought that the clause would not have any effect 
where the defect was "branded upon the face" of the decision whereas 
an order not patently defective "is still an act capable of legal 
consequences. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law 
to get it ••. upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible 
purpose as the most impeccable of orders". 
Similarly in Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan (1874) LR 5P 'C-714 
"manifest want of jurisdiction" vas regarded as allowing the court to 
exercise a power of review in the face of a privative clause. This 
doctrine has been utilized in this context by Australian Courts ( 24) • 
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Decisions which al.low validity to the acts of de facto offices 
are based UJlOn the same rationale ( 25) as perhaps are those cases 
which hold that the otherwise discretionary remedies of prohibition and 
perhaps certiorari cannot be refused if' a jurisdictional defect appears 
upon the face of the order (26). 
However these are isolated authorities and Rubinstein recognises 
that this view is not supported by the majority of decisions. It is 
suggested that this approach is unsatisfactorJ as a gen~ral basis for 
judicial review.in as much as it requires different principles to be 
a~lied, depending upon whether challenee is direct or collateral. 
Ostensible e.uthority does not give sufficient scope for intervention 
when a decieion is sought to be set aside by meBllB of the prerogative 
ordere or a declaration whereas its application is more convincing where 
the validity of the decision becomes indirect~y relevant in an independent 
legal issue. Thus in D.P.P. v. Head [1959] 1 A.C.83 the respondent 
was convicted of an offence againot a woma.n "under detention in an 
Institution" under Mental Health Legislation. The l!ouse of Lords held 
that his conviction should be quashed as a certificate which authorised 
the conviction was defective. Lord Denning dissented on this point on 
the ground that the certificate beinc within jurisdiction was only 
voidable and therefore the woman was, at the relevant time lawfully 
detained. A more setisfRctory result could, it is surgested have been 
achieved hao a doctrine of ostensible validity been applied, which 
itself would have been consistent with the policy behind the creation 
of this statutory offence. However this doctrine would produce justice 
only in situations, such as this where the validity of administrative 
action is genuinly incidental, and should only be applied as the basis 
of the void voidable distinction in conjunction with a system of direct 
attack which is independent of the question of jurisdiction. otherwise 
the position would resemble that postulated by Blackburn J. in Pease v. 
Ch~or (1863) 3B2S620, who was prepared to regard "jurisdiction" as 
governed by different principles in a collateral action in tort than 
if direct review were utilized. This adds further confusion to the 
already complex rules about choice of remedy. 
'lhe second attempt to produce a rationale of jurisdiction enjoys 
more support from the cases. 'l'his is the "pure theory of' jurisdiction 
propounded by D. M. Gordon in a series of articles published between 
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1927 and 1966 ( 27). 'Ihis review regards jurisdiction as o. matter of 
capacity to investigate a prescribed subject metter and to cake a 
determination thereon. If a body hac such capacity, nothing done in 
the course of such determination cnn remoYe its jurisdiction. Thus 
only one question is relevant to determine jurisdiction. Is the 
trib\Ulal the right one'l This involves detern..ininc; whether the body 
concerned is the tribunal authorised by statute and whet.he:r that body 
is dealing with thP. issues entrusted to jt by statute. Any decision 
upon a matter which tha tribunal has to decide is conclusive, in the 
absence of a right of appeal. Thus if a rent trib\.lnal is empOYered 
to tix rent for furnished premises, its decision upon that point is 
necessarily within jurisdiction, even thoup,h if wrong the tribunal will 
be dealing with unauthorised subject matter. Gordon finds it illogical 
that a tribWlal c&~ have jurisdiction to detem.ine a matter, which if 
wrongly determined, results in loss of jurisdiction. But in every 
case a tribWlal or Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction. 
The theory of judicial review would be self defeating if a wrong 
decision upon Ld:s matter was itself within jurisdiction. This 
suggests that the pure theor-.r is unsound. 
'l'Yiis theory, is similar to but narrOYer than, the a-pproach seen in 
Seventeenth Century decisions upon collateral attack (28). It involves 
a mechanical test for establishing jurisdiction~ which :is '-•PPlicable 
only at "the commencement of the inquiry'' _(29). Thus many procedural 
errors, including breach of the rules of natural justice, as well as 
mistakes of law, fact and abuse of discretion will never be jurisdictional. 
Gordon justifies this narrow formulation by assuming that certiorari bas, 
historically had a wider scope than at present. extending to many kinds_ - . --
of non-jurisdictional defect. This view is extremely doubtful ( 30) and 
except in the case of patent error of law does not represent the modern 
position. However Gordon accepts that the need to extend this sphere 
of judicial review has caused this narrow formulation to be distorted, 
and the clear distinction between nullity and voidability based upon 
capacity to decide to be overlooked. 
This approach which provides an a priori test of jurisdietion bas 
affected the-approach of both judges and writers to the concept of 
jurisdiction. Thus in R v. Bolton (1841) 6G.B Lord Dennison said ''The 
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question of jurisdiction does not depend upon the truth or falsehood of 
the chnr~e, but on its nature. It is determinable on the c~encement 
not at the conclusion of the enqdry''. This dictUil has been treated 
as a locus classicus supporting a narro"'-r concept of jurisdiction but, 
in the li~t of the facts of the case, which co:1cerned a wrong finding 
by justices that the def~ndent vas a pauper and therefore eligible to 
be evicted frOI!l a parish house, is si:cpl:r autllori t;;r for the elementary 
princi~le that a wrong finding as such does not deprive n tribunal of 
jurisdiction. Sit:dlarl~· Griffiths and Street (31) sut;gezt that the 
distinction between void:.1es~ and voie!ability may lie between lack of 
jurisdiction, dete:r:cinl.l.ble at the commence:nent of the inq_uir.r and abuse 
of jurisdiction involvinG defects arising at n later stnge usually 
involving an abuse of discretion. The llouse of Lords in Anisminic v. 
Foreign Coo.pensation COlrission confronted idth a diecrepenc~' bet\leen 
the pure theory and authority that other defects res...U..ted in nullity 
distinguished between n narroH strict sence of jurisdiction involving 
a commence:cent of inquiry test, and lack of jurisdiction in a wider 
sence extending to defects of motive and reasoning. It is clear 
however frao the S?Ceches of Lord Reid, and Lord Pearce that the 
consequences of both types of jurisdictional defects arc the same. In 
the Court of Appeo.l Diploe!: L. J. had employed an approach similar to, 
but some\rhat "Wider than, that of Gordon treating four ty?es of defect 
as affecting juriG<!iction. 
1. The authority must be properly qualified 'Which includes absence 
of bie.s. 
2. There must (U3ually) be an inquicy. 
3. The case must be of the kind described in the Statute which 
descr2ption includes, inter alia vords identi1'ying parties 
and subject matter. 
4. The determination must state whether a situation of the kind 
described in the statute exists. 
Except that Gordon ,.,auld not regard observance of nntural justice as a 
condition of jurisdiction this approach is based upon the idea of 
capacity to consider a prescribed subject matter which excludes the 
imposition of restrictions as to the manner in which the power is to be 
exercised. Gordon finds it ''astonishing that it should ever seem 
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plausible to contend that the v~· a pover is used. can ehov that the pover 
does not exist, Proceeding!> without jur:iseiction are CORM: NON ~TUDICE, 
but hov can a judge be e.ny less of a jud~e b~· :merel:•r blundering." ( 32) 
It is suggested that the pure theory is base<" upon E'. misconception 
as to the meaning of ca~acity, end upon en unduly rigid classification 
· of defects. Capacity simpl:: means the abilit~.· tc. effect e change in a 
legal relationship~ and as such is as Hade shows ( 34) syrrononous and 
not at variance with the notion of pm.,er or e.uthcrit.;r. 
in AnisrrJ.nic shows that in the context of decision rnakinr rover the 
po\rer or ca.pRcity concerned consists of the e:hility to brin,z about a 
state of affairs which those reeponoible for enforce~ent racbinery 
will be bound to recoenise and to e;i ve effect. Thus the operative 
moment to determine when jurisdiction exists, is, it is surzested ~~en 
enforcement becomes necessary. Only then coes. the issue become 
material, because until then no e.lteration :i.n the individuals' legal 
position ha.B been r.mde and therefore the que!'lticn of pmrer does not 
arise. If this view is accepted t~ere is no difficulty in treating 
jurisdictional defects e.s ad.sing at any ~tar;e.·:in the proceedings, 
since it is when the final decision becomes effective that the necessary 
requirements of validity n..ur.t be esta'hlishef .. It is JlC9dcle to 
distinr,uish between defect~ of jurisd.iction "'hic~1 rreve~.1t tht:: tribunal 
frorr. corr.n;encine: its inc..u~-r:. , and those which arise at ll lnter stnge, 
and this may be ml'.terial in cases vhere it is SO'..lght tc inw~inate not 
merely the final decision lmt the whole proceedinr:s elJ initio. Lord 
Evershed in Ficre v. Bald:•:in (1.963) 2 ALL.EP. at 88 distinguished 
between a decisio:1 tho.t is ~. nullity el thow:l~ the rroceedin~s up to its 
pronouncement were pro]"ler ar.d effective, anC: situations where the e",tire 
proceedinr.s are ineffective. Tr.is niay be material in nature.l justice 
eases where a complete rehearinr is demanded. 
Apart from these considerations it doee not seem lor,h:ally necessary 
to assume with Gorden that Jurisdiction once squired cannot be lost. 
One aspect of jurisdiction is capfl.city to enter upon the inqui~ s but 
if Pe.rlirune-nt ce!l impose any linits whatsoever to the juriflc.iction of 
a statutorJ body, there is no reason ;rhy the Courts should not impose 
standarcs of fairness, relevance and procedure upon the pO"W"ers of an 
inferior body. The extent to 'Which the Courts should impose such 
- 30 -
l~tations is a catter ot policy rather than logic, and this is vbat 
distinguishes defects as to mode ot exercise of '!"Wet f'rcnr. lacl. or 
cap11city in a narrov sense. Thus DiploeJo; L. J. in Garthvsite v. 
Ce..rthvaite [ 1964] P. 356 at 357 said that Jurisc1iction, in a vide 
sense, embraces the "settled practice of' the Court'' no to the va:,• it 
vill exercise its 'JX)Ver. In the case of inferior tribunals this 
''practice" is i:npooec\ by .Pt:.rliament or the revievin;~ Court. 
Finall.v Gordon appear!" to clasai:t,or the variour. types of de-fect 
in an unduly rigid manner. He distinguishes bet~en error of lev 
and lack ot jurisdiction and between the procedure and definition of 
n tribunal. It ie 11ubrd.tted that ntan:r defects eM be clasoified in 
alternate v~s vith ditterinr. consequences. 'nluc bios can be 
rettarded o.s an aspect of' natural justice M" th~refore ns vronr: 
procedure. but alternativel.v can be treated as affecting the qualificat-
ions of the tribunal and thus as jurisdictional. This vae tt.e ap:proach 
of the Court of Appeal in Anism.irde. Similarly an error of lav ean have 
numerous different results. In Aniaminic an error of construction 
resulted in the tribunal considerine: an irrelevant matter. In other 
caseo an error of definition may result in the tribunal consirlerinf the 
vrong Gubjeet matter as vhere a Rent ~~ibunel erroneously dccidee that 
the prenisea in question are furnished. r.ordon would de~r thAt. this 
type of error artects jurisdiction as this ie one of the iusuea thP.t the 
tribunal oust consider if it ia to reach a deciDion. ~'his rationn.le 
aakeo statutory li~itations upon sUbject ~atter vorthleso. Failure to 
eomply vitb the audi alterBJU partem rule can be regarded as & defect 
sui generis, or ao a tailure to eanply vi tb en implied procedural 
requirement, vhile the categoriee ot abuse of r>CNerl, unreasonableness .. 
icproper purposes, fraud or irrelevant coneiderationo overla~ 
considerably, vi tb each other ao vell as vi th requireuents o.s to subject 
matter. 
It ia submitted that it is not the nature of the detect in itnelr 
that governs the question or jurisdiction, but its effect, vhetlaer it 
results in an infrinper1ent ot the limits to the tribunals freeCiom imposed 
by farli~nt ae to subject matter or by the Court as to mode of exercise. 
Doth t)11eB of limitation upon th~ exercise of power are rrir.:e facie perc-
isaable. 
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The pure thP.o!j•, ia inconsistent "ri th the fl.tti tude of the House 
of Lord!: in Jl.r:isrtinic. Their Tordships vithout ~rodu~in~ a. general 
forrula lbted the vnrious co.ter:ories of' defectn "'~ich prochtce nullity. 
Th(.e include defccte substrable under a. coll!I"'ence:D"ent of in~uiry te3t, 
but else e:r.tend to defect[! of procedure, frau~ tre conAidere.tion of 
irrelevant r1ntterr., e.nr the e:r.clusior. of rele-·.·ert nettcrs. 
Hovever, the defects where there is doul'-t a.P to tb~ ~uestion of 
vcidnes~ anc_ voiclnbilit~·, are thosP. '1-rhiC'h the "pure theor.•" do not 
trec.t nz jurisdictior.r.J., procedural errors, nature.l ,hmtic~, error of 
lm~ or fnct, anC. abuse of discretion. . DefectA S'l!rsur:tr.hlc ur.der the 
CoiJI!lenccr:ent of the ir.nuiry test ere e.lwo:-,rs tret>.ted ero jurisdictional. 
Thus a. decision tnken by a pernon unauthorised bJ• statute ic alwa:•s 
treated o.s ultrr. vires end void ( 33). Problenr; vhich nrice in thio 
arcn are cnusec ~Y m1bi~ous classification. rometimea n tribunal is 
i~roperly qualified cminr, tc P. r~·c cedural defect anc1 this influences 
the Court in deci~inc; whether the re::mlting decision is n nullity (34). 
A cor.rlaint bo~ed upon failure to rive a hearinr coul~ obscure a 
situation where there is unautho~ine~ sub dele~ntion of the power to 
decide ( 35) a;.1d here too the effect cf the C.edsion ma~· derend upon 
which classification ie selected. 
It is ::mbmitteC. that the Pure thecry is not, M has teen c.nvoce.ted 
by its r.1ain propo11Bnt logicnlly necessary as an explnne.tion of 
juri~diction. ann as a matter of policy, it fails to provide the Court 
'With adequnte scope to deal 'ri.th all the defects which havt· been held 
to be reviellnbl£>. 
It provideR an ex:rlenntion of only one possible rec.u:i.rement of 
jurisdiction, that of O:nitial capacity. vhich :i A probahl~r the least 
common area ir. which complaints occur. In the follm.d.nr.: chApters the 
main categories of reviewable defect \nll be examined, with reference 
to the influence of the pure theory, in order to deterrn:i.ne whether the 
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ChAPTER 4 ~OCEDUT~ DEFECTS 
----·--
Gordon objecto to the notion that proccC:Ul'o.l defects may affect 
jurisdiction, upon the ground. tho.t miscnrriageo durin~ the inquiry 
cannot nullify and constitute nt most, error of la·.;. Fe regards it 
as illogical, firstly tlmt a tribunal, havinc jt~isdiction at the 
outset, can subsequently lose jurisdiction, and secondly tlw.t errors 
of law or procedure: should be divided into two catet.;orites based upon 
the seriousness cf tl•e defect, or upon any other criterion vhich he 
recardv as ar'titrr.;J.·~· (1). I!c citco authority to Bho..., that procedural 
defects are not necessr~ily treated as jurisdictional, but nevertheless 
recoc;niscu the.t hif; contention io not fenerall:l' sul'ported l>y the 
authorities. 
It has been suggested, above, the.t the cOI:mtence::.Ient of inquiry 
test is not ~ necessRry lo~:;icul solution to the pro'IJler.: of jurisdiction. 
The limita to jurisdiction can be set by the court, Rnd it is when 
the decision is made and not at the co~encemcnt of the decision 
making process that the q_ue~tion of validity becor.:es relevant. Thus 
any defect occurinr. before that fJOiilcnt can, in princ i:nle be treated 
ao jurisci.ictiona.l. Gordon's other objection althouf::h recognising 
that, as e. matter of convenience, it would be wronc to trent all 
errors as jurisdictional, does it is succested put too high a pre~ium 
upon conceptual exactitude. Distinctions based upon Cie(ree of 
importaiJce, essentially value judE;er:entc, rc:.ultinr; fror' an accumulation 
of factors, are used throughout the law, nnd ere i'rec,uently a basis 
for classification. This is so for cxaT:"~)le in the cace of the 
distinction between contractual conditions o.nd warranties. Value 
judr.ements of this type are a basic element in ler:al techniques (2), and 
theil- ~rt.ance is u:.derestimatec by stie;:ma.tizin~; then as arbitrary. 
Gordon finds it ''astonisllin£ that it should seet! plausible to 
contend that the vay a paver is used can shov that the paver does not 
exist". Is not the converse position more acceptable? IUl persons 
having power, must operate ,.fithin a minimum procedural context. The 
rules of procedure exist partly in order to define and id~ntifY the 
tribunal. Thus as Dias points out (3), (albeit in a different context), 
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if the reigning monarch makes a declaration with the unanimous assent 
of all the members of both Houses of Parliament assembled, for example, 
at a garden party, that would not become binding. Onl.y when the 
correct procedural machinary is harnessed, is the exercise of power 
meaningf'ul.. (Indeed this is perhaps the defining characteristic 
of a legal system (4) ) 
Thus potentially, all procedural defects, are capable of 
nullifying. This would however be extremely inconvenient in view of 
the technical complexities of modern statutory procedures. The 
Courts therefore distinguish between those procedural re~uir~ents 
which are essential to the jurisdiction (mandatory) and thoaewhich 
are merely directory and do not necessarily invalidate. The 
distinction between them is a question of degree based upon the imr~rtance 
of the particular requirement concerned. (5) 
Unfortunately apart from this wide principle, the authorities are 
contused. 
employed. 
The terms mandatory and directory are not consistantly 
There is authority firstly that failure to comply with a 
directory provision does not effect validity at all, and gives no 
ground for challenge, and that tailure to comply with a mandatory 
requirement makes a decision either void or voidable (6). This is 
curious, involving as it does the proposition that observance of a 
statutory requirement can be dispensed with without the attachment 
of any sanction. Secondly there is some authority that evan a 
directory requirement must be substantially complied with (7) and 
thirdly that failure to comply with a mandatory provision results in 
nullity, but that a decision involving contravention of a directory 
principle is voidable (8). This, it is submitted is the most 
acceptable approach. If mandatory procedural requirements are 
essential, then they should constitute conditions to jurisdiction. 
A tribunal which disregards these cannot therefore be regarded as 
exercising the jurisdiction intended by Parliament. Failure to 
comply with any other procedural requireJ!lent, even if trivial, is techn-
ically a mistake of law, and therefore, assuming the existence of 
appropriate methods of challenge, should prima facie constitute a 
ground tor setting aside the decision. It upon a correct interpretation 
of the statute the Court is of the opinion that the defect conce~ned 
should not ettect validity at all, then it can, in its discretion retuse 
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a remedy. This analysis has the advantage of simplicity, vbile 
oervine the same policy ends, as the alternative approacheo, and it 
is subtlitted thnt modern authority surportn thic viev. Man;r of the 
decisions cited to support the propooition that failure of a 
director:r rcquireoent does not effect validity are cases where it vas 
necessary to establish nul.lity • and thus the possibility of the 
decision being voidable was i.JQmaterial. Thuo in !!ailey v. 
'lol'illiar.son the plaintiff relied UJlon the invalidity of a regulation 
whic!l had not been lai(~ before Parliament as the statute required. by 
vay of c. defence to a prosecution. This voul.d only suceed if the 
defect made the by lav void at initio. And in Havard v. 1~dington, 
Lord :Penzance, holdine that a decision of a Bishop under the Public 
Worohi:p Herulation Act 1874 vas void for non complience vith statutory 
provisions as to time distinguiohed betvcen ~perative conditions 
v1ach if not complied vi th result in the nullity of all ouLsequent 
proceedir~r,s and provisiono which are 'mnndatory or director/' vhere 
''altholl€h such provisions have not been COJI11=1lied with, the subsequent 
proceedint.:s do not fail" . It vac not relevent, to determine 
whether lack .of a directorJ requirc.ent al.lovs any form of cba.llenge. 
In more recent cases it has been held tbat vhile failure of a 
mandatorJ• condition nullifies. defects arising out of directory 
requir~ento also constitute ground for reviev. Tnun in Chapman v. 
Earl an application to a rent tribunal ommitted to specify the ncount 
of rent claim.ed. It was lleld that this vas a mandator.{ requirement 
which nullified, so that the appropriate r~edy vas reviev in certiorari 
rather than 'by vay of appeal under S9 of the Tribunal.a and Inquiries Act 
l95c. Had the provision betvcen merely directory the defect could have 
been vaived. Considerable authority supports the proposition that if 
the requirement is directory a defect can be cured by ve.i ver or 
consent (9). These cases voul.d of course be meaningless if such a 
decision vas unchallengable, but in viev ot the proposition that a 
nullity cannot be waived (10), support the viev tbat defects in respect 
Qf director/ procedural requirements result in a voidable decision. 
Gordon cites suchmees as evidence that no proce~ural defect affects 
jurisdiction (11). liovever, be gives very little attention tc the 
distinction between mandator.{ and direc:tolj· requirements, and hie 
discussion appears to overlook the fact that in many of the cases the 
question of waiver vas treated as depending upon the effect of the 
particular provision upon the jurisdiction of the tribunal (12). 
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In Edvick v. Sunbury upon Thames Urban District Council [1962_] 
l QB 229 it was held that a notice of refusal of planning permission 
was void because it had been served outside the statutory time limit. 
Salmon J. equated disregard of a mandatory requirement vith nullity. 
In James v. Minister of Housing(l961)failure by a local authority to notify 
a planning decision to the applicant va.s held not to nullity. Lord 
Denning M.R. said (at 142) "I think the procedural requirements are 
directory only. The grant or refUSal of permission a:rter tvo months 
is not void, but at most voidable. Finally in R v. Minister of 
Health ex p. Yaffe [1931] A.C. 494 a local authority improvement scheme 
vas challenged, upon the ground that certain procedural requiret:J.ents as 
to form had not been complied with. The scheme was protected by a 
privative clause of the "as if enacted in the Act form. The House 
of Lords thought that the privative clause would protect a scheme only 
if what is done falls within the limits of the conditions founding 
the Ministers jurisdiction. A scheme which failed to comply with 
imperative requirements would not be a scheme within the meaning of 
the Act. However the majority held that the scheme submitted was a 
valid. The provisions not COmPlied with were not imperative, and any 
defects had in fact been cured. 
These decisions support the proposition that failure to comply 
with a mandatory requirement results in nullity, and that even if the 
requirement is directory only, the Court can in appropriate 
circumstances set aside the decision as voidable. 
The only express modern authority that non compliance with a 
mandatory requirement does not necessarily affect Jurisdiction and 
nullity is the decision of the Queens Bench Division in Brayheads 
(Ascot) Ltd. v. Berkshire County Council [1964} l ALLER 149. The 
applicants had been served with an enforcement notice alleging breach 
of a condition which vas attached to a grant of planning permission. 
They contended that the condition was a nullity in that in the initial 
notice of grant no reasons had been specified for its imposition 
contrary to the statutory requirements. 
It vas held that even though the procedural requirement concerned 
vas mandatory, it did not follow that non compliance made the decision 
void. It is submitted that this viev is inconsistant with the weight 
of authority and also inconsistant with the rationale of an imperative 
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requirement. In as far as the authorities are agreed that some 
procedural requirements nullity vhi1e others do not, the inconsistancy 
may merely be a terminological one. Nevertheless in as far as 
mandatory conditions aXl of which are regarded as essential require, 
on this view, to be further sub-divided in those that nullif'y and 
those that result in voidability only, it is difficult to determine 
the principle upon which such a distinction should be based. 
Similarly this view allows for the proposition that disregard of a 
directory requirement does not carry any consequences vbatsoever. 
To regard such defects as voidable only, allows a discretion to the 
Court to uphold a decision where the defect has caused no harm or 
injustice. The existing contusion-allows the same discretion to 
be exercised only by way of manipulation of the terms directory, 
mandatory and imperative. 
The distinction drawn by the Courts between mandatory and 
directory requirements suggests that mandatory requirements are 
regarded as affecting jurisdiction. The general test employed is 
the importance of the particular provision in the light of the 
governing statute (13) • Thus where the amount of rent to be 
claimed was not specified in an application to a rent tribunal it 
vas held that the decision was void, upon the ground that Parliament 
did not intend the jurisdiction of the tribunal to extend to fixing 
the rent for itself. Thus the requirement was deemed to be 
mandatory ( 14) • Conversley in Franc is Jackson Developinents v. Hall 
(1951) 2 KB 488 an application by a sub-tenant to a rent tribunal 
had tailed to specify the Landl.ord 's name correctly. His lessor, had 
served a notice to quit and the Landlord in his turn brought an action 
for possession of the premises. A notice to quit could not take 
effect vhile an application was before the tribunal. Thus the 
Landlord's claim depended, inter alia upon whether the procedural 
detect resulted in the application being a nullity. The Court of 
Appeal relying upon the distinction between directory and mandatory 
requirements held that the omission did not nullity, since to have 
such effect would prejudice the kind of person likely to take 
advantage of such procedures,- being usually without professional 
advice. 
Griffiths and street (15) suggest that the distinction between 
procedural requirements that affect jurisdiction and those tha1t 
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do not depends upon the commencement of inquiry test. Thus no defect 
committed in the course of inquiry will nullify. This view, somewhat 
wider than that of Gordon is not supported ~~ the authorities mentioned 
above. Other tests have been employed which are inconsistent with this. 
In Cullimore v. Lyme Regis Corporation [1962] 1 QB 718, a Coast 
Protection Scheme made by the defendents was made without complience 
with statutory provisions concerning service of certain notices. 
Edm\Uld Davies J. held that the particular provision was mandatory and 
that non complience therefore nulli'fied. He based his decision upon 
the distinction between a statute conferring powers, and one 
conferring duties. In the former case procedural requirements will 
be strictly construed whereas where a duty is involved the Court will be 
more willing to treat such requirements as directory in order to facilate 
performance in the public interest. 
It is submitted therefore that the distinction between directory 
and mandatory requirements governs that between voidness and voids.bility, 
and that the conceptual commencement of the inquiry test·offers no 
acceptable solution to the problem of drawing such a distinction. It 
is open to the Court in the light of its opinion as to the effect of 
the defect upon the policy of the statute (16) to detennine which 
provisions affect jurisdiction. Non compliance with other procedural 
requirements allows the Court to set aside the decision provided that 
machinary for quashing exists and subject to any rules that allow the 
Court a discretion to refuse e. remedy. 
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The authorities as to whether breach of the bias rule, and of the 
audi alteram partem rule produce nullity are in some contusion (1). 
Breach of the audi alteram partem rule vould not, under the pure 
theory atfect Jurisdiction, although occasionally the somewhat 
arbitmry diatinction has been made between a t'ailure of natural 
justice before, and one during the inquiry (2). On the view of 
jurisdiction taken above, it is submitted that, in principle at any 
rate there is no reason why observance of both rules should not be 
a requirement of Jurisdiction. Jlovever, even where the pure theory 
is not relied upon breach of the rules of natural justice is of'ten · 
treated as a ground or review in i te own right, separately trom ul tre. 
vires (3). This can of course be accounted tor in view of the 
intrinsic importance of natural justice, but apart trom expository advant-
ases such classification is inconaistant with the general principle 
that review, apart trom ultra vires, is only justified where the 
defect concerned is patent. which is unlikely to be the case where 
natural justice is concerned (4). 
It ia possible to claasity natural justice within the ultra vires 
principle, as a species ot procedural ultra vires (5) or in the case 
of the bias rule aa a matter affecting the qualifications of the 
tribunal (6). However the mode of classification within the ultra 
vires principle is a samevhat sterile question. It breach or natural 
justice produces nullity, it must. however clasasitied, be regarded as 
a head ot ultra vires. 
Before ezamining the lllOdern authorities, it should be noticed 
that an historical objection, exists in the case ot both rules of 
natural justice, to resardinc such detects as jurisdictional. Gordon 
cites authority, purporting to Bhov that bias and failure to hear were, 
before the end of the Bineteenth Century. treated as error in fact, a 
non jurbdictioll&l. defect, which vas remedied by the writ of error (7). 
This :raedy did not lie to &1.1 inferior tribunals ( 8) and Gordon argues 
that error in tact vas remedied b;y certiorari in ai tuations where the 
vri t of error did DOt lie. Thus despite the obsolescence of vri t of 
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error (9) error in tact is theoretically still available as a ground 
just;S;tying the issue ot certiorari. 
Both these assertions are only tenuously supported. There is 
authority tram the Seventeenth Century that bias ( 10) and the audi 
alteram partem rule (11) go to jurisdiction and result in nullity, and 
tl"om the middle ot the eighteenth century it has been established that 
non jurisdictional detects were reviewable only if patent (12) but 
that the record could be traftrsed vhere lack ot jurisdiction vas 
alleged. Both bias and failure to hear are unlikely to be disclosed 
by the record. Gordon is ot the opinion however, that extrinsic 
evidence vas available to ahov error in fact. However the authority 
he otters conaiats in the main of bias cases, which vere often 
treated as inwlving Jurisdiction. In certiorari cases the face of' 
the record rule has been relied upon without distinction between the 
two kinds ot non-jurisdictional detect (13). 
Secondly even assuming that extrinsic evidence lay for error of' 
fact (14), it is by no means certain that certiorari did so. Gordon 
admits (15) that "it is almost impossible to tind any clear reference 
to erl'Or ot tact •••• in connection vith certiorari proceedings". 
Thus, ae extrinsic evidence vas necessary to show bias, want of' 
jurisdiction could well have formed the basis for intervention by 
means ot certiorari. Yardley distinguishes between courts of common 
lav and statutory tribunals denying that in the latter context bias 
vas to be regarded as error ot tact (16). Be argues that the concept 
of error in tact is now detunct. 
It is submitted therefore that the earlier authorities should be 
treated vith caution. Moreover even if natural justice has not 
alv~ been treated as jurisdictional, : the meaning of' jurisdiction 
has fluctuated tram the seventeenth century to the JZ"esent day, and 
thus there ia no :reason in principle vby both bias and failure to 
hear should not to&Q' be among the heads of' ultra vires. 
'Dle tvo rules will be discussed eeparately. 
i'he authorities supporting the proposition that bias results in 
a wic1able deciaion are not impressive. In modern times the issue 
has not directly riaen tor determination. Nevertheless in Metropolitan 
Pl'Operty Co. 'Y. Laanon \1969) vhere a decision of a rent tribunal 
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vas quashed by certiorari, Lord Denning M.R. regarded it as an 
inarguable proposition, thA.t a biased decision vas voidable only. 
Only six decisions can be regarded as firmly supporting this 
proposition (17) and each ot these is inconclusive as authority. 
The leading case is Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, an appeal f'rom 
a decision of the Lord Chancellor declaring that the respondent 
Company vas a beneficiary in a certain estate. It was argued that the 
Lord Chancellors decree was vitiated by bias, as the Lord Chancellor 
held shares in the respondent comp&JJy. The issue ot voidness or 
voidability vas material as, before the appeal, the applicant had 
given notice that he intended to treat the respondent company as a 
trespasser and took steps to impede its use of the land in question. 
It vas held by Parke B, spealdng tor the judges of England, to whom 
the question had been referred that the Lord Chancellor's decision vas 
voidable only, and thus effective until set aside on appeal. However, 
this vas unnecessary tor the result, since the Vice Chance~or, whose 
decision vas not effected by bias, had made an order in the lover Court 
which had the same effect as that made by the Chancellor, and this 
prevented the respondent tram being a trespasser. Moreover the 
decision in this case has been distinguished (18) on the basis that the 
decision in question vas that ot a superior court, the decisions ot which 
can in practice only be voidable and not void. A superior court has 
jurisdiction to determine the limits ot its own jurisdiction, and thus 
any wrong conclusion can itself only constitute error within Jurisdiction 
(19). In addition, the decisions of superior courts are not reviewable, 
but challengable in direct proceedings, only by vay ot appeal. (Perhaps 
a gross or manifest excess of Jurisdiction could be treated as a nullity 
in collateral proceedings). Parke B, emphasised the inconvenience that 
vould result it the decision was treated as void. This applies whatever 
defect is in question, and is only a.: •iitiif'icant argument in circUIII8tances 
Where the nullityins detect ie latent, highly technical, or in aome 
other~ not likely to be detected by a person relying upon the decision. 
The other authorities rely heavily upon Dimes, and thUJJ are affected 
by the inconclusiveness ot that decision. Phillips v. Eyre, although a 
distinguished authority upon other matters involves in thia context no 
more than an obiter statement that a person vho acts under the authority 
ot a biased Judgement cannot be treated as a trespasser, and that an 
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appeal or writ of error is the appropriate remedy. R v. Galw~ J .J. 
waa an attempt to quash an acquitted by quarter sessions for bias. 
If the decision vas void, it vas argued, that the accused could be 
tried ap.in, whereas if it was voidable the double jeopardy principle 
would apply and the accused would go tree. It was held that the 
decision vas voidable only and thus the accused having been "put once 
in peril" could not be retried. However Pallas C.B. for obvious policy 
reasons expressly treated attempts to set aside acquittals as sui 
generis, regarding bias as generally affecting jurisdiction. It is 
suggested that the double jeopardy principle does not necessarily 
turn upon the classification of a decision as void or voidable, but 
upon the question of whether, as a matter of i\ct a person has been put 
at risk. of conviction by the institution of proceedings against him. 
Thus only where proceedings are manifestly a sham or illegal would the 
accused not be protected by the double jeopardy rule. R v. Simpson 
vas another double jeopardy case, where certiorari was sought to quash 
an acquittal by justices. Here the disqualification was statutory and 
thus the question of natural justice was obiter. The majority of the 
Divisional Court based ita retusal to quash the acquittal upon narrover 
grounds than that of the void, voidable distinction. Singlet_on. L.J. 
thought that a plea of autrefois acquit in any later proceedings was the 
appropriate remedy, and that this would be lost if the acquittal was 
quashed. This left the issue open, but nevertheless his Lordships 
reasoning suggests tha.t he considered the acquittal voidable only. 
Ballaiche J. however found himself, upon policy grounds, reluctant to 
quaSh an acquittal, and contented himself vi th saying that the decision 
was not "obviously" lacking in jurisdiction. 
the suggestion made above. 
This is consistent with 
A more general authority is the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
R v. Commissioners of Severs of Essex (1885) 14 QBD 561, where an order 
b,y the Commissioners to the applicant to execute certain repairs vas 
quashed for bias. It was held that the order would be .. _quashed for the 
future, but that this would not entitle the applicants- to recover 
expttnses for work already undertaken in obedience to the order, since 
these were incurred as a result of an "existing legal obligation''. 
Under the governing provisions however, individuals were bound to PII\Y 
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for repairs, as long as the cammissioners vere "acting within their 
jurisdiction''. However even without this express provision, no order 
made by the Commissioners would be effective if' outside jurisdiction_. 
Therefore in order to give this statutory provision any force at all, it 
is suggested that it should be construed as "providing a different test 
of jurisdiction to the one that would otherwise operate, perhaps one 
limited to the narrow meaning of jurisdiction as capacity over persons~ 
place and subject matter. If this is so, then bias would not, in this 
sense and context, destrqy jurisdiction. 
Finally, the case most frequently cited in support of the principle 
in Dimes is Wildes v. Russel. A justices clerk brought an action to 
recover salary, after he was dismissed from office by the Quarter 
Sessions, acting under statutory powers. His allegation that certain 
members of the Court vere disqualified by bias, was rejected and thus 
the issue of voidness or voidability was obiter. It is clear however 
that his quasi contractual action could only have been successful had 
the decision been void. It was stated that if the decision was 
vitiated by bias, it would be voidable only. 
A part from these decisions a number of other cases indicate that 
bias can be cured by waiver or consent. (20) This suggests that bias 
does not effect jurisdiction. Nevertheless waiver may be regarded as 
relevant to the issue of a remedy to a particular individual, and thus 
based upon different considerations than those governing the effect of 
the invalidity (see Chapter 10 below). In one case, R v. Williams 1914 
1 KB 6o8 it vas expressly stated that the conduct of an applicant (for 
certiorari) can preclude him from relief', whether the decision is void 
or voidable. 
A large number of modern cases on the other hand suggest that bias 
can be regarded as a jurisdictional defeet (21). In addition to the 
express dicta, the need to show bias by extrinsic evidence, coupled wit-
the rule that except for patent en-or of law the Courts paver to review 
decisions of inferior bodies must be founded upon jurisdiction (22) 
suggests that both rules of natural justice are but regarded as 
jurisdictional. The alternative is to regard natural justice as sui 
generis, not governed by the tace ot the record rule, but nevertheless 
not constituting a jurisdictional detect. It is suggested that this 
solution is unneceesary. 
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There are a number ot express dicta to tho eftect that bias 
produces nullity. 'l'be Court of Appeal and c. majority of the Rouse 
ot Lords accepted this in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensntion 
Commission 1969 2 A.C. 147 and in ex parte Perry 1956 1 l;.B 22!> at 
221. Goddard C.J. said "If certiorari is moved becau~e of' the bias of 
a justice, the theory that lies behind that io tl~Rt .•••. the justice 
bas no jurisdiction'~. 
In Cooper v. Wilson Q-937] 2 ClB 309 tnl' issue "'US uirectly 
relevant. The plaintiff had. been diar.issed ~ran t!te Liverpool Police 
Force by the Chief Conntuble, and bis nrpeal againnt thin :lccinion 
vu.s rejected by the ~ia.tch Corx.ittee. He then aou,;ht n declaration 
that the decision of the 'Hatch Ca'U'I.ittee Wt& invalid, inter A.lia tor 
bins. The respondents argueC. that the e.pplicu.nts 1)roper course vas 
to e:r.ercise his at'-l.tutor:l right of' &l)peal to the lione 5ecrete.ry. In 
rejectin~; this the Court of' ArJl)e~.l based ite reasoninG upov the nullity 
' of the decision. Greer L.J. snid (at 321) ''It would be idle for a 
plaintiff who ie ~eginr. thnt he be.s never lJeen dimnissed to appeal 
to the Gccreta.rJ of Gtb.te." E.e also rec;c.rdf!\! a declaration that the 
oti'eudint:: decision wun null aml void. as an appropriate rwedy. Scott 
L.J. tU.ao rA&de it clear tbat l1e regarded the d~c iaiou as a nullity. 
However there \111.0 an alternative batiie for the decision in thr.t the 
Court was of t.he opinion that the applicant lw.d effectively l'esigned 
before the purported dia;;,issal, vhich vaa for that reason a nullity. 
Thus the modern decisions arc indecioive. One reason for this 
is tllat the raajori ty of bius cnseo consist of' certiorari applications 
to quash decisions of licencinc justices and other Judicial tribunals. 
In these cases the di::;tinction between void and voidable is haaterial. 
certiorari lyins in both cases. However in Metropolitan Property Co. 
v. Lannon, (above) the Divisional Court doubted whether an appeal under 
Beet ion 9 ot the Tribunnl and Inquiries Act 1958, vae Bpproprinte to 
challenge a biased decision of a rent tribumil. Certiorari vas 
' 
reaarded aa the &]'lllr'opriote remedy. This 1 is only u.rlicable upon the 
basin that the defect va& jurisdictional and that no &ppeal can be 
trom a nullity (23). Where the point has arisen diacussion is 
perfunctory. In R v. Rand ~86t:J l QB 230, Blackllurn J. (at 233) 
considered that pecuniary bias would make a juotioes' certificate ·a 
nulli t;y • but that this ma;y not be so in the case ot other types ot 
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bias. Apart from the extent of interest required to disqualify there 
is no reason to distinguish between the various kinds of bias. 
Cases involving dismissal trom trade or professional organisations 
are more significant. In Taylor v. National Union of Seaman [1967_/ 
l WLR 532, the plaintiff vas dismissed from his post as a Union 
Official in breach of both the bias and the audi alteram partem rule. 
His dismissal was, vithout distinguishing betveen the two aspects of 
natural justice treated as a nullity. Nevertheless the Court 
refused, perhaps as a matter of discretion to issue the declaration 
asked for, since this vould amo~t to specific performance of a master 
and servant contract, and vould since the plaintiff had obtained other 
employment be somewhat unreal. Similarly in Allinson V .G.M.C. 1894 
l QB 750 vbere the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent his name 
being removed from the medical register pursuant to a decision of a 
disiplinary tribunal, Lord Esher M.R. said that participation in the 
decision by a biased person vould render the decision "vholly void". 
It is submitted that the approach of Lopes L.J. is correct in that he 
regarded that the matter as one of capacity. This is consistant vith 
Diplock L.J. 'a view in Anisminic (above) and makes it clear that bias 
naturally falls vi. thin the ultra vires principle. 
It may be possible to reconcile these conflicting groups of cases 
upon the basis of Blackburn J. 'a dictum (above) in R. v. Rand, by 
distinguishing between pecuniary and other types of bias, or between 
purely technical disqualifications and situations vhere there is a 
"real likelihood of bias" (24) the latter category of defects beinc e. 
serious abuse of pcver and there tore jurisdictional. There is little 
to be gained tram such a distinction, and it is therefore submitted that 
there is sufficient authority to support the proposition that a biased 
decision is a nullity. This1sa conceptually satisfactory solution, 
since both rules of natural justice are treated as generally analogous 
to heads ot ultra vires rather than to patent error. Moreover the 
policll' of the lav is better served by this analysis vith its emphasis 
upon the serious nature ot a breach of natural justice. 
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~udi_gteram ~~ 
_be principle authorities on the question of failure to hear 
support the proposition that this defect produces nullity (:?5). As 
in the case ot bias there is no reason in principle why this should 
not be so. Nevertheless there is same authority thnt, in order to 
meet some of the difficulties arising trOll!. a failure to bear, breach 
of this rule produces a voidable decision only (26). As in the case 
ot bias express statements are intrequent, but unlike bias cases, a 
large number ot decisions exist vhich are explicable only upon the 
aasum~tion that a decision in breach of the audi alteram part~ rule 
is void. 
Ridge v o Baldvi.n [ 196~ 2 .ALI.En 66 is the leadinf.: case o The 
·House of Lords held by a majority (Lord Devlin and Lord Ever shed 
dissenting on thie point) that the dismissal under statutory provisions 
of a Police Chief Constable without a hearing vas a nullity, so that 
his exercise of a statutory riy.ht of appeal to the llome Secretary vas 
also void, and could not BJIIOunt to a waiver of his rir,bt to challenge 
the decision in the Courts, even though under the relevant legi61ation 
the decision of the Hane Secretary vas made ''final". 
lord l!odgeson said (at 116) ''The dechton taken by the Watch 
Cocmittee was at all times a nullity, and nothing thnt vno done 
thereafter by vay of appeal could give it validity ••••• In all the 
cases where the courts have held that the principles of natural 
justice have been nouted I can find none where the language doeanot 
indicate •• o o. that the decision impugned was void''. 
Lord Evershed thought the decision was voidable, but cited no 
authori t;y in support o He thought that this analysis vas necessary 
in order to preserve the discretion of the court to retuse relief 
vhere no injustice haS been done. Thio conflicts with the generally 
accepted opinion that breach of natural justice is vronstul per se, 
whether or not any additional harm or inJustice results (27). 
Moreover the question of relief depends upon the rules governing the 
remedy vhich is BOU£hto Even thoueh a decision is a nullity the 
Court, if a ~edy is discretionary may retuae to issue it (28). The 
tvo issues are logically separate. Lord Eversbed vas also of the 
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opinion that certiorari cannot lie to quash a void decision (at P.89). 
This issue will be discussed below (see Chapter 10). If this is 
correct, however, it would seem that few jurisdictional defects would 
be, in Lord Evershed's sense, capable of producing nullity, since 
certiorari is well established as a means of exposing jurisdictional 
defects (29). 
The opinion of the majority~ has been generally followed (30). 
But in Durrayapah v. Fernando [1967] 2 A.C. 337 which is the only 
subsequent decision of the highest tribunal, where the point has 
arisen, Lord Evershed's view was preferred by the judicial committee 
of the Privj Council. A Municipal Council in Ceylon had been 
dissolved by a Ministerial order. The Council itself did not challenge 
the decision but the Mayor who had lost his office applied for 
certiorari upon the ground that the decision was in breach of natural. 
justice. It vas held that the dissolution was invalid but, that it 
vas voidable only, and therefore could be set aside only by the 
person who was its direct object, ~n this case the Council, against 
whom however it could be regarded as void ab initio. The purpose of 
this analysis was clearly to prevent a third party from obtaining a 
remedy if the person primarily effected did not wish to challenge the 
decision. As Wade points out (31) this result could have been 
achieved by utilizing locus standi rules, or the discretionary nature 
of certiorari. Instead of this the Privy Council introduced three 
difficulties into this area of law. Firstly the decision clearly 
confiicts with Ridge v. Baldwin. The Judicial Committee construed the 
opinions on that case as forming a majority in favour of voidability. 
Lord Morris' speech vas relied upon to produce this, since certain 
passages can be construed as signifYing that a decision in breach of 
natural justice vas voidable. However his Lordship merely pointed 
out that the terms void and voic!able must in this· context be used with 
care, since even a nullity must at some stage be declared such by a 
Court, otherwise the decision, being enforceable by the executive will 
be de facto effective (see Chapter l above). This is a truism 
applicable to all defects. Nevertheless the Privy Council,· giving a 
narrower meaning to Lord Morris's words distinguished between decisions 
that were void and others only voidable, placing those in breach of 
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natural justice in the latter category. 
Secondly, it is not clear that, even it a decision is voidable,only 
the person against wham it is made can challenge it, and thirdly their 
Lordships statement that a voidable decision is void ab initio as 
B@ainst that person is tantamount to giving the quashine of·:a ·voidable 
decision retrospective effect. 
(Chapters 10 and ll ) • 
These issues will be discussed below 
B,y relying upon Lord Morris' trUism the PriVY Council have 
obscured the main purpose of the distinction between void and voidable, 
is that, when challenged in the Court, a void decision should be 
treated as far as possible as if no legal consequences can flow from it, 
whereas a voidable decision can be given a limited amount of legal 
efticie:cy;. 
Durr~apah v. Fernando bas been criticised. and in Bew Zealand, 
expressly treated as erroneous (32). The House ot Lords in Anisminic 
(above) stated, obiter, that breach of the audi alteram partem rule 
results in nullity, and this is supported by the authorities before 
Ridge v. Baldwin. The frequently quoted dictum of the Earl of 
Selbourne in Spackman v. Plumstead Board of Works (10 App. Cas. 229 at 
240) that "there would be no decision within the meaning of the 
statute, it there were anything of that sort contrary to the essence 
of justice" has been renected in the decisions. Thus in Smith v. R 
(1878) 3 App. Cas. 614 the fOrfeiture by the Crown of a Colonial 
lease was held to be a nullity that could be collaterally impeached 
because, in the absence of a bearing the Crown had no duty to act . 
In several ca.aes actions of trespass have suceeded concerning the 
enforcement ot local authority decisions taken without a hearing ( 33). 
Although no express statements were made, the absence of aey formal 
quashing of the orders concerned mows that these decisions can only be 
explained upon the basis of nullity. 
Similarly in Capel v. Child (1850) 16 QB 162, Bonaker v. Evans 
(1850) 16 QB 162 and Osgood v. Nelson (1872) LR 5 B.L. 636, actions for 
money had and received were regarded as appropriate remedies tor loss 
ot office vi thout hearing. 
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The concept of' nullity was applied in an extreme manner in Wood 
v. Woad (1874) LR 9 Exch 190. The plaintiff' was expelled :rrom a 
mutual insurance society without a hearing and brought an action· tor 
damages against the committee. It was held that the decision was a 
nullity, and as such it could have no ef'f'ect upon his ler,al position. 
Therefore still being a member of' the society he had suffered no loss 
"The act of' expulsion was really of' no ef'f'ect at all" Per Kelly CB 
at 199. 
Clearly the decision supports an inconvenient general principle, 
and takes logic to an illogical extreme. It is submitted however 
that Wood v. Wood is authority merely for the proposition that an 
invalid decision does not constitute a cause of action in itself. 
This applies whether the decision is void, or voidable, with the 
possible exception of malicious decisions within jurisdiction. (See 
Chapter 9 below). Had the plaintiff' actually been refUsed any 
benefits due to him as a member of' the society he would have had a 
remedY in contract, under the normal rules governing collateral 
attack. Moreover an action f'or a declaration that the expulsion was 
void would, today, be an appropriate remedy. 
Nevertheless it is possible to argue that the concept of nullity 
does not govern decisions involving contractual as opposed to statuton· 
powers. A decision in breach of' natural justice invol vee a breach of 
contract, whether void or voidable, assuming the existence of an express 
or implied ( 34) duty to hear. The reasoning in Wood v. Woad suggests 
tLe.t breach of' contract occurs only if' the decision is voidable. 
However the rules of' contractual bodies, such as trade unions, are in 
f'act analogous to legislation, being subject to judicial review in the 
interests of' public policy, which is frequently exercised in terms of' 
the Ultra Vires Doctrine. Lord Denning has remarked that trade union 
rules are akin to by-lave ( 35) D.ild this analysis has been confirmed in 
the recent case of Edwards v. S.O.G.A.T. (1970) vhere the Court of' 
Appeal held that the rules of' natural justice are applicable to 
expulsion from a trade union deopite their purported exclusion by 
contract. Lord Denning M.R. 'a reasoning was based upon the existence 
ot a right to livelihood and the ultra vires doctrine. Sachs L.J. 
however based his judgement upon the ordinary law of' contract, regarding 
a te~ excluding natural justice as being void as a matter of' public 
policy. If Lord Denning's view is correct. then the rules of' natural 
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justice are binding, independently of contract, and thus it is meaningful 
to regard a decision in breach of them as a nullity, and ineffective 
to terminate the relationship. 
Even where no status arises from membership, of a domestic body, 
it is still meaningful to treat a decision of expulsion in breach of 
natural justice as void, since any attempt to enforce it would then 
constitute repudiation, ~ich terminates the relationship only if 
accepted by the other party. If the decision were not void, the 
relationship would be terminated, but an·action in damages would lie 
for breach of contract. It is doubtful whether natural juztice is 
applicable to decisions other than those involving expulsion (36), 
but if decisions imposing other serious;penalties are subject to 
these rules, it is submitted that the decision itself being void, any 
attempt to enfcrce it would constit~te breach of contract. This is 
consistant -with Wood v. Wo.ad above. 
Only in the case of the ordinary master and servant relationship 
does the concept of nullity seer:. in~pplica:bl.e. However it is doubtful 
whether natural justice is applicable in this context (37) in the 
absence of a status relationship arising out of statutory protection 
of the employment. If natural justice is applicable, violation of 
the rule can at most constitute breach of contract, since repudiation 
per se, terminates the relationship, the Courts being unvillil'l£ to 
order re-instatement (38). Possibly the position of the private 
employee might be open to reconsideration in the light of recent 
developments in the related area of Trade Union decisions and also 
in situations involving expulsion tram Universities. The notion of 
status appears no longer to depend upon procedural protection. 
It is submitted that breach of both rules of Natural Justice 
results in nullity. Both are rest~ictions upon decision making pover 
imposed by the Courts. Neither can be classified as mere "mistakes'' 
within jurisdiction. Both can be established without the limitation 
of the face of the record rule. The decisions generally support this 
proposition. Arguments in favour of voidability proceed upon the 
basis that this is necessary to preserve judicial discretion as to the 
issue of remedies. This will be discussed belcm (see Chapter 10) • 
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Decisions already mentioned shov that the Courts are prepared to treat 
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It is not clear whether abuse of jurisdiction results in nullity. 
Most authorities would regard it as a vitiating defect, but there is 
little agreement as to its classification, and indeed as to what defects 
oan be subsumed under this head. 
Many commentators subdivide the ultra vires principles into lack 
of jurisdiction anc1 abuse of jurisdiction ( 1) an·J there is House of 
Lords authority #or distinguishing between jurisdictional defects in 
the narrow sense of incapacity to commence the proceedings, and in the 
wilier sense, embracing defects of motive or reasoning, fraul:_, improper 
purposes, taking into account irrelevant considerations or failing to 
take into account relevant considerations (2). There bas, however, 
been little examination of the purpose (if Blzy' exist apart from 
convenience of classification) of this distinction anJ the authorities 
are inconsistent as to the terminology used to describe the kinu of 
defect involved. , 
Some ant.hori ties, particularly in local Government oases treat 
the issue aa one of reasonableness (3). Lord Reid in Eingsbridge 
Investments v Kent c.c. 1970 1 ALL.ER 70 in discussing the effect 
of a Local Authority planning condition said that, to be valid a 
condition must not be ultra vires and must not be unreasonable. In 
Roberta v Hopwood 1925 A.c. 578 Lord Wrenbury said (at 613) "A person 
in wham is vested a discretion must ueroiae his discretion upon 
reasonable srounds." 
However unreasonableness is probably insufficient as a justification 
ot the Courts intervention (4). Other authorities list specific grounds 
upon which review oan be baaed. De Smith Mstinguiahea acting tor an 
improper purpose, whioh includes traud, taltiug irrelev&Dt factors 
into OOJlSideration or failing to take relev&Dt factors into consider-
ation, and unreasonableness. These poounds tor review apply to 
administrative (5) 1 judicial (6), and legislative (7) powers, although 
in the latter oaae unreasonableness Mas been confined to Local Authority 
byelaws as opposed to ministerial regulatiollS .. · . Oarner uses the 
pneral term "bad tai th" to cover these oatesories, but it is submitted, 
that unless this sr<NDd tor review is restricted to wide discretionary 
powers, the maohiavaliu undertones in the tei'ID are inappropriate to 
· describe situations such as that in AniiDinio where a pnu1ne mie-
1 
' oonstrwrtion of a teolmioal tem reaul ted in a decision beoamiDg ultra 
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vires on the grounds that the Commissions error has resulted in a 
deoision based upon irrelevant considerations. Bad faith should be. ,. 
confined to actual fraud or dishonesty as suggested by Lord Greene 
in Point of Alr Collieries v Lloyd George 1943 2KB at 547• 
These various categories overlap. Fraud is one kind of improper 
purpose. Improper purpose in turn can be treated as one kind of 
irrelevant consideration al thou&h there ~ be a difference of degree 
between the two categories. It is not olear that, despite the diotum 
of Lord Greene in the Wednesbur,y Case that unreasonableness is a 
ground for review in its own right. In the leading decisions on 
unreascmableness the test the Courts used _was, in fact based upon the 
relevance to the statutory policy of the factors taken into account 
by the authority. Thus in Roberts v Hopwood the wage award was 
"uDreasonable" be~se the authority had based its calculation upon 
social welfare considerations, a factor regarded by the House of' 
Lords in 1925 as irrelevant (8). In Ball v Shoreham 1964 1 WLR 240 ··• 
the Court of Appeal apjllying a test of unreaaon&bleness and one of 
irreleventy held a pl.amliJJg condition void, as imposed partly f'or the 
unauthorised purpose of' avoiding the ~ent of compensation. 
Similarly in Padfield v Minister of A-griculture, 1968 A.c. regarded 
by Wade as an assertion of the power of the Court to interfere vi th 
unreasonable 8%ecutive action, the defect actually involved vas the 
admission by the Minister of political polia.y considerations in 
dealing vi th statutory provisions concerning the interests of the 
milk producing commwrlty. It is ditf'ioult in practice to visualise 
a decision that is su.f'fioiently unreasonable to varrant interference 
and iidi the same time impeccable in respeot of the relevancy of' its 
reasoning. Lord Read appeared to recognise this in Westminster Bank 
v Beverley 1970 2 W L R 645 when he aaid "Unreasonableness ia not 
811 apt description of' action in excess of _pover, IIDd it is not a 
very aatiataotor.v description of action in abuse of power". In that 
oase the House of Lords held that a Jlinisterial decision confirming 
the retusal of' planniDg permission by a Local Authority vas not 
UDre&acmable aDd an abuse of power because the factors taken into account, 
in pariicn1lar the ti.DaDoial burden upon the ratepqers were (per 
Viscount Dilhorne at 647) "a material consideration"• (91 
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It is submitted that Unreasonableness is not an independent head 
of ultra vires but is important rather to dete~ine Whether one of the 
more specific heads of abuse of power should vitiate a decision. 
Improper purposes, irrelevant considerations do not vitiate per se, 
but only if they materiall3• affect the O.ecision, (10) if the decision 
cannot reasonable be justified. in the light of legitimate considerations 
or purposes. In Walkers decision 1944 KB 664 the s~e irrelevant 
consideration w.as taken into account as in Roberts v. H.opuood, but 
nevertheless the wage alrerd wc.s held vnlid on the grounds t:t:F.tt, 
despite the irrelevancy the awn fixed vas reasonnble. 
?-tegaw J' s dictwn in Hanks v. l<ininter of Housinr: and Local 
Government 1963 1 QB provides the most useful arrroach to the 
classification of abuse of pover. In criticioin~ the ~ultiplicity 
of workds used to describe the categories of abuse of power he regarded 
the essential criterion as the relevance to the statutory rurposes 
of the considerations taken into account in renchinf:; the decLd.on. 
Improper purposes, fraud, unreasonableness are all aspects of the 
overall requirement of relevance. There is one possible qualification 
of this. Despite some inconsistencies in the authorities (11) it is 
reasonably clear the.n an ii:tproper purpose will only vitiate if it is 
the main or dominant purpose of the decision (12) althouch in Webb v. 
Minister of Housing and Local Government (above) the Court of Appeal 
squashed a compulsory purchase order vitiated by the inclusion of 
more land than was required for the authorised purpose. The improper 
purpose was substantial but could not be deRcribed as dominant. 
A subsidiary purpose even though not authorised will not vitiate 
(13). This test hns not been used in irre~~vant consideration cases 
where the inclusion of any material irrelevancy justifies review. 
Thus if an improper purpose not bein{; dominant fails to satisf'y the 
test, the defect, if it affects the decision in any way could be 
reviewable under the head of irrelevant considerations. The couverse 
is not the case.. An irrelevant consideration could not be reviewable 
as an improper purpose unless dominant. Thus irrelevant considerations 
is a wider category than improper purposes and therefore unless the 
effect of classifying a defect as improper differs. from that in the 
case of irrelevant considerations there appears to be no need for 
improper purposes as a separate category. However it will be suggested 
that the line between voidness and voidibility lies between ~proper 
purposes and irrelevaut considerations, and that improper purposes is 
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a jurisdicitonal detect vhereas an irrelevant consideration is error 
within jurisdiction. Therefore in discussing the authorities abuse 
of paver will be subdivided into Improper Purposes, Fraud and irrelevant 
considerations. 
The authorities on the question whether abuse of pover goes to 
jurisdiction and produces nullity are inconsistent, partly because ot 
the influence of the narrov, and it has been suggested, fallacious 
commencement of inquirJ test and partly because the implications 
of the overlappinr. of the various cater,ories have been insufficiently 
explored. 
There is strong authority that improper purposes produces nullity. 
There is also authority suggesting that "irrelevant consider,-.tions" 
produce nullity. Here the cases are not consistent, and the lav is 
seriously confused by a larr,e bo~· ot cases which treat taking 
irrelevant factors into consideration as error of lav, reviewable 
only if on the face of the record (14). Similarly decisio~a based 
on insufficient evidence have been held erroneous in lav (15) although 
this kind ot detect is closely connected vith, if not synamonous with 
tailing to take relevant considerations into account. 
As regards improper purposes, it vas said in Short v. Poole 
Corporation 1926 CH GO at 88 that "it an attempt is made to exercise 
powers corruptly, for some improper ~urpose, such an attempt must 
tail. It is null and void". The decision of Webb v. Hinister of 
Housing, (discussed above) where, a coast protection scheme involving 
the exercise of compulsory povers for purposes not within the governing 
legislation, was collaterally impeached by means of a challenge to 
a compulsory purchase order to which the scheme vas a condition 
precedent can only be explained on the assumption that, subject to 
express statutory provisions, the scheme vas a nullity. 
Similarly in :R v. Paddington and St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal 
1949 1 ALLER 720 a Local Authority had, fbr policy reasons, referred 
entire blocks of flats to a rent tribunal instead of dealing vith 
individual contracts, as envisaged by the governing legislation. As 
a result it vas held that the reference vas a nullity since the 
unauthorised purpose constituted a failure to exercise their powers 
under the Act. There being no reference upon which to base the 
tribunal 'a jurisdiction, the rent assessment vas a nullity. This 
would not have been the same had the decision been voidable only. 
Other authorities indirectly utilise the nullity principle in 
improper purposes cases by per.u1itting such decisions to be collaterally 
impeached by means of an action in tort where public authorities 
justit'y the infringement of private rights by reliance upon statutory 
powers Which they have exercised for the wrong purpose (16). Decisions 
involving challenge under statutory procedures providing for review 
upon the ground that the decision concernedis "not within the powers 
of the a.ct", treat improper purposes as a head of ultra vires under 
this provision (17). 
The only important authority to the contrary is the maJority view 
of the House of Lords in Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C. 1956 A.C. 736 
where the validity of a compulsory purchase order made by the Local 
Authority as the result of' the fraud of the clerk vas in question. 
A privative clause allowing review on limited grounds including ultra 
vireo governed the decision, preventing challenge after the expiry 
of six weeks. A majority held that this clause vas effective to 
prevent all challenge after that period, (this point will be considered 
below) and a different majority thought that even within the time 
limit "bad faith" could not be revieved, since this did not involve 
the decision being "outside the powers of this act". 
Lord Reid (at 762) distinguished misuse of power, both bona 
fide, and mala fide, :f'roru ultra vires "the order is intra vires 
in the sense that what it authorises to be done is within the scope 
of the act under which it is made''. 
Lord Radcliffe (at769) emphasises that an order made in bad 
faith is not a nullity and "is an act capable of legal consequences. 
It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead, and until it is 
lquashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its 
ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders". 
This suggests that the House of Lords were utilizing a narrow 
concept of jurisdictional error, but if' so, it is difficult to 
understand the basis upon which review would ha:vc been possible 
had the privative clause not been operative, since the fraud did not 
appear on the record even if the particular order could have been 
treated as "judicial" tor certiorari purposes. 
Smith v. East Elloe was criticised by the House of Lords in the 
Anisminic case (above) (18), and the decision is readily distinguish-
t·.ble since the fraud involved was not that of the Council itself but 
ot its clerk who procured the compulsory purchase order. Thus 
vis a vis the Council the decision in question vas not detective tor 
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fraud, or improper purposes, but at most for taking, unvittingly an 
irrelevant factor into account. 
It is suggested therefore that a decision based upon improper 
purposes is a nullity. 
FRAUD 
~10 distinct situations must be considered; firstly where the 
deciding body itself reaChes a fraudulent decision. If improper 
purposes nullifies then a fortiori the same is true in the case of 
fraud which is a particular kind of imp:·oper purpose with the additional 
element that the purpose is knovn to be improper by the deciding body. 
Lord Morton in Smith v. East Elloe (above) retuaed to distinguish 
'improper motives bona fide from thrc:Ae mala tide~' regarding each as 
capable of being jurisdictional. 
The second situation is where the fraud is committed by a third 
party as in Lazarus Estates v. Beasly 1956 1 All ER 341, where a 
Tribunal awarded a rent increase as a result of a fraudulent declaration 
by the landlord. Here there are dicta that fraud nullifies. In that 
case, Denning L.J. said ' if the declaration is proved to be false or 
fraudulent it is a nullity and void, and in Harrison v. Southampton 
Corporation (1853)4 D C M2 G 137: a decision of an Ecclesiastical Court 
which had been obtained by fraud ~as treated as a nullity after a lapse of 
fi:rty years. However, the doctrine of the bona fide purchaser appears 
to protect a person acquiring asthird party upon a judgement in rem which 
is obtained by fraud ( 19) • This would not apply where third party 
title through a void contract is in question. 
It is submitted that fraud in this situation does not necessarily 
nullity. If the deciding body is nat a party, the fraud operates, 
as in Smith v. East Elloe as an ir1elevant factor which it has unwittingly 
taken into account. The same consequence as in other irrelevant 
considerations cases should therefore apply. One situation might be 
distinguished; that where a fraudulent declaration or statement is made, 
Which is necessary to found turther proceedings such as application to 
a Rent Tribunal. Here the ultimate ·decision will be vcid, aE in Lazarus 
Estates v. Beas.,l.y, and R v. Paddington Rent Tri~unal (above) the fraud 
making the Landlords declaration void, which resulted in the Tribunal 
having no jurisdiction to proceed, for failure ot an essential 
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condition precedent. Thus the decision is void, not for fraud but 
for procedural ultra vires. 
Fraud will therefore be regarded, not as a ground of invalidity 
in its own right but as a quality which brings the exercise of a 
power within the ambit of one of the other recognised categories of 
invalidity. 
Irrelevant considerations 
'.:..here is, in principle, no reason why a decision based upon 
irrelevant factors should not be ultra vires and void. Power can 
be limited by a sphere of relevance as well as by subject matter. 
Gordon's objection to this stems from his insistence that jurisdiction 
is a matter of capacity to proceed, determined at the commencement of 
the proceedings, and that, it is illogical to maintain that jurisdiction 
can, once established, be lost. 
These difficulties are avoided if, as argued above, the operative 
moment to· determine the question of proceedings is regarded as being 
the conclusion, not the commencement, of the decision making process. 
It is only then that all the conditions for an enforceable decision 
are present. An order which the tribunal is not empowered to make 
can ~o more be enforceable than a decision affecting the vrong subject 
matter. Jurisdiction means only power to make a statement or perform 
an act which will be legally binding and enforceable by the executive 
(20), and if any requirement of jurisdiction is absent, at the time 
the decision should become enforceable the decision is void. 
In Anisminic Ltd., v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 
1147 a majority of the House of Lords considered that failure to 
consider relevant matters or the consideration of irrelevant matters 
was a jurisdictional defect, which produced a nullity 'that vas no 
decision at all' and could not be protected by a privative clause (21). 
The Commission was obliged to certifY an applicant as entitled to share 
in the compensation :f\md if a specified number of conditions were 
satisfied, the relevant one being that the owner of the land concerned 
and any person vho became successor in title to the owner should be a 
British National upon a certain date. As a result ot vh&t their 
Lordships regarded as a misconstruction of the term • successor in 
title', the Commission held that the applicant was not entitled to 
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participate in the tund since its interest in the property concerned 
had been assigned to an Egyptian Company which was treated as 
successor in title. It was held that, upon a true construction of 
the legislation, a successor in title could not include a person 
existing contemporaneously with the original owner, and so, ex . 
hypothesi the nationality of a successor in title was not relevant 
when the original ovner was the applicant. Thus, in requiring the 
nationality of the Egyptian assignee to be established the Commission 
bad taken an extra, unauthorised, factor into consideration. 
Similarly in R. v. St. Pancras Vestry (1890) 24 QBD 371 failure 
to consider relevant matters and consideration of improper matters 
was equated with refusal to eyercise jurisdiction and mand~ 
lay upon the assumption that no operative decision had been made (22) 
and in R v. Weymouth Licencing J. J. ex p. Sleep[l94~l L KB 465 at 
472, 480 where an application for a licence was refUsed on irrelevant 
grounds, the availability of !~andamus was based upon excess of 
jurisdiction. Finally Estate and Trust Asencies Ltd. v. Singapore 
Improvement Trust [1937] A.C 898 constitutes Privy Council authority, 
that a decision based upon irrelevant factors is void. A housing 
authority used an unacceptable test in deciding that a home was 
unfit for human habitation and the Judicial Committee held that 
~heir statutory declaration, being in excess of jurisdiction, was 
unenforceable (at 917) • 
However, other decisions are equivocal. In two groups of cases, 
while no express consideration was given to the point it appears that 
the Court was not prepared to treat the offending decision as void. 
Firstly in a number of certiorari cases the remedy has issued, but 
without making the casas of review clear vhether the order was 
issuing for excess of jurisdiction or ~ent error (23). The dual 
role of certiorari has caused considerable contusion in this area. 
In two cases the irrelevant factors were required to appear on the 
record before the Court would interfere by certiorari (241, and in one 
of them, ex p. Kendel Hotels the Divisional Court refused to set aside 
a decision of a rent tribunal which had omitted to take certain factors 
into :..ccount regarding the decision as within jurisdict1on (25). 
In the second group of cases despite dicta that a failure to take 
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relevant factors into account in reaching a decision is not a Genuine 
exercise of the statutory discretion certiorari has issued to quash 
the decision in conjunction with mandamus (26). This suggests that 
the decision was not regarded as a nullity. gandamus issued 
unsupported by certiorari in R v. Flint County Council licencing 
Committee (above) where a licence was refUsed in reliance upon a 
general policy irrelevant to the statutory purposes, but there no 
change in legal relations had been affected owing to the nature of 
the subject matter. Thus there was no necessity to quash, before 
orderinr the committee, by mandamus to reconsider (27}. 
In a number of decisions, it has been held that planning 
conditions based upon considerations not relevant to the policy of 
the governing legislation were void (28}. In Hall v. Shoreham the 
whole planning permission was held by the Court of Appeal to be 
a nullity and therefore the plaintiff was in the position of a 
developer without permission despite bis contention that the 
permission should take effect free of the condition which would be 
disregarded as a nullity. It was held that the condition was not 
"Beverabre·.. The issue of severance and its relationship with 
nullity also arose in Kent County Council v. Kingsway Investments 
where the condition concerned provided for the automatic lapse of 
the applicants permission unless details were approved within a 
three year period. The details were not approved and thirteen 
years later the applicant sought a declaration that, the condition 
was void, and that therefore his permission still existed. Nullity 
was crucial to this contention, since had the condition been voidable, 
it would unless quashed within three years have taken effect and 
destroyed the permission. The Court of Appeal and the Bouse of Lords 
agreed that the invalidity of' the condition tor unreasonableness based 
upon its relevance to planning policy would make it void. 
The House of Lords however, held by a majority that the condition 
was not invalid at all., and therefore that the permission itself had 
lapsed. The same conclusion was reached by their Lordships upon the 
alternative ground that the condition al.thoue;h void was no severable 
and therefore its nullity affected the permission itself and made 
that void. It appears :f'rom this decision (29) that only trivial 
P.nd :peripheral conditions are capable of severance (30), and that if' 
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the condition is fundamental, essential, or 1 part of the structure 1 
of the permission (31}, the whole permission stands or falls with it. 
This somewhat circular criterion, put into more precise language by 
Lord Reid ( at 75, 77} when he distinguished between conditions which 
affect the manner of development, and those which do not concern 
' 
user of the land itself, reveals the dre.stic consequences of regarding 
abuse of discretion as producing nullity. In most cases the whole 
of a permisoion would have to be treated as non exist ant. Lord 
Denning L.J. and Davies L.J. in the Court of Appeal repognised this. 
''t-1a.ny houses in Kent would have been built without valid permission, 
and would be in danger of having enforcement notices served on them" 
(32). If severence was allowed "many permissions thought to have 
expired, and become dead will be resuscitated and so cause chaos in 
the defendents planning policy". 
These remarks reveal the dangers in the nullity concept, since 
there is no power in the Court to alter. amend, or substitute 
defective conditions even though the vitiating factors may vary 
thro-qgh all the degrees of importance. It is suggested that the Court 
could retain some freedom of manoeuvre if the condition were to be 
treated as voidable at the option of the Court. A power to remit an 
unsatisfactory condition or permission to the Minister or Planning 
Authority for amendment would it is suggested, be a welcome innovation 
in this area of administrative law. 
The authorities, albeit with a substantial inconsistency appear 
to regard irrelevant considerations as jurisdictional and producing 
nullity. However the planning cases discussed above are equally 
capable of cle.ssification under the head of improper purposes. The 
defective conditions were described in terms of unreasonableness, and 
lack of relevence to planning policy and in each case the authority 
had imposed a condition to f'urther sane non-'!_)lanning purpose. In 
Hall v. Shoreham (above) the defendents purpose in requiring the 
plaintiff to build a public road on their land as a condition to a 
grant of planning permission was to avoid the payment of compensation, 
which would have been necessary had they acted, under the more 
appropriate highways legislation. The condition was held veid 
because it was fundamental to the grant (1964 1 ALLER 1 at 10, 14, 18.} 
Similarly in Mixnams Properties v. Chertsey U.D.C. 1963 2 ALLER 767 
a condition imposed on a caravan site licence, amounted to an attempt 
to impose a system of caravan rent control without statutory authority. 
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It is suggested however that irrelevant considerations should not 
be regarded as p~ducine nullity. A fundamental difficulty appears 
if the governing Anisminic case is applied liberally~ since categorising 
irrele,~cies as jurisdictional defects tends to obi~terate the 
distinction between ultra vires, and error withjn jurisdiction, and 
therefore that between appeal and rev~ew. Before Anisminic it 
was established that error of law was u ground for review only if 
apparent on the record (33). Although the appro1 riate, and probably 
the only remedy ( 34) was certiorari and therefore the point is 
seldom material it is also reasonably clear that this defect does 
not produce nullity (35). Error of Law in a wide sense of course 
can include all defects whether jurisdictional or otherwise, but 
the narrower class of errors includes only defects which would not 
be reviewable were it not for the 'face of the record' rule recognised 
as applicable to administrative Tribunals in the Northumberland case. 
For the purpose of this rule the taking of irrelevan,t factors into 
consideration (36) or the failure to consider relevant factors (37) 
of lack of evidence to support a decision {38) have been regarded as 
error within jurisdiction only. '.i'hus in the Northumberland case, the 
failure of the Tribunal to consider a relevant period of service, for 
redundancy compensation purposes was not regarded as capable of being 
a jurisdictional defect, since this would have made most of the 
reasoning concerning the face of the record rule, unnecessary. 
Similarly in Taylor v. National Assistance Board the Board had treated 
alimony pending suit as part of the applicants income for legal aid 
purposes. The Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords treated the 
alleged error as one of Law (See 112) a1 tho~ the remedy sought vas 
a declaration, which as will be shown below ia probably appropriate 
only to jurisdictional defects. In Anisminic however, the consider-
ation of an additional factor, the nationality of a person whom the 
Commission erroneously treated as a successor in title wao held b,y 
a majority of the Bouse ot Lords to produce a nullity as a 
jurisdictional defect. It is difficult to detect any analytical 
distinction between this case &hd the cases discussed above. In 
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Anisminic in determining whether the applicant was entitled to 
compensation the comndssion required an unauthorised fact to be 
established. In the Northumberland case, also concerning e claim 
for compensation the tribunal failed to establish the required number 
of facts, and in Taylor the tribunal was alleged to have calculated 
the amount of. legal aid by reference to an irrelevant source of 
income. Indeed every error of law, except trivial mistakes involving 
procedure, constitutes the introduction of' irrelevant caterial, either 
in itself', or in its result where a wronr, definition of a teclmical 
term is applied to the situation before the Tribunal, the application 
of' the erroneous definition beinG an irrelevant factor. This allows 
the reviewing court, f'ollowinc Anisminic to exercise consiO.erable 
freedom of' manoeuvre, to determine whether to treat a given defect as 
error of' law or excess of' juris~iction. Its choice will be exercised 
on the light of' such factors as privative clauses, the disclosure of' the 
defect in the record, and the remedy so~ht. Professor De Smith points 
out "The impression received (from Anisminic) is that a:unost any question 
of' law decided by the cOIUl!lission is susceptible to review", (39) and in 
Baldwin v. Francis v. Patent Appeal Tribunal 1959 A.C. 663 Lord Denning 
recognised that taking irrelevant factors into account has a dual aspect. 
In dealing with a Patent decision vitiated by failure to consider 
relevant specifications he en1phasised that the decision beinG voidable 
needed to be squashed by certiorari (at 694) but at the same time was 
prepared to regard the error of law as capable of' amounting to excess of 
jurisdiction "Allowing that a tribWlal which falls into an error of this 
particular kind does exceed its jurisdiction, nevertheless I am quite 
clear that it falls into error of law too". 
Brown J. in Anisminic in his judgement at first instance (40) which 
vas upheld by the House of Lords attempted to formulate a basis for 
separating the two categories "There is a distinction between a case 
where the inferior tribunal asks itself the right question and gives the 
wrong answer (Was this house fit for human habitation, what was the 
length of' this man's service?) and a case where the inferior tribunal 
asks itself' entirely the wrong question." Thus in Anisminic the 
commission formulated an extra question for itself to decide, vie the 
nationality of' T.E.D.O., but in the Northumberland case, the question 
w .. ·.s correct, the length of' service, but the matters relevant to the 
answer were misconstrued. 
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With respect this distinction appears to be purely verbal, or at 
most a formula representing a distinction based on degree of importance. 
The essignment of a defect to a cateEory appears to depend upon vbat 
are treated as 'quest ions ' to be answered by the Tribunal. Unless the 
draftsman expressly lists the ma.tters to be determined, as vas the case 
in Anisminic the Court is f'ree to rec;ard any matter to be established 
as a relevant 'question'. Thus in Davies v. Price 1958 1 ALL 67 a 
tribunal up~olding a landlord's notice to quit under the ~ericultural 
Holdings Act 195£ failed to consider the use to which the landlord 
proposed to put the land. The Court of Appeal held that this was an 
error vithin jurisdiction based upon failure to consider relevant 
evidence but the decision vas criticised by the House of Lords in 
Anisminic their Lordships regarding the tribunal as having considered 
a wrong question. n1e distinction between 'questions' and other 
material to be considered is also inapposite to apply to administrative 
discretions where a planninc authority is empowered to attact 'such 
conditions as it thinks fit' to a grant of planning permission. Here, 
conditious based upon irrelevant factors are invalid, but it is 
meaningless to describe the various factors contributing towards the 
decision as 'questions', and to distinguish between these, and other 
irrelevances. 
It is submitted that the classification of the type of defect in 
as jurisdictional should be restricted to the particular type of 
statutory scheme involved where the subject rrAtter to be conEidered 
by the Commission was formally listed in the governine Order in Council. 
Thus the mistake, in treating a person as successor in title, who was 
not, in the vie~ of the House of Lords.capable of beinG so treated, is 
closer to the collateral fact situation, (many so called collateral 
questions being really questions or lav) than to irrelevant considerations. 
Thus the commission vere dealing with the wrong subject matter, the 
existence of a euccessor in title being regarded by the majority as a 
condition precedent to jurisdiction. The wide dicta conceruine 
irrelevant factors in the speeches of Lord Reid and Lord Pearce cannot, 
it is suggested, be reconciled with the decisions of the House of Lords 
in Taylors case, Baldwin and Francis, and the Northumberland case. 
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The approach based upon jurisdictional subject matter has some 
support in the analoGous situation whcr~ decisions have been r.ade 
based upon lack of evidence or U!JOn ina.drlissnble evidence. 'l'he same 
inconsistency is appRrent since it has been held thAt decisious defective 
in this way are not void for excess of jurisdiction, but merely 
erroneous il• law ( 41) • However, in R. v. J.farsh(•lll 1892 l {tB. 371 at 
378 a distinction vas DlB.de between refusal of evidence on tlle groWld that 
it vas not relevant to the subject matter before the Court, "rbich was an 
error within jurisdiction, and refusal of evidence u:ron th(· croWld that 
tlle subject Jr.atter concerned vns not within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. This would constitute a jurisdictional defect. '}.bus if in 
Anisminic the CoJIDilission had made the converse mistake, i.e. decided 
erroneously that a particular person was not a successor in title, and 
therefore refUsed to consider evidence as to that person's nationality, its 
decision would .not he.ve been ultra vires for failin,~ to consider the 
correct subject matter. 
The rule in R. v. Marshem applies to formal bodies with jurisdiction 
to construe rules of evidence (42) but in principle there seens no 
reason why the same principle should not gov'=!rn e.droinistrative discretions • 
~ many of the decisions concerning discretions exercised U}~n irrelevant 
grounds, such as Roberts v. Hor>wood, Prescott v. nirrninchare Corporation, 
and Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture the point vas irnmuterial, and in 
others which were held to result in nullity, the main purpose of the act 
in question vas unauthorised. 
Lord Norris, dissenting in Anisminic appeared to take this approach. 
His Lordship regarded the use cf the phrase, 1 asl~ing the wrong question 1 
as appropriate to describe the situation where a tribunal's jurisdiction 
is dependent upon the existance of a condition precir.ent or ''related 
to some state of affairs" (193). Thils in ex parte Eierowski 1953 2Ql3 
147 a rent tribunal vas ern110Wered to reconsider rent upon the grounds 
of change of circumstances. A decision made where no change of 
circumstances was alleged was v:oid, not because relevant factors bad 
been ignored, but because the aituation upon which the jurisdiction 
depended bad not been sho~m to exist. Had the tribunal erroneously 
decided that there was a change of circumstances, it is submitted that 
the decision would still be void, as this was a jurisdictional question. 
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It is suggested therefore that irrelevanc:r should not produce 
nullity, unless the irrelevant consideration is sufficiently important 
to bring the decision withinp; the 'dominant purpose' principle. Only 
if the main purpose of the decision is improper, or where jurisdictional 
subject matter is involved~ is the resultinr. act void. ~~is preserves 
the diotinction between appeal and review and prevents the consequences 
of nullity attachinr, to all misuses of discretion houever trivial. 
Clearly the distinction ·uetween irrelevant considerations and improper 
purposes is a question of degree involvinr, a value jud£ement based upon 
the relationship between the extraneous material and the final decision. 
This distinction would, however, meet the problem postulated by De 
Smith (at 30b) where an authority, needing land for housine purposes 
r.akes a compulsory purchase order in respect of A's land, rather than 
B's or C's, because it dislikes A's political views. If the decision 
is grossly unreasonable because for example C's land is the most 
suitable for the purpose it can be inferred that·the irrelevancy is 
fundamental, and therefore the decision will be a nullity, giving A a 
cau~:>e of action in tort. If on the other hand the purchaRe of each 
plot can be equally justified the Court will treat the situation as 
involvine; error re-dressable only by appeal, or certiorari and thus 
exercise a diecretion whether to quash. Unless the bias rule was 
ap11licable in this situation the Court following Anisminic would 
probably have to treat the order as a nullity in both situations, the 
only alternative here being to regard the irrelevancy as completely 
immaterial, and therefore not to regard the decision as defective at all. 
The distinction between void and voidable in this context allows the 
Court flexibility of approach, and provides a round conceptional basis 
for the issue of discretionary remedies. 
One difficulty arises. It irrelevant considerations is treated as 
error within j,.1risdiction the Court; s paver to intervene will be limited 
by the face of the record rule, a concept inappropriate to administrative 
acts. However, there are some dicta that even latent defects are 
reviewable by means of the declaration (43) and that therefore the 
limitation to judi_cial acts, a part of certiorari law, is inapplicable. 
It will be shown later than this is unlikely ( 44) and that 
certiorari is the only reme~r appropriate to error of law. Even if 
this :i3 so the ambit of certiorari has been extended in recent years to 
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include non-judicial fUnctions (45) and certainly compulsory purchase 
orders (46) and grants of planning permission (47) have been treated 
as judicial for certain purposes. The notion of record is vide 
enough to include written reasons for a decision and pcri1aps extends 
to oral reasons (47) for a decision, particularly importan~ in the 
· light of the increasing number of situationo involving a statutory 
duty to give reasons for a decision. Even where no such duty 
exists! if the decision is unreasonable in the lirht of available 
evidence this can constitute patent error (48). 
T'nus the face of the record rule is capable of covering the 
F.reat majority of decisions in abuse of power, and the jurisdictional 
role should be limited to apply only to the more important of these, 
fraud and fUndamentally imrroper purposes. ~1is avoids the existing 
anomalies, and allows the reviewing Court greater flexibility in its 
treatment of unreesoneble decisions. 
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wr.ether jurisdiction can be destroyed as a result of an error 
made by the tribunal in a matter upon which it nulit decidt; is a 
crucial issue in Gordon's exposition of i1is theory of jurisdiction (1). 
Gordon, regards it fi.S illogical t:ClB.t a mistake in 0. ue.tter Wilich the 
tribunal is called upon to decide can result in nullity. J.'!;L; viev 
has been criticised abcvc (sec C:Ut~.rter 3). Nevertheless the 
traditional a:rproech of the Courts has been tc adopt a distinctior! 
between lack of jurisdiction and Jr.istake, treatinr: oistake as ::mci1 
as not affectinc: jurisdiction, and o.s producing at most a voic.a·ule 
decision which can be challenged only upon appeal or by certiorari 
if the defect is ratc~t (2). There is a contradiction involved in 
entrustinr, a matter to the decisiou of a tribunal, and allo·w-inr. revie\-r 
tor vires if the decision is "wroDF;". As Diplock L.J. pointed out in 
the Court of Ap:n.eal in Anisrninic, the terms ''rir;ht" and "wront:''. in a 
legal context have no o·ojective meaning. They merely denote the 
exiRtance of a. decision ma.dc b~" e. competent body, and the possibilit~·, 
for example by way of appeal, of another bo~v substitutinc its 
decision for the one in question (see 196'7 2 ALL:ii\ at 993). Nevertheless 
the tern error is wid~ er:ough to com~rehend, mistakes as to qualifications 
and procedure, and these are regarded as capable of affectinc 
jurisdiction. l~oreover a. tribunal dealing with the wroll£ Gubjcct matter 
is exceedillf. jurisdiction, even though the definition of the subject 
matter may involve decisions upcm questions of la'" a.nU. fact. '£hus in 
ex p. Zerek [195~ 1 ALLEr\ 482, the jurisdiction of a rent tri buncl. to 
reduce rents for unfurnished tenuncie~ was held to be dependent upon 
the "actual exista.nce of an unfurnished lettinG.', and that any wrong 
decision upon this matter resulted in the tribunal actinc ultra vires 
and the decision beine a nullity. Lord Goddart! said (at 485) ''If a 
certain state of facts has to exist before an infr·rior tribunal has 
jurisdiction, it car. inquire into the facts, in order to decide 
whether or not it has jurisdiction, but it cannot r,ive itself 
jurisdiction by a wrone decision on them". Gordon argues that this 
reasoning is invalid upon the ground that the matter in question is one 
which lies in the direct path of the tribunal to decide. If this is 
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correct, the result is that, unless a right of' appeal exists, 
limitations as to subject lllBtter are nugA.tory, a point particularly 
vell illustrated in decisions such as White and Collins v. tUnister of' 
Health 1939 2 KB 838, where negative limitations are involved (3). 
Thus the Courts have su~erirn:posed, upon tbe basic t'Iistinction 
between jurisdiction and error, the doctrine of' jurisdictionel,or 
collateral tact, which requires that any findinp, made ~J the tribunal 
upon a question which, as a. matter of statutory.~rpretetion, is 
relevent to definition of subject matter, and therefore operates as 
a condition prec edcnt to jurisdiction, is subject to review, a.nd 
that a wrong finding destroys jurisdiction (4) producinr nullity. 
Many of' these questions of fact are more accurately classified as 
questions of:'.law. However the distinction in this context is 
irnmateriol. (See the diet~ of Farwell J. in note (3) above). The 
notion of collateral findi~s is sufficiently imprecise to allow 
judicial discretion a wide rein, and a.s·Waee points out (5) is 
essentially a policy notion to allow control to b~ exercised over 
the findinss of inferior bodies. Lord Esher in B v. Commissioners 
f'or Special Purposes of Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313 at 319 regards 
that matter as one of 1 i:gisle.tive intention. It would be more 
accurate to treat the qu~:tion as one of' judicial intention, since 
the villinr.ne~s of the Court to classi~ f'indings as jurisdictional 
varies with changing policy. Thus in the United States where a 
doctrine of' "substantial evidence operates" the Courts are less 
inclined to treat findings as jurisdictional, since a reasonable 
measure of' control operat~s witho~t reco~se to the ultra vires 
principle.(6). Although the jurisdictional fact doctrine constitutes 
I 
a.···: useful "spare wheel'', particularly vhere the Courts vish to set 
aside findings vhich are supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, 
in this country it is possible that the strict doctrine of 
jurisdictional fact may be declining in inrportan~e, owing to the 
increasing usefulness of other methods of revie¥. Statutory rights 
of appeal o't lav are often the appro:rriate remedy 'tor challenging any 
wrong finding (7). Moreover the reasoning of' the House of Lords in 
Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation.Commission leads to the conclusion that 
the notion o't ultra vires can be liberally applied, since a decision 
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will be without jurisdiction if any error of construction leads to the 
introduction of extrn-eneous considerations or to the failure to take 
relevent factors intc account. This analysis has been criticised 
a hove (see Cht>.rter (.. ) • Finally there are signs of the en!ereence 
of a doctrine annloeous to that existing in the United Eltates. In 
Ashbriece v. Invest~ents v. Minister of Housing and Local Government 
[1965 J 1 \o:T.R 13~0 the Court of Ap!!eal held thet for the purnose of a 
statutory cleru-ance of order, neither a findinp; that a buildin{! wns 
"unf::.t for human hP.l>itation'' nor one thP.t it we.s ''a house" went in 
itself t,., jurisr'jction. J~oveve:r such findil!fA could be reviewed if 
unsupported b~· evi~ence, possibly only complete absence of evidence 
could justi!'j· reviev for ultra vires apon this ground, but insufficiency 
of evidence constitutes error of law, reviewable by certiorari (8). 
Gordon denie~ the validity of the doctrine of collateral fact, 
but nevertheless recor.nises that the Courts do utilize the device. 
Eis objections nre lo~ical and ere twofold. Firstly his notion of 
jurisdiction RS ce.racity to investi~ate specified matters, leads 
him to the concluaion that jurieC.iction, once obtained cannot be lost. 
It has been suerested above thattbis narrow notion of juriaC.iction is not 
as c. l'latter of logic necessary. Ca:nacit;\' in this context means power 
to bind, and the moment to ascertain this is when the purported decision 
becomes effective, at the end, rather than at the cor-.menceliient of the 
inquid·. :-.~oreover to recnrd every matter that the tribunal is called 
upon to decide as within jurisdiction is to deny the possibility of 
judicial review, since in every case a tribunal must, "in the direct 
path of itc inq_uir.r" decide whether it has jurisdiction. 
Secondly Gorden objects that it is logically impossible in any 
specific case where there are no express ste.tutory instructions to 
decide Which issues should be treated as jurisdictional. This has a 
substantial measure of agreement. Wade regards the notion of 
jurisdictional fact as illor.ical, but justifiable upon policy grounds, 
as a device to prevent tribunals exercising excessive powers (9). De 
Smith finds logical justification difricult (10) and Rubinstein finds 
thA.t the dividing line between jurisdictional and other questions ''is 
at best vague at the worst arbitrary" (11). Gordon collects 
numerouR aut~oritieR to show the iMpossibility of includinr. a general 
formula as a result of the many cases in which the Courts have held 
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issues to be jurisdictional (12). Certainly where the decision making 
process can be divided into two or more otages, in the sense that a 
finding upon a specified issue must be made before the tribunal can 
proceed vith its investigation into further matters, the doctrine is 
prima facie applicable (13). However almost every decision making 
process can be so treated, a fortiori where the statute expressly 
lists the findings that must be made, as in the Anisminic case. More 
specific formula verge upon the paradoxical. Thus it has been said 
that a jurisdictional question is one'vhich is extrinsic to the 
adjudication impeached" (1~) or "not the main question which the 
tribunal have to decide" (15). This compels the conclusion that 
the less important an issue is, the higher is the chance of it beinr: 
treated as jurisdictional. Jaffe holds the converse view, that, 
"jurisdictional matters are those upon which the legislatures attention 
has been focused, and that the word "jurisdiction'1 simply expresses the 
sravity of the error (16). From this would follow the absurd 
proposition that the question of guilt or innocence in a criminal case 
is jurisdictional, :tul.filling as it does, both these criteria. Nor 
can the relative gravity of the many kinds of error which a tribunal 
may commit, easily be determined. 
any error is important. 
If an unjust decision results, 
It is therefore suggested that a search for an a priori formula 
applicable to any set of facts is an inappropriate approach. The 
problem is of the same logical nature as that involved in questions of 
causation. If an act occurs it forms the culmjnation of a chain of 
cause and effect events extending backwards into time indefinitely. 
n1e distinction between proximate and remote cause gives rise to 
philosophical issues (17). In a legal context however the issue is 
partly, though not completely one of policy, namely what acts should the 
law regard as contributing towards liability for an event which involves 
damage ( 18) • There is also a logical element involved, and this does 
not involve an a priori formula but depends upon the particular context 
or each situation. In a specific context but not otherwise it is 
possible to distinguish those conditions of an event which constitute 
conditions sine qua non, tram those which are necessary or sufficient 
to complete the event. 
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This also applies in the collateral fact context. The idea of 
preliminary expresses nat an absolute concept, but a relationship which 
is meaningful therefore only in the context of a particular (statutorJ) 
situation. As D. J. Bentley shows (19) the analogy is to be found 
in language. The respective fUnctions of adjectives and adverbs is 
clear. But a particular word can only be classified when it is seen 
in position in a group of vords such as e. clause or phrase which 
constitute a meaningfUl whole. Thus the fUnction of collateral 
findings is all that can be determined upon an a priori basis. Rubinst·ein 
describes such a tunction as the formation of the "gatevay through vhich 
the tribunal must pass to reach the safe ground of its jurisdictional 
sphere". Thus jurisdictional issues can be identified in a particular 
context partly by means of a value judgement, and partly by dividinc 
the various issues which tall to be determined into logically sep.arate 
chains of reasoning. In this ve:y at least, t~.ose which might poBsible 
constitute conditions precident can be separated from those vhich form 
an integral part of the reasoning leading to the decision. This 
approach is reflected by ordinary J.angu.age and recognises the element 
. 
ot policy which is involved. The policy factors which are relevant 
can also be examined, and it is in the search for these that the 
decided cases are relevant, rather than as aids to producing a general 
formula. 
Gordon's declared antipathy towards judicial discretion, conditions 
his attitude to questions of jurisdiction. In many areas of lav the 
language used being "open textured" in characters allows for judicial 
value judgements (20). This is not merely inevitable but advantageous. 
Unless legislation attempted the impossible ta.Sk of listing every 
specific situation, questions of degree, value and importance, must be 
settled by a value judgement, which although limited by the linguistic 
possibilities of the particular concept, is no l~ss e.pplicable to 
questions of jurisdiction than in the fields of tort and contract. 
Gordon se:ys (21) "But have the Courts any right to have policies? 
They are supposed to follow definite legal principles which me:y grov, 
but are supposed to be self consiatant". 
submitted, leads to unreal difficulties. 
This attitude, it is 
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Finally Gordon dravs a distinction betveen judicial and 
administrative decisions (22) regarding it as acceptable that an 
administrative act such as the discretionary power of the Home Secretary 
to deport aliens, be dependent for its validity upon the existence of 
a fact situation. It is submitted that, even if it is possible to lay 
dovn a general fomula to distinguish betveen the judicial and the 
administrative, such a distinction is not relevent to this context. 
Gordon, perhaps because of the res judicata principle attaches 
peculiar significance to the notion of a judicial finding. As 
Rubinstein shows, the doctrine of res judicata is not relevant to the 
question of validity for judicial reviev purposes (23). The doctrine 
operates as a defence.vhere a matter alre~- decided by an authorised 
body is in question in later proceedings of the same kind (24). If 
a decision is void for excess of jurisdiction the doctrine is not 
applicable. As far as errors within jurisdiction are concerned, it 
may be that the strict doctrine of res judicata does not apply to 
administrative decisions (25}. Hovever ther~ appearo to be no material 
distinction betveen the tvo kinds of function. In both cases an 
official is given a discretion to make a decision upon a prescribed 
subject matter. The distinguishing characteristic of a judicial 
f'unction appears to ·be that the discretion must be exercised in the 
light of prescribed factors which are required by the statute to be 
taken into consideration (26). An administrative discretion on the 
other hand involves no such mandatory requirement to make objective 
findings (27). However in both cases the subject matter of the 
decision is limited by the statute, and thus the collateral fact 
principle operates, whether the decision is one of a rent tribunal 
required to apply prescribed standards in fixing rent for "furnished 
dwellings" or of the Home Secretary required to determine as a matter 
of policy whether an "alien" should remain in this country. In both 
cases a situation must "objectively" exist (that is in the opinion of 
a reviewing Court} before jurisdiction can arise. In both cases it 
is convenient to allow crucial issues relevant to the limitations of 
the power in question to be determined by the Court, this being the 
rationale of the jurisdictional fact doctrine. 
As mentioned above, the majority of jurisdictional facts, involve 
the application of statutory definitions-and are therefore more properly 
classified as error of law, which is reviewable by certiorari without 
recourse to the ultra vires doctrine. However if this course of 
action is taken the decision will be voidable only (29), whereas, 
where the collateral fact doctrine is relied upon, the decision must 
be a nullity. Thus despite the convenience of certiorari and statutory 
remedies for errors of law, it is still necessary to distinguish the 
special class of error which falls within the jurisdictional fact 
principle. Horeover recent developments which indicate that an 
appeal is not an appropriate remedy where the decision in ~uestion is 
ultra vires (30) ~v accentuate the importance of the device. 
Apart tram this doctrine it is established thet errors of tact are 
not reviewable nt all, and that errors of law, are revielrable only if 
on the face of the record, and by means of certiorari (31). There is 
however some authority that even latent error can be reviewee if the 
declaration is utilised since the face of the record rule is simp~' 
an incident of certiorari law (32). Against this it can be argued that 
the declaration does not lie against a voidable decision, and that the 
rule allowine review for error within jurisdiction is itself only a result 
of the historical development of certiorari (33). It is clear that 
error within jurisdiction results in a decision that is voidable only. 
This was expressly lield both ·by the Court of .Appeal and the House of Lords 
in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, and supported by the 
decisions of the _Court of Appeal in Healy v. I>!inister of Health [:.954] 
3 ALLER 452, and Punton v. Hinister of Pensions (No. 2) [l9C4J l ALLER 
488 in both of which cases the Court refused to intervene by means of the 
declaration upon the ground that a valid, albeit erroneous, decision 
had been made by the competent authority and there was no machinary 
available for settinc this aside. In ex p. Armah ~968] A.C. 192 
Lord Reid said (at 234) "Neither an error in fact nor an error in law 
will destroy jurisdiction". Nevertheless there exists a body of 
authority that patent error of law is a jurisdictional defect and 
produces nullity. If latent error of lav is not reviewable at all, 
then this proposition leads to the conclusion that all reviewable, 
as opposed to appealable decisions are void, a tidy solution which is 
however inconvanient as a matter of policy, since wholesale invalidation 
of administrative action as a result of technicalities is as 
pernicious as ineffectual judi cal remedies. If, on the other hand 
latent errors are also reviewable then the distinction between 
voidness and voidability appears to depend UT>On the technical question 
of the record, an equally unsatisfactory viev. It is rensonably clear 
hovever that latent error ot lav is not reviewable. There are dicta to 
this effect in Aniaminic (at 196) and the decisions in the Northumberland 
Case (abo~e) and in Baldwin t Francis v. Patent Appeal Tribunal [195~ 
A. C. 66 3 where the meaning of ''the record'' vas examined in detail, are 
inexplicable if the possibility of reviev did not depend upon whether 
the record discloses the defect. 
The authorities in favour of patent error bei~a jurisdictional 
d~~ect appear to be based upon the notion that disclosure of an error 
by the record is an insult t.o the legal system and therefore a gross 
abuse of pover (33). Thus in R. v. Hahony [1910] 2 IR E95, Pallas C.B. 
at least thought ~hat patent error vas a jurisdictional matter, and 
would not be protected by a privative clause. Another source of conf-
usion vas the belief that certiorari l~y only for jurisdictional defects 
which led to attempts to subsume a.l.l defects reviewable by certiorari u 
under this head. In ex p. Perry [1955] 3 ALLER at 395. Goddard L.J. 
said "Certiorari is a remedy granted ••.•• where a tribunal has exceeded 
its jurisdiction ••.•. if' 9!1_. th~---f_'~c~ of'. th~ ... !'l_otific!l:tJpn_o_r_ E-~-~~i~e.~i!J.!l_B 
ve could see that they had taken into accol.Dlt something that vas not a 
service at all ..••• the Court could s~ that the tribunal vas acting 
vithout jurisdiction"(34). It is difficult to reconcile this vith 
ex p. Shaw where it vas established that the face of the record rule 
applies to administrative tribunals. It was accepted in that case 
that certiorari lies to jurisdictional defects, and thus the decision 
would have been unnecessary had the patent error in quesion been 
jurisdictional. The Court ot Appeal regarded itself as reintroducing 
the rule that certiorari will lie for non-jurisdictional defects if 
they appear on the record (see Denning L.J. U-952]1 Ia3 at 348). 
This decision shows that the proper explanation of the face of 
the record rule is that it is an exceptional ground of review existing 
as a result of the historical development of' certiorari. Thus it 
operates by way of exception to the rule that voidable decisions are not 
reviewable. This is also supported by convenience since nullification 
as a result ot a technical error is a disproportionately severe 
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consequence, and is also couiatant with the theorJ or jurisdiction 
both conceptually and historically. The ODly substantial group 
ot cases inconaistant vith this consists ot a number ot ratinc. 
decisions where it vas aauumed that patent de~ects allov a distress 
varrent tor non p8l'11lent ot rates to be collaterally impeR.Ched vithout 
the rate tint beiDE ~\lAShed (3·5). 1-:ovever, this view vu negatived 
by the Court ot Appeal. iD ex p. Peachey Properties Ltd. [196 ~1 QB 380 
where a ~uation list constructed upon a wrong legal basis vas 
reprded as voidable cml.y, ~d therefore certiorari vas neceasa.r:• to 
quash, . betore lll&lldamus could issue to the valuation otticer to 
construct a new list. Rubinstein (36) shows that ir the relevant 
decisions are exaained the detects invol ~d vill appear as 
... 
jurisdictional matters involving non-occupancy and pr~ses situated 
outside the ratios area. 
It is submitted therefore that patenterror does not result in 
nullity, and that it is clearly eatabliabed that latent error, it 
reviewable at all, can similarly produce no mere than a widable 
4ecision. However the doctrine ot jurisdictional tact pJ"Ovides a 
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PART III. EFFECTS OF THE DISTINCTION 
(a) Appeals 
The exercise of e right of appeal is in principle only possible 
where the initial decision is voidable. If a decision is void then 
all subsequent proceedings including appellate ones should also be 
void. Further i~ can be said that an appellate court has no 
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a nullity, since this would 
be ass~in[ original rather than appellate powers. In viev of the 
many statutory provisions in force governing appeals from administrative 
'bodies, in particular under .S9 of' the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958, 
this consequence of a strict approach to nullity would cause inconvenience 
in au area alre~v beset by numerous formulary problems. 
Three situations can be distinguished. 
1. Where a right of appeal exists and has not been exercised but the 
applicant seeks review of the decision. 
2. Where a right of appeal has been exercised, but the plaintiff' still 
seeks to invoke the review powers of the Court. 
3. 'Where the plaintiff exercises a right of appeal on the ground that 
the initial decision is ultra vires. 
1. There is a consistlnt body of authority that, where a decision is 
a nullity, failure to take advantage of appellate procedure does not 
prevent the plaintiff from obtaining certiorari, or a declaration. 
Thus in Cooper v. Wilson [ 193'!] 2 KB 209, the appellant had been 
dismissed from his post in the Police Force, as a result of a decision 
by the Watch CoDDllittee which the Court of Appeal held to be void. It 
was contended that under the governing legislation the plaintiffs sole 
right vas to appeal to the Home Secretary. The Court held that this 
right of appeal need not be exercised where the decision vas a nullity. 
Greer L.J. said (at 32l.) "It would be idle for a plaintiff who has never 
been dismissed to appeal to the Secretary ot state". Similarly in 
Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 1 ALLER 1113·D~nnitig L.J. in 
dealing with the relationship between a statutory code governing 
complaints against vrongf'ul. dismissal and the prerogative orders thought 
that an appeal tram a void decision would itself be a nullity (at lll9). 
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In Birmingham Overseers v. Shav (1849) 10 QB 868 at 880, Lord 
Denman thought that the position in sucl1 ~- case vas that the party 
affected may appeal, but if the decision is void, is not bound to do 
so. This appears to be the principle underlying R.S.C. Ord 53R2(2) 
which allows the Court a discretion to adjourn an application for 
certiorari, to qua iJh an order subject to an appeal vi thin a limited 
time, while that appeal is pending. 
However these cases can be explained upon the vio.er eround the.t 
the existance of an alternative statutory remedy is not necessarily 
a bar to judicial review (1) unless the remedy provided is, as a. l'liB.tter 
of interpretation intended to be exclusive (2). Thus in Coopers case 
(above) Greer L.J. regarded the relationship between the issue of a 
declaration and a statutory right of appeal as R r~tter for the 
discretion of the Court. Thus in decisions concerning the statutory 
procedures for challenge provided under various statutes concerning 
decisions affecting land ( 3} it has been held that such decisions cannot 
directly be challenged after the lapse of the prescribed period of time 
(4) although the position may be otherwise in the case of collateral 
challenge ( 5) • Thus the Court in its discretion may refuse 
certiorari or a declaration if a convenient right of appeal exists, 
irrespective of whether the decision is void or voidable, an~ 
conversly will exercise its review powers despite the existence of a 
statutory remedy where the decision is only voidable (f). 
However if the defect does not go to jurisdiction it is submitted 
that the statutory right of appeal is prima facie the appropriate 
remedy, whereas for jurisdictional d.efects review procedures are 
appropriate (7). This can be inferred fron-. the decisions in Chapman 
v. Earl [ 1968] 2 ALLER 1214, and Hetropoli tan Property Co. v. Lannon 
[.196lD .1 ALLER 354. Both decisions involved. appeals ~der 89 of the 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958. In Earl!s case this vas coupled with 
an application for certiorari to quash a decision of a rent officer for 
breach of a mandatory procedural requirement. The Vi visional Court 
helC. that the decision vas a nullity and the Court vent on to say (at 1220) 
that "the appeals are misconceived and. that relief cannot be given to 
him except by certiorari". In Lannons case a decision of a rent 
tribunal was challenged for bias. It vas held by the Court of Appeal 
[1968J 3 ALLER 304 that the decision would be quashed upon certiorari, 
the appeal procedure being relevant only to a subsidiary objection as to 
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the statement of reasons. The Divisional Court expressed the "gravest 
doubts" as to the appropriateness of an arpeal. procedure to quabh a 
decision for bias. 
It is submitted thc.t where n str.tutory nppca.l. or otia r det.ermination 
ic held tc be the exclusive renedy, the void voidRbl~ distinction 
becomes relevant since, n~tho'Ll{i:h the Court is precluded ty the Statute 
froi:I substituting its decision for that of the statutory body, no 
infringe."lent o1' thi.:; is irNolvcC. if the Court awards a C'.eclurntion to 
t!1.e effect that no decision hnc been na.de by the competent authority. 
Thus in Heal.e:; v. Hini:::tcr of r:eclth [19)5] 1 QB 221 the Court of 
Apreal refused to grant a declu.ration concerning a question which the 
govcrnin~; legislation entrusted to the Hinicter on the ground that this 
would Give rise to two inconsistant decisions (Per Denninr, L.J. at 228) 
but left open the possibility of avarding a declaration upon the basis 
that the decision vas void because the ~linister lacked jurisdiction. 
2. \-lh.ere a ri6ht of' appeal has been exercisecl and the aJ.lplicant then 
enlists the aid of the Court the nullity principle has been invoked 
to allow him to do so. In Annamunthodo v. Oilfield lvorkers Trade 
Union [196~ A.C. 945 the applicant had appealeu against dismissal 
from a. trade union to a.n authority whose decision was under the rules 
of the Union to be ''final and binding". The Judicial Co:tm!li ttee of the 
Privy Council held that this did not prevent his present application 
for a declaration that the decision vas contrary to natural justice. 
"If the decision vas null and void the appeal. to the Annual Conference 
cannot me.ke any difference" (Per Council arguendo at 949). 
This principle was applied in a Statutory context in Barnard v. 
National Dock La.bour Board [1953] 2 QB 18. The Plaintiff was 
suspended from his emplo:yment by an Official to whom authority had 
been wrongfully sub-delegated. His appeal to a StatutorJ Tribunal 
was dismissed. The Court however were prepared to issue a declaration. 
Singleton L.J. said (at 3}.) "If ••• the notice of suspension was a 
nullity, the fact that there was an untuccesful appeal on it cannot 
turn that which vas a nullity into an effective suspension!!. 
Similarly in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 an unsuccessful 
appeal to the Home Secretary did not prevent the plaintiff from seeking 
a declaration that his dismissal vas void as contrary to natural 
justice. Lord Morris stated the governing prinlidple (at 126) when he 
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said "An appeal to the Secretary of State raises the question whether a 
decision which ••••• has validity, should or should not be upheld. 
The question raised ••••• vas the fUndamental point that the purported 
decision of the watch committee vas no decision''. 
However, it vas assumed in these decisions that tbe applicant vas 
entitled to exercise the prescribed rights of Appeal, which e.s De Smith 
points out (7) gives him "two bites at his cherry". It is submitted 
that, if this is correct the court in its discretion should be able 
to vithold a remedy in appropriate circumstances, for eXIU'lple if the 
plaintiff had failed to raise ~he relevant objectionR at the appeal (8). 
This is an aspect of the law governing particular remedies, and 
analytically distinct tram questions of voidness and voidability. 
3. The cases discussed above have generally proceeded upon the basis 
that a right of appeal can be exercised vbether the decision ia void or 
voidable. If this were not so the statutory procedures whereby an 
"order" m.aj• be challenr;ed in the High Co\L'I"i; on specified grounds within 
a period of six veeks would appear to be nugatory if confined to 
voidable decisions only~ since the prescribed erounds of challenge are 
confined to jurisdictional mattern (9). 
However certain decisions have applied the strict consequences of 
nullity to the effect that an appellate body has no jurisdiction to 
hear an appeal from a void decision (10}. Thus in ChRpman v. Earl 
(above) the divisional Court regarded certiorari as the appropriate 
remedy since the decision concerned was made without jurisdiction and 
void and refused to allow an appeal under 89 of the Tribunals and Inquiries 
Act 1959 regardinl\ such a course as "nisconceived". This is a self 
destructive principle since as Lord HacMillan add in l·IcPherson:v. 
McPherson "Where a judge has assUI!led jurisdiction which he did not 
possess and on appeal it is held that he had no jurisdiction, is his 
judgement treated as a nullity, and if so how can you appeal against itt" 
If no decioion exists, it tl8.:f be argued that botl! appeal and review are 
inpossible. 
The same principle was ar.plied by ~-1e(!Urt;r J. in the recent case of 
Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [1970J 2 ALLER 713 where the 
Plaintiff vas expelled ~am the Union in Breach of Natural Justice. It 
was argued that the deficiency in natural justice was cured b:r a fair 
- 91 -
hearing before a.n appellate tribunal. It we.a h~Jd however that since 
the hearinr, by the appellate bo~v was, in effect the first hearing, the 
previous decision being a. nullity, the Appeals Committee could not 
assume an original jurisdiction and thus the appeal was invalid. 
However it is submitted that a simpler explanation of the decision can 
be found, in t}w.t if a failure of natural justice wo.s curealJle by a 
proper appee.l tlte pltiinti ff vould in effect be deprived r:£ the chance 
of t•.1o fair heerinr;s, on the merits. The appellate proceedinF:s would 
constitute the first legitimate henrinc available to the plaintiff and 
he would be depriver: of his right of appeal (at P. 720). 
There iG adeyuate nuthority to tl.e ·effect that a:ppellate proceedings 
are a suitable fora.>:~ to c~nvess jurisdictional defect9. Express 
dicta from the Court of Appeal can be found in O'Connor v. Isaacs 1956 
2 QB at ::.64 and Re Purkise' Application 1962 1 'W!..R 902 where Diplock 
L.,J. said of the Land Tribunal "Its decision either that it had 
jurisdiction or that it had no jurisdiction is not conclusive. It 
can be questioned either on appeal •.••• or by certiorari" Other 
decisions, including those discussed above assume the appropriateness 
of this method of challenging jurisdiction (11). 
It is submitted that here is a situation where it is obvious that 
the Court must sacrifice lo~i c to convenience. statutory methods of 
challenr;e provide a conveniant way or avoiding the procedw·al tangles among 
the traditional preror,ative end equitable re~edies. It would be 
particularly unsatisfactory to limit the scope of 69 of the Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act for conceptual reasons. 
(b) Certiorar~ 
Certiorari being an order to quash an invalid decision is not 
strictly necessary where the decision is a nullity, ita function being 
solely declaratory (12). This has resulted in the refusal in certain 
early cases to issue certiorari where the decision was void, and to 
leave the applicant to his remedy by way of collateral attack (13). As 
a result it has sometimes been said that any decision quashable by 
certiorari is valid until quashed (14). Before the availability of 
certiorari for error of law on the face ot the record vas applied to 
the field of administrative tribunals in the Nineteen Jltties, it was 
thougbt (15) that certiorari lay only for jurisdictional defects. This 
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coupled vith the above rule led to absurdity where it was sometimes 
denied that certiorari had any scope at nll in this area. Thus in 
R v. Burnaby (1703) 2 Ld Raym 9000 Powell J, in dealine vith an 
application for certiorari to quashe a conviction by justices said 
"If they had jurisdiction, the act that rests their jurisdiction in 
them excl~ldes us and everyboey else to call in question their 
judgement • • • • . and if they have not juriodiction then an action 
lies against the maker, and him that executes the conviction anu that 
is the }'1e.rties proper remedy". The device of assertinr. ttwt certiorari 
was excluded only in caaeo of "manifeat lack of jurisdiction'· wo.s 
sometimes relied upon gi v:ing credance oft.! the relationship between 
certiorari and the face of the record rule (16). 
This view is inconsistent "rith the veir)lt of authority since, 
even before the face of the record rule was re-established it was 
settled that certiorari lay for juriedictione.l defects~ even thouGh 
the decision concerned was held to be void, \othere n priVE.tivE: clause 
vas involved (17). The Courts in these eases bnve consistantly held 
that certiorari will be, despite the existence of such e cle.use where 
the decision is a nullity for w~~t of jurisdiction. It is well 
established now that jurisdictional defects are revie·.ratle b~r certiorari 
(16). 
A similar conf'usion bas existed as a result the converse 
assl.Dilption that certiorari lies only where the decision is e. nullity. 
Cases where certiorari has quashed decisions patently defective in law 
have sometimes been justified upon the bnsis that these defects result 
in nullity ( 19). However the law is nov clear ths.t certiorari has 
tvo separate areas of supervision. "One is the o.re3 of the inferior 
jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of itc exercise. 
The other is the observance of Lavin the course of itc exercise" (20). 
Certiorari will, illogically lie to revie't· jurisdictional defects 
even though it bas been recognised (21) thet there is strictly no need 
to quash. Certiorari will also tulfill whnt is historically its 
original tunction, that of setting aside a record upon wLicL e. defect 
is apparant (22) and it :B clear that this kine of de:t't:.ct results in 
a voidable decision, allcming a constitutive role to the Order. 
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(c) Declaration 
It can be maintained thnt the Declaratory Judp,eoent iv appropriate 
only to reviev void decisions Akehurst points out that a "declaration is 
in strict theory merely declaratory of existing rights, it does not 
constitute nev rightEl. /, declarnticn that a decision iG voidable is an 
nclJJot:ledgc1ent thu.t the c.lecision is liable to be quafihcd, but it does 
not actually que.sb the decision. Consequently the Cou...-ts have 
aometiL1es refuGeu to issue declarations in respect of voi<iuble clecisions 
because. tlle:r consider that public respect for tbe Courts vould be 
i.mpowerec: if they passeu judgements which the defend9Jlt was under no 
lee;al obligation to alley''. (C.3) 
Fron. this it appears that the C::eclara.tion is a collateral form 
of challenge in that it operates only to state an existinf: legal 
relationship. If a decision, for exBIIlple of expulsion purports to 
alter that relationship, a declaration states *.ether it has done so, 
and thus can e>..-pose voidallle decisions only to tht. extent that they 
must be regarcled as effective until quashed. Thus it is only useful 
if a decision is a nullity. 
It is not clear whether the Courts do rely u:pon this conceptual 
approach in vielr of the recel_:·tion of the declaratory judge!l!ent as a 
"general" administrative law remedy (24). Further, even if this 
attitude is taken it is not clear whether the Courts refuse jurisdiction 
to issue a declaration to a voidable decision, cr whether this is simply 
an aspect of the discretionary nature of the reme~r, and a wider aspect 
of the rule that a declaration will not issue \lhere it serves no useful 
purpose (25). 
Tbe Jurisdiction to issue a declaration in respect of an administr-
:~tive decision arises from R.s.c. Ord 25 Rule 5 which provides that ":tlo 
actior. shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely dec1aratory 
judgement is sought thereby and the Court may make binding declarations 
of ri$t whether any consequential relief can be claimed or nat". Less 
frequently a declaration can be sought by way of originatine summons 
under Ord 54A Rule, lA vhich refers to "any person claiming ~· legal or 
equitable right in a case where the determination of. the question whether 
he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of the construction 
of a statute.11 
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Both provisions refer to declarations ot right, as opposed to 
declarations or the invalidity of the act concerned. This is reflected 
by the law as to l.ocus standi for the declaration, and also by 
difficulties arising where the decision concerned does not affect legal 
rights. In Gregory v. Camden n. C. [ ]96~ WLR 869 Paul J. refused to 
issue a declaration that a grant of planning pe~iesion was ultra 
vires because the Plaintiff whose premises adjoined the property had 
no connection with the isaue apart from an interest in amenity 11All: . .a 
declaratiou does is to declare the rights of a particular individual". 
Similarly Dipl.ock L.J. in Anislilini'- v. For.eign Compensation Commission 
1967 2 ALLEINSl.wao doubtful wbetl1er a declaration would lie acainst 
the Foreign Compensation Commission whose decision vas merely precedent 
to executli.ve action to be taken by another body. 1'he Court would have 
no jurisdiction to declare the decision itself erroneous. "'l'he 
Jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to declaring the existence of 
legall.y enforceable rights and liabilities'~' (26). llowever this viev 
was 'doubted in the same case in the liouse of Lords (27) and it is 
possible to find examples of declarations taking the form that a decision 
is invalid, or ultra vires as well as dicta that this is possible (28). 
Bovever even in these cases the declaration includes a statement as to 
the plaintiffs personal rights or liabilitieG, that, for example, in 
case of wrongful dismissal., he still has pension rights (29) or that 
where he is contesting an invalid revocation of planning per.mission, 
that he still has e. 1,.;rmission. The term "rights" in this context 
has a wide rather than a Hoh;f'eldian meaning~ extending to all lega;t 
rel.ationships, particularly important being the immunity 9 di.oability ~ 
or "no right", privilege rel.ationships vbere the plaintiff seeks a 
declaration that he need not comply with a particular order or decision 
(30). 
Despite this collateral and non constitutive aspect ot the 
declaration it is significant that only a minority of decisions have J: · 
I 
proceeded upon the basis that a declaration precedes nullity, and in 
each case an alternative explanation is possible. 
In Healey v. Uinister of Health [l95l!J 3 ALLER 452 the r.Unister of 
Health was empowered to determine who was a mental health officer for 
the purpose of statutory superannuation regulations. The Plaintiff 
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sour~t a declaration that he vas a mental health officer within the 
meaning of the regUlations alleging that the Ministers decision tothe 
contrary vas erroneous in lav. It vas held that as the statute had 
entrusted the matter to the 1-ti.nister, no otller body had jurisdiction to 
determine the question. This vas an application of the rule in 
Barraclough v. Brown [189] A.C. 615 providine; that "here a statute 
entrusts a matter exclusively to the jurisdiction of another body, an 
ordinary court cannot determine that matter and was sufficient to 
dispose of the ease. In fact Morris L.J. (at 231) pointed out that 
the position might he.ve been different had. the decision been challenged 
by w~ of the Courts supervisory jurisdiction for ultra vires, or error 
of lav. However Lord Denning vas concerned the.t unleos the 1-tinisters 
decision vas revoked by him of his ovn free will, it would still stand. 
"There would then be two inconsistant findings, one by the l~inister and 
one by the Court. That would be Fl most undesirable state of affairD". 
(at 228) His Lordship thoueht ,that had the declaration been formulated 
as a declaration that the decisior, vas erroneous in le.v, the plaintiff 
might have suceeded. The same objection however would remain even 
here. The declaration doeo not involve machinery for setting the 
decision aside, thus h011ever formulated would be useless. 
Zamir regards this decision as an attempt to resort to the original 
jurisdiction of the High Court which failed because the jurisdiction had 
been entrusted to the t.ti.nister ( 31) • However the majority regarded the 
decision as an attempt to appeal tram a decision which could not be set 
aside. It is clear trom Morris L.J. 'a speech that the Court would have 
been able to declare that the Hiniaters decision was a nullity. 
In Punton v. Minister of Pensions (No.2) the declaration vas 
expressed in the form that a Tribunals decision that the plaintif'f's 
were "persons interested in an industrial dir1pute'' and f:IO not entitled 
to unemployment benefit, vas erroneous in lav. The Court of' J\r'Jleal 
retused to issue the declaration on the ground that the matter was 
entrusted to the Tribunal and that the Triburinl. 's decision was binding 
until revoked. Sellers L.J. (at 451) regarded certiorari as an 
appropriate remedy since this would merely quash the decision and would 
not usurp the tunction of' the tribunal. An application could also be 
made under 89 of the TriblDlale and Inquiries Act 1958. His Lordship 
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(at ~55) Mde it alear that the declaration in ~itself did not. involve 
any machinar,y for setting aside the decision. Hovever llie Lordship 
also regarded the diseretion ot the Court to refUse declaratory relief 
as relev-•t. 'l'he eftect of the statute vas to "emphasise the need tor 
spocdj and final deci ... Q.cma" by a lltatut.ory authority. 1-'er Davies L.J • 
. "(at l57) -Md:'ti}erefo:re litigant& should Dot be encour&ae<! to cbme·"to· --.~~~,.__, 
the courts after a del£zy ot six months durins 'Which the deci1don could 
have been appealed under 89. 
The element or discretion rather thBn W'l o.lJaolute lack of 
Jurisdiction to issue the declaration vas aloo revealed in the manner 
in which Geller{~! J. diotinguiahed Ta:rlor v. lia.tional. Assiatonce Board 
(l95GJ P470 vhere the Court ~e~e prepcred to issue a declaration in 
.respect of a decision vhioh vas merely erroneous, and not regarded an 
ultra vires. 'l'be Doard there had po-"'ers of &niendlllent , and thwr; a 
declaration that ito decision vns voidable vould have served a use1'ul 
purpooe. 
T!1ese tvo cases altbough etl'lphasisin£ the logical dirticulties 
involve<i in obtaining a declr.rt~tion against a voidu."Lile decisio11, are 
it is au"Limitted not concluaive to prevent the Court rror .. issuing a 
declaration in aucl, circwastnnces. 
Further support. for the proposition can be found i:c Wal.teru t. 
Eton R.D.C. [1950] 2 ALLEn 588 where the Court of J.r,pe.U Y&S asked to 
issue a declaration that the Flaintirf vas enti tletl tc I.lllrlidpate in 
a statutory superannuation tund. The Minister va.u en:.povcred to 
dctentine questions arisinB out of the provisionn of the statute • and 
it vas provided that l1is ''determination shall be fino.ln. ':i.'he 
declaration vas refused on th~ ground that as the respou~ible authority 
had already reached ita decision the Court vould uot suuctitute ita 
awn viev. in the face ot this valid, albeit erroneou.o detemxw.tion. 
liovever it vas CCilDilOn around that if the r:ecioion vnz made by 
the proper authority 1 t could not \ie chflll,enged ~ ancl the only issue in 
4iapute vas whether the defendant aa employer • or the County Council 
u administer-in£ authority vas the "body chargee vitb the decision 
makillG povar". Therefore the attention or the Court \Tue not dravn 
to tbe seneral. question or vhether "a. declaration vas the appropriate 
nme~. 
Other cleobioua ottu quated in npport ot the unsuitability_ ot_ t.be 
'·· 
. / . 
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declaration in the field of erroneous decisions are similarly based 
upon the rule that Where a matter is entrusted to a specified body 
for determination the High Court cannot itself determine that matter 
(32). This concerns restriction of original, not of supervisory 
jurisdiction. The only authority dealing with supervisory jurisdiction 
is Punton and· in this case it is submitted that the element of 
discretion is the underlying ratio. 
However where legislation is construed as havinG entrusted a 
dispute to the exc),.~i ve determination of an ac:!ministrati ve body, 
the distinction betw~ void and voidable has some bearin~ upon the 
"1 b" . \d 1 • . ava1 a 1l1ty of the ec arat1on s1nce where the body concerned has 
.failed to make a deteroination the plaintiff should be able to declare 
the.t the plaintiffs legal :position has not been altered. Thus if a 
purported decision is a nullity the Court can issue a declaration to 
that effect, and the situation in Healey and Punton does not arise. 
Thus in Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Housing,e. grant of planning 
permission in respect of the plaintiffs quarrying activities was 
eheJ.lenged on the grounds that the jl.U'"isdiction to grant such 
permission hac 'Jeen removed by statute. The ·court of Appeo.l held 
that, despite the existance of a code of statutory appeals procedure 
the declaration was an appropriate rerneey iD this case, since its 
subject was whether the plaintiffs common law rights to quarry had 
been restricted by a valid decisioD. The Court was not usurping a 
tunetion entrusted to another bof.Y.~ 
This limited application of the nullity principle justifYing the 
issue of a declaration, does not support the wide statement ~hat a 
declaration will not lie to a voidable decision (33). 
There is direct authority to the contrary in Taylor's ease above, 
and a considerable amount of indirect authority in cases vbere the 
Courts have issued declarations without regarding nullity as a condition 
precedent, albeit the decisions were held for ~her purposes to be void 
( 34) • · In other eases the Court has doubted J'hether the decision is 
wid or voidable, but have nevertheless been prepared to issue a 
declaration (35). 
Diplock L.J. 's doubt in Anisminlc [ 1961] 3 WLR 412 as to the 
aTailability ot the declaration against a decision of a tribunal that 
V&8 elTODeoUB in lav, is sometimes quoted in SUpport ot the limitation 
in question ( 36) • Hovever this vas baaet upon the principle that aa 
- 98 -
the declaration must refer to the rights of the parties, the tribunBl 
is an unsuitable object for it, since its determination under the 
statutory provisions concerned, did not itself set up private rirpts, 
but was merely a condition precedent to action by another person. It 
is that person against whom the declaration should be issued. "The 
conduct of the inferior tribunal wl}~ther._it_ i~.!L __ nul_l_!~y __ or_.n()~ is not 
capable of giving rise to any cause of action against him on the part 
of the claimant" (at 413). Thus the issue of voidness or voidibility 
is irrelevant in this context. 
The most convincing group of cases, hovever, are those ,.,here the 
Courts have discussed the scope of the declaration in relation to 
error of lav. There are wide dicta particularly by Denning L .J. 
that the declaration lies to correct errors of law and is not limited 
to jurisdictional defects (37). However these decisions in fact 
involved defects of jurisdiction. other cases, involved the question 
of whether errors that did not appear on the record could be reviewed 
by means of the declaration t3f».. Although this point is uncertain. 
it seems from these that the Courts saw no difficulty in reviewing 
patent error of law, even though this results in a voidable decision. 
Thus in Lee v. Showms.ns Guild of Great Britain 1952 2 QB 329 
Denning L.J. in dealing with a defect in a decision by a domestic 
tribunal (which was not therefore amenable to certiorari) said that 
the remedy by declaration was more effective that the remedy by 
certiorari, because the former "is not subject to the limitation that 
the error must appear on the face of the record I! ( 346) • However in 
Healey's case this was described by Parker L.J. as "a novel, and far 
reaching contention". In Taylor v. National Assistance Board 1956 
P 70, a declaration issued against an error that was probably not 
patent, being disclosed in the course of preliminary correspondence. 
The House of Lords, albeit overturning the decision on its facts did 
not question the propriety of the remedy. 
To regard the scope of review BB limited to patent error whether 
for certiorari or declaration~purposes, is tantamount to accepting 
the view put forward by Wade (39) that it is the blemish on the record 
rather than the defect itself which constitutes the vitiating factor. 
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It is suggested that the better view is that the face of the record 
rule is a procedural aspect of certiorari law, and does not therefore 
apply to the declaration. These decisions at least show that the 
Courts do not regard nullity as a condition precedent to the 
declaration. 
Fina1ly in private law, a declaration has been successfully 
claimed to the effect that a contract is voidable only ( 39) . However 
possibly this can be reconciled with principle upon the ground that the 
parties can themselves rescind in relience upon the declaration. 
It is submitted that, as in the case of certiorari it is open to 
the Court to violate logic, and award a declaration against a voidable 
decision. This is subject to two qualifications. Where the 
declaration will serve no useful purpose the Court may vithold it, in 
its discretion.(4o)secondly the Court will not declare rights subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of another body, except in a negative 
sense to determine whether the resposible authority has in fact made 
an effective decision. Here the distinction between void and 
voidable will be relevant. It has been argued that administrative 
bodies are not jubject to res judicata in that they can usually 
reconsider their own decisions (41). If this is so then the rule 
that the declaration cannot quash is unimportant, except that where 
the authority concerned is a judicial body, subject to res judicata, 
certiorari will perhaps be the appropriate remedy. However the cases 
supporting ~he application of the declaration to voidable decisions 
assume that its effect is constitutive. 
(d) Mandamus 
The Prerogative order of mandamus issues to compel the performance 
of a duty. Thus it has no direct concern with the setting aside of 
invalid acts, being limited to enforcement of the duty to exercise a 
discretion, but fall.ing short of compelling the discretion to be 
exercised in a particular way. Rather misleadingly it is sometimes 
said that mandamus lies to ministerial but not judicial tunctions (42). 
Thus where a justice erroneously holds that he has no jurisdiction 
mandamus will lie, but will not lie for a mistaken exercise of that 
jurisdiction (43). Mandamus should therefore lie only where a 
purported decision is a nullity, since the underlying rationale must 
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be that the tribunal has not performed its duty to reach a decision. 
This is the basis of a consistant line of authority. Decisions 
have been challenged by mandamus on the ground that the defect 
concerned resulted in the tribunal declining jurisdiction, or failing 
to exercise jurisdiction (44), although it was pointed out in R v. 
Cotham 1898 lQB 802 that the distinction between an erroneous 
exercise of jurisdiction and "failure to hear and determine according 
to law" can be "very fine" (at 806) a distinction regarded by Gordon as 
non existent (45}. Thus mandamus will lie wbere there· is an excess 
of jurisdiction, but not where a statutory body is acting within its 
jurisdiction {46) unless the decision is first quashed by certiorari • 
. In R v. Paddington Valuation Officer ex p. Peachey, [1966J 1 QB 380 
a rating list was challenged on the grounds that it had been constructed 
upon the wrong basis. The Court of Appeal held that this defect 
rendered the list at the most voidable, and that therefore mandamus 
could not lie to order the valuation officer to prepare a valid list 
unless the defective one vas quashed by certiorari. Salmon L.J. {at 
419) said "A finding that the list is null and void is necessarily 
implicit in an order for mandamus". However the Court thought that 
to avoid inconvenience the mandamus might issue in advance of the 
certiorari. Binilarl.y in Bal.dwin and Francis v. Patent Appeal 
Tribunal [ 1959] A.C. 663 Lord Denning said that where mandamus is 
issued to the tribunal, it must hear and determine the case afresh, 
and it cannot well do this if its previous order is still standing" 
{at 693-h). 
However, under the formula of "declining jurisdiction" the Courts 
have issued mandamus in respect of decisions based upon irrelevant 
considerations (47) or where relevant factors had not been taken into 
account ( 48) • Although this can be justified upon the basis (criticised 
in Chapter 7 .above) that these defects result in nullity, in Jll8JlY cases 
intervention has been justified upon the basis that these decisions 
vere wrong in law, and that mandamus lies to compel a tribunal to 
decide according to law. Thus in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture 
[1968] A.C 997 the House of Lords held that the Minister, in exercising 
a discretion Whether to refer a matter to a statutory committee, had 
taken irrelevant factors into account. This was treated not as ultra 
vires, but as a failure to exercise the discretion according to law. 
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Lord Upjohn (at 1058) said "The Minister in exercising his powers ••••• 
can only be controlled by a prerogative writ (sic) which will only 
issue if he acts wrongfully'' and Lord Horris, (dissenting in the 
result) assumed (at 1041) that mandamus could issue if "the Hinister 
misinterpreted the law, or proceeded upon an·erroneoun view of the law". 
In ex parte Kendal Hotels [194-rJ 1 ALLb"'R 448 mandamus was regarded 
as an appropriate remedy against a decision to which certiorari would 
not lie Goddard C.J. held that as the decision vas within jurisdiction 
and good on its face, mandamus vas the only remedy. Similarly in a 
number of cases mandamus issueo. in respect of decisions vitiated by 
irrelevant considerations without reliance upon nullity or lack of 
jurisdiction (49) and in two cases mandamu5 val> held to be available 
to review a decisio~ which vas held valid for the purpose of preventing 
collateral challenge (50). 
If these decisions are accepted then the scope of mandamus 
approximates to that of certiorari. liowever intervention based upon 
the imposition of a duty to determine accordine to law does not meet 
the objection raised in Peachey (above) that the offending decision must 
be removed, and mandamus is inappropriate to do this. In certain 
circumstances an existing decision can be ignored, or reconsidered by 
the authority concerned without any formal setting aside. Thus the 
granting of a licence in disregard of certain for.mal requirements could 
not be questioned by mandamus alone as the licence was, in the absence 
of a jurisdictional defect, a valid one, (51) whereas a licence refused 
in the same way could be so challeneed becaune no new legal relationship 
had arisen, in the absence of a provision preventing successive 
applications (52). Thus, irrespective of voidness and voidability 
mandamus would be appropriate in a situation similar to that in 
Padfield which involvesnn administrative neg~tive. decision, not subject 
to res judicata. 
It is submitted that the cases where mandamus has been extended 
under the pretext of enforcing a duty to observe the law, can be 
explained partly upon the basis that defects arising out of an abuse 
of discretion are treated ambiguously by the Courts, being sometimes 
presented as jurisdictional and sometimes regarded as mere error (53), 
and partly by the desire of the Courts to intervene in cases which 
•·' 
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vere regarded as not amenable to certiorari, and for which mandamus 
appeared the only available remedy. The restriction of certiorari 
to judicial f'unctions given a narrow meaninG to exclude even decisions 
of licencing justices (54) contributed towards this. However in 
recent years the scope of certiorari has broadened, as has the meaning 
given to the term judicial. (55) and thus less justi!'ication exists for 
an overlap betveen these remedies. 
Mandalnus should be restricted to revie\r decisions •1hicn are 
alleged to be nullities, in order to provide a consistant principle 
upon wilich to base a choice of remedy, but even here the order can be 
issued in conjunction with certiorari, to prevent difficulties arising 
out of.incorrect fo~ulation of the grounds of review. Indeed the 
remedies are often issued in conjunction even in cases where the defect 
concerned clearly results in nullity (56). 
Summn_rr 
In the field of direct review the courts have only spasmodically 
applied the lbgical consequences of nullity. Competinr; factors have 
necessitated extensions of the various rer::.ecies, with the result that 
they overlap to sue~ an extent that no clear basis exists for choosing 
between them in a given situation. 
It is suggested de lege ferenda that the principle of nullity 
should be employed as a bnsis upon which to define the Y~nd of situation 
to which each remeC:r is appropriate. Thus appellate proceedings and 
certiorari should apply only to defects within jurisdiction, and 
mandamus only to jurisdictional defects, defined to exclude defects 
involving irrelevant considerations. The declaration having 
procedural advantages over certiorari should be recognised as constitutive 
and therefore lying both to jurisdictional and non jurisdictional 
defects. Alternatively certiorari might tul.fill this £"unction since 
this reme~· bas certain advantages in having flexible locus standi 
rules, in which case the role of the declaration should be limited to 
jurisdictional defects, and in particular to situations where 
mandamus is clearly unsuitable, as vhere an individual maintains that 
a certain decision is not enforceable against him. Authority exists 
to support such a classification, although without rejection of a 
considerable number of decisions, it is impossible to maintain that this 
I 
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represents existing la.v. Such a scheme also involver. the production 
or a cleer teat tor distinguishing between ultra vires and error 
vithir.. jurisdiction since a.t present thiG is obscured by the G.ual role 
ot ootl: certiorari and the declaration. 
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It should be possible to challenge a decision collaterally only 
if it is void, since collateral challenge always involves the calling 
in question of a decision without taking steps to have that decision 
set aside, reversed or nodified in proceedings specially designated 
for the purpose (1). Thus whenever a person asserts or de,ends a 
claim, to which the validity of a decision is material, be is 
challenging it collaterally. ThE range of possible collateral 
attack situations is therefore extremely vide. In particular 
colla~eral challenge may involve an action in contract, quasi contract 
or tort where the defendant justifies his act by reliance upon a 
decision made under statutory powers. Similarly resistance to 
enforcement proceedings involves collateral challenge of the decision, 
and less frequently the effect of a decision can be so canvassed in 
an action involving title to land or goods (2) or in an action where 
a decision or act is directly challenged, on the grounds that its 
validity depends upon the existence of an earlier act or decision as 
condition precedent (3). 
Some procedures are in form methods of collateral challenge, but 
are in fact utilized as means of direct attack in that no other result 
is scught than to expose the decision as invalid. Thus Habeas Corpus 
being directed towards the person detaining the body of the applicant 
in principle presupposes that the decision authorising the detention 
can be disregarded. Mandamus being an order to a public body to 
discharge a statutory duty, again presupposes that any previous 
decision vas void (4). The Declaration issued under R.S.C. Ord 25r5 
takes the form of a statement of the Plaintiffs legal rights (5), and 
thus can logically impugn a decision only if it is void and thus 
ineffective to alter his legal position. However, as shown above, 
in these cases the line between direct and collateral review has 
become blurred, and these procedures involve a scope of review nearer 
to that where certiorari is the remedy sought. 
It is sometimes maintained (6) that different policy considerations 
govern direct and collateral attack, justifYing a narrower scope of 
review in collateral than in dir~ct proceedings. Firstly the purpose 
of collateral attack is not necesRarily to expose an invalid exercise 
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of pover. This may be genuinly incidental. Thusin D.P.P. v. Head 
1959 A.C. 83 the validity of a committal order made tventy yeurs 
previously vas relevant to a conviction for an offence against a vome.n 
subject to detention under l>1ental Health Liegislation. Viscount 
Simmonds at 87 made it clear that the exposure of unlawful administrative 
action vas not, in those proceedings the concern of the Court. Secondly 
the doctrine of collateral challenge can have unjust results where persons 
relying upon decisions vluch are treated as void find themselves lackinr 
legal justification for acts done in good faith. In Innes v. ~rJlie 
1844 l Cor & K262, a Constable vho, in obedience to an order of 
expulsion, prevented the plaintiff from enterin~ the premises of a club, 
vas held liable in tort because the expulsion vas in breach of natural 
justice. 
Thus either the possibility of collateral attack must be more 
limited than that of direct attack, or alterativel.y exc~ptions to the 
governing principle vill have to be admitted to avoid imposing an unfair 
burden of responsibility upon executive officials. 
Historically the relationship betveen nullity and collateral attacl~ 
vas vell established by the middle of the Seventeenth Century {7). In 
Terry v. Huntingdon, concerning an action in Trover against the 
Commissioners of Excise for vrongly classifYing certain liqueurs as 
"strong vaters". Rainesford C .J. said {The Commissioners) ''both 
themselves and their offic~ vould be trespassers ••••• and the reasor, 
is that vhen they exceed their authority they cease to be Commissioners 
and act as private persons, .• 
In Wilkins v. Bovard (1838) 7 Ad and I_807, in an action against 
Magistrates in respect of a committal order it vas said "It is clear 
that the plaintiff cannot suceed unless the proceeding vas a nullity". 
Hovever in these early cases e. narrow concept of jurisdiction 
limited to persons, place and subject matter, corresponding to the 
suggested commencement of the inquiry test appears to have geverned 
the possibility of collateral attack. This leads Rubinstein to suggest 
that, at least in same circumstances 
vary with the method of attack (8). 
3 B & 6 620 Blackburn J. thought that 
the lin..5.ts to jurisdiction might 
Thus in Pease v. Chaytor (1863) 
a wider range of defects vould 
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justify a defence to enforcement proceedings thnn would apply in an 
act ion in tort • 
This solution, it is submitted is not necessary to achieve the 
aim of allowing a greater scope for review in direct proceedinr,s than 
in collateral proceedings. The same result is achieved by the siiilJller 
process of treating the availability of direct remedies as independant 
of the question of jurisdiction. Thus since the North\Dilberland Case 
certiorari lies for all errors of law, a category wide enou~h to 
include jurisdictional defects as well. It is sugp,ested that vith 
the extension of certiorari to administrative bodies the "face of the 
record" requirement should be abandoned, but even if this does not 
happen, the distinction between jurisdictional and other defects need 
only be material in limited circumstances, where a defect does not 
appear on the record, or where a privative clause is in force, or 
where the decision is sc~ght to be collaterally impeached. 
In modern law the principle of nullity is relied upon in 
collateral proceedings to the extent that collateral remedies have 
frequently been refused upon the ground that the decision concerned 
is voidable only. Thus in Marsh v. Marsh [l945J A.C. 271 the validity 
of a divorce decree became material in later proceedings concerning 
the administration ot an estate. The House of Lords held that the 
decision being voidable only must be treated as valid for the purpose 
of collateral impeachment. It is significant that it was said, (at 
284) that the position would have been otherwise had a breach of 
natural justice been involved. 
Similarly in cases involving bias, collateral actions have failed 
because that bias was regarded as producing a voidable decision only (9). 
The same principle was applied to an order made by en Administrative 
body, by Lord Denning in D.P.P. v. Head [1958] l ALLER 679. The 
Accuseds conviction of an offence against a person detained under Mental 
Health legislation depended upon whether the original certificate of 
detention made years previously by the Home Secretary was valid. Lord 
Denning held that as the certificate disclosed an error of law it was 
wida.ble only and thus since it had not been set aside it must be treated 
as valid to support the conviction. However the majority were prepared 
to set aside the conviction, whether the certificate was void or voidable 
on the ground that the presumption that a person was a defective within 
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the meaning of the Act, which was necessary to establish the offence 
was rebutted by defect in the committal order. This is sufficient 
to explain the decision in the light of the particular statutory 
provisions involved. However the majority reasoning has received some 
criticism (10) and it is submitted that Lord Dennin~n rationale with 
its emphasis that a void decision destroys the validity of all action 
taken in reliance upon it is to be preferred. The majority speeches 
were probably influenced by Habeas Corpus law in that patent error 
not going to jurisdiction is sufficient basis for the writ (11) which 
as regards inferior bodies, has, despite being strictly a means of 
collateral attack, a similar scope to certiorari (12). 
other decisions of administrative bodies have been invalidated 
in collateral proceedings (13). However in these decisions it is only 
exceptionally that nullity is specifica.l;Ly !:lade the basis of the action. 
This was the case in Webb v. Minister of Housing (discussee above) where 
a compulsory purchase order was quashed on the ground that the works 
scheme to which it was a condition precedent was a complete nullity 
despite the existence of a statuto~J provision preventing direct 
challenge after a six weeks period. Actions in trespass in Coopers 
case, Hopkins case and the Westminster Corporation case (above) have 
simply been based upon the invalidity of the decision. However the 
defects involved 9 breach of the audi al.teram partem rule, and improper 
purposes, have in other contexts expressly been held to nullity (14) 
Wood v. Wo~d discloses a difficulty in the application of the 
nullity principle to collateral attack. The Plaintiff was expelled 
from a mutual insurance society in breach of the audi alteram partem 
rule. He brought an action in tort to recover money be would have 
received against a claim. It was held that as the expulsion was void 9 
and the plaintiff was therefore still a member be bad suffered no loss 
since be should simply have ignored the decision. Clearly this 
rationale is inapplicable where a trespass or some other recognised 
tort is committed in reliance upon the purported decision, but where 
loss flows directly from an ultra vires act, which does not gi. ve rise 
to such course of action it is difficult to establish liability. 
Wood v. Woad itself was distinguished in Bonsor v. Musicians Union 
[195~ 1 CH 479 on the ground that no damage in fact took place. 
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However there is authority that loss arising from a decision 
which lacks jurisdiction is not actionable as such (15). n1e effect 
of the jurisdictional defect is to make the decision void, and thus 
remove a possible defence of statutory authority in any action 
arising out of the implementation of the decision "No such thine was 
ever heard of as an action for making an order age.inst a person 
without jurisdiction" (16). 
Despite this there have been dicta that loss consequent upon an 
ultra vires act is actionable (lT) and in the Canadian case of 
Roneavelli v. Duplessis 1959 SCR 121 the plaintiff successfully 
claimeq damAges against the Prime Minister of Quebec for wrongful 
revocation of a licence, even though the decision was regarded as 
void (Per Rand J. at 143). This decision has been explained by Wade 
as resting upon a provision of the Quebec Civil Code and thus not 
applicable in Ene.,land (18). However it appears that malicious acts 
within jurisdiction are actionable (19) and it is difficult to see why 
the same should not apply to ultra vires acts as long as mala fides 
is shown. 
If this is so liability in tort for ~-ici_ous. irregularity or abuse 
of paver is independent of the void voidable distinction and, 
constituting a cause of action in its own right, is not a form of 
collateral attack. 
Thus, with this one possible exception, an action in tort 
presupposes a void decision. 
Three aspects of this remain to be discussed. Firstly whether 
the collateral attack decisions are based upon a similar definition of 
jurisdiction to the one established in the other contexts which have 
l•een examined? Secondly, what exceptions to the general principle 
exist. Thirdly is the scope of collateral attack limited by the 
concept of jurisdiction in the case of both judicial and administrative 
decisions. 
The Meaning of Jurisdiction in Collateral Proceedings 
Salmond takes the view that jurisdictional defects for the purpose 
of collateral attack are confined to defects of person, place and subject 
matter.(20)This, as shown above, is supported by the early decisions, 
and also by the rule limiting an action in tort for defects within 
jurisdiction to situationa where malice is shown. In direct proceedings 
malice, or other improper purpose, would, .as :shown above, be regarded as 
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a jurisdictional defect, and thus there would be no need for this rule 
recognised by Parliament in Sl of the Justices Protection Act 1848. 
However, there are dicta (21) to the effect that the malice referred to 
in this context is in itself the basis of the action. This is 
consister:t with Roncarelli v. Duplessis (above) A.nd with the suggestion 
that where malice is the be.sis of the complaint the cause of action is 
sui generis, for abuse of statutory power, anu not e Jr.ethod cf 
collateral e.ttacl<.. If this is so, tl"en the question of malice is 
indepetl<lent of the void, voidable distinction. The authorities are 
inconsistent ur,on this point. It is submitted however thE1t Sl and 62 
of the Justices Protection Act can be cor:.strueci in this waj· without 
distorth.g what Coleridge J. described as ar. 11 exceedingl.y ill worded'' 
Act (22). El allows an "action on the case as for Tort" onl:-.• if malice 
is ahown where a justice acts inside jurisdiction, ar..<'l. S2 preserves the 
same rights of action as exist e.t coilllllon lav for acts 11without or in 
excess of jurisdiction". Both sections, although confined t'.> ju.:;tices 
of the peace have been l!!garded. as introducing no me.terial ch.anges in the 
law (23) and it is suggested that vhere an act ia in excess of 
jurisdiction it can either be the subject of collateral attack, where 
malice is generally irrelevant, or of a possible, if at present inchocite 
(24) action in tort for malicous abuse of power. 
Recent cases in the field of direct review, in particular Aniaminic 
and Ridge v. Baldwin he.ve been based upon a wide arJ>roach to jurisdictional 
defects, and nltho~h it is suggested that Anisminic extends the category 
too far, it is clear that breach of' natural justice reGults in nullity. 
This ground ha.u justified collateral attack in Coopers case and Hopkins 
case, (above) and decisions vitiated ty ire;roper purpoces have been 
treated as void in collateral proceedings, in Webb v. Minister of Housing 
and Westnd! .. i>ter Corporation v. L.N.W.R. (above). Indeed in Osgood v. 
Nelson 41 LJ QF 329 in an action in quasi contract by an official who 
alleged (inter alia) that his renoval from office was in breach of natural 
justice the House of Lords held (obiter) that "if a man was removed from 
an office of' this kina from any frivolous or fUtile cause you would ·in 
all rrnbabilit~· bE' inclineC:. to treat tue removal as e. nullity". Perhaps 
like Anisminic this case Loes too far in widening the range of 
jurisdictional defects, into the area of unreasonableness and insuffic-
iency of grounds, but suggests at least that the Courts are prepared to 
depart from the person, place, subject matter formula. 
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Finally an inconvenient result of such a distinction between 
collateral anc direct proceedings would be to sharpen the distinction 
between the two whereas there is an area where they merge, where 
remedies such as the declaration are involved, in form collateral, but 
in fact, as shown above, used as methods of direct revie'lo:, Tvo 
competing notions of jurisdiction as vell as beinr, concer.tually 
unnecessary would l:imit the effectiveness of these remedies, vbereas a 
sinrle notion of jurisdiction allows thern a sufficiently wide scope, and 
yet does prevent the ambit of direct, being wider than that of collateral 
attack. Certiorari nnd statutory methods of direct review are available 
to challenge non jurisdictional defects. 
2. Exceptions to the Hule that Collateral attack depends upon nullit:r 
ApEQ"t front the self-destructiveness or the nullity principle shown 
in Wood v. Wooc, it is clear that the doctrine althoup)l preventinf~ all 
defects from beinc reviewable in collateral rroceedinr.s, has drastic 
consequences, particularly vhere the processes of decision making and 
iwplementation are complex since ma~y persons relying upon a decision held 
to be ultra vires may find themselves exposed to leeal action, either as 
principle or servan or agent. 
Thus, unless as has been advocated (25), the governine principles 
should be replaced by s:pecial rules, similar to those operative in France 
governing tort liability of public officials, it is necessary to 
introduce peacemeal exceptions to the principle in order to protect both 
officials and members of the public. 
This area of law has been more thoroughly developed in the United 
states both as to the iDII·lications of nullity and it's exceptions. 
This is due largely to constitutional aspects of illegal action, and 
the law has been developed particularly in the context of statutes held 
to be uncor:::·titutional, which have been regarded by the Courts as 
complete nullities giving rise to no legal consequences (26). 
However despite such extreme assertions exceptions have been 
formalised. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank 
308 V.S371 liughs C.J. said (at 3T4) "an all inclusive staten:ent of a 
principle of retroactive invalidity cannot be justified". 
Thus various devices t~ve been used to modifY the consequences of 
nullity. 
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Firstly the ·idea of relative nullity haa Dleant that a statute may 
be invalid as applied to one set of facts and yet valid as applied to 
another. However this can lead to official confusion. Secondly a 
presumption of validity prevents collateral attack of a decision which 
is prima facie valid and acted upon in good faith (27). Tlnw a 
finance officer paying out money in reliance upon an unconstitutional 
statute has been held not liable. 
Similarly there is a "de facto'' doctrine regarded by Swenson (28) 
as a simple matter of policy and necessity. Proceedings of a de facto 
official are, for purposes of collateral attack, to be treated as 
equally binding as those of a de jure officer. 
In English Law the principle and its exceptions have not been 
systematically treated, but it is possible to detect four groups of 
exceptional situations where, despite the nullity of the decision 
collateral attack is restricted. Conversely there is some authority 
that in cases involving personal liberty collateral r~edies will be 
allowed even though the decision is within jurisdiction (29). However 
these cases proceed upon the assumption that every patent defect produces 
a nullity ( 36) • This has been discussed above ( P. ~ 3 ) • However there 
are some early dicta that collateral actions lie age.inst a voidable 
arrest warrent ( 31) • These cases are inconsistent with modern 
authority as to the effect of patent irregularity, and are best regarded 
as bo.sed upon an undue extension of Habeas Corpus law. 
Firstly protection is given to persons enforcing a decision by 
excusing them from liability in respect of a void order unless they have 
notice of the want of jurisdiction concerned (32). Some decisions have 
gone :f'urther and made the face of the record rule decisive. In Demer 
v. Cook (1903) 88 LT 629 it vas said that where a gaoler receives a 
prisoner under a varrant that is correct in form "no action will lie against 
him if it should turn out that ••••• the court had no jurisdiction to 
issue it". In O'Connor v. Isaacs [l956J 2 QB 88 this principle was 
extended (obiter) to cover the liability of the deciding officer. 
Diplock J. whose judgement was upheld by the Court of Appeal thought 
that, unless e. defect of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record, 
the record must be quashed before a collateral act ion lies • This 
violates the general principle that the existence of a record is immaterial 
vhere jurisdiction is challenged, but in its application to magistrates 
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can be explained by reference to the express requirements of the Justices 
Protection Act 1846 S2 which provides that a conviction~ but it seems no 
other kind of order, must be set aside before an action in tort vill lie 
for excess of jurisdiction. 
Similar protection to enforcement officials has been given by a 
number of statutes. In particular the Constables Protection Act 1750 
protects "any person • • • • • for anything done in obedience to any warrant 
under the hand or real of any justice of the peo.ce". By S6 this 
expressly includes jurisdictional defects. Thus, ns \U1der the conu:aon 
law decisions the enforcement officer need not detennine questions of 
validity, but it is submitted that his protection is lost if the defect 
appears on the face of the warrant (33). 
Other statutes provide protection Which expressly includes jurisdict-
ional defects. Sl41 (1) Mental Health Act 1959 exempts "persons 
purporting to exercise powers under the Act'' from liability in civil and 
criminal proceedings "whether on the ground of want of jurisdiction or 
any other ground" • 
However where jurisdiction is not so mentioned, it is submitted 
that the rule in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [196~ 
A.C. 147 may govern this situation, whereby protection to persons 
relying upon a "decision" or an ''order" may extend only to something that 
does exist as a decision, or Order and thus would not include acts to be 
void. This, coupled with the wide concept of ultra vires employed by 
their Lordships in Anislrinic would, however, trustrate the purpose of 
this kind of provision, and it is suggested that this point should be 
expressly covered in all such lesislation. 
A similar exception to 15.ability is based upon the defence of mistake 
of fact. A magistrate ( 34), and, according to the dictum of Blackburn J. 
in Pease v. Chaytor (1863) 3D & S 620 any "tribunal of limited authority'' 
is exempt tram liability arising f~on an excess of jurisdiction if he had 
no means of knowing a fact which deprives him of jurisdiction. This 
does not extend to matters of law and thus would not normally include 
the "juriallictional f'a.ct" situation. 
It is significant that most authorities in this area and in the field 
of collateral attack generally are old cases. This renect s the 
inf'requency in modern times o~ an action being commenced against the 
individual infbrcing officer, and more generally the prevalence, despite 
the inadequacies of the prerogative orders and the declaration (35) of 
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direct as opposed to collateral means of review. The establishment of 
statutory means of challenge to decisions affecting land has probably 
contributed towards this. It appears from Uttoxeter U.D.C. v. Clarke 
1951 ALLER 1318 at 1321 where an injunction issued against the 
defendant who resisted entry to his land by the plaintiff actinf under 
compulsory powers, that apart from the statutory procedure. no other 
means of challenge either directly or collaterally will be permitted (36). 
These rules are not strictly exceptions to th~ general principle in 
that they constitute purely personal defences, and do not negate a 
cause of action as such. Thus in O'Connor v. Isaacs, a case concerning 
the Justices Protection Act 1948, the plaintiff relied upon S2 of the 
Act which provides that a conviction made without jurisdiction must be 
formally set aside before an action can be brought against the magistrate. 
~he Court of Appeal held that for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1939, 
time runs from when the vrongf'ul act vas c-ommitted and not from the 
setting aside of the decision, which was a purely procedural device to 
protect the magistrate. Morris L.J. said (at 361) "The whole case of 
the plaintiff is that the orders made were nullities and need not be 
obeyed". 
However ~ genuine exception exists in the ease of acts bY de facto 
officials. There is • authority that a doctrine sin'.ilar to that in the 
United b~ates exists in this country. 
Thus in R. v. Corporation of the Bedford Level (1805) 6 East 356 the 
appointment of a deputy registrar charged with the duty of registering 
title to land was defective. The issue arose vhether persons uhose 
titles to land he had registered, had the right to vote at an election 
for which a valid registration of title was necessary. Lord Ellenborougb 
held that the acts of an officer de facto in the sense of "a person who 
has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not 
a good officctr in point of law" (at 367) would be valid). It was held 
however that with the recent death of his principal a fact "notorious to 
the owners of land in the level" the person concerned had lost any 
reputation he might have possessed. · In Kestell v. Langmaid [1950] 
lKB 233 a botice to quit which vas under the provisions of the governing 
legislation "null and void" held by the Court of Appeal to "exist" as a 
notice, so that it could be acted upon by the tenant, giving him a right 
to compensation under the Statute. 
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The same principle seems to have been applied recently in Royal 
Government of Greece v. Governor of Brixton Prison [1969] 3 ALLER 1337. 
The House of IDrds vere a.sked to decide whether a Greek national, vho 
bad been convicted of an extraditable offence by a Greek Court, should 
be extradited. A duly authenticated certificate of conviction had 
been presented. The conviction although valid under Greek La.v vas in 
breach of the audi alteram partem rule, and it vas argued for the 
prisoner that as the Conviction vas a nullity in English Lav (37) there 
vas. no ground for extradition. It vas held that the conviction existed 
in fact. IDrd Reid said (a.t 1337) "It is one thing to say that he va.s 
never convicted, and quite another thing to say that the lav regards his 
conviction as a nullity". This coupled vith the discretion exercised 
by the liane Secretary in matters of extradition meant that assuming that 
the certificate vas genuine, the conviction could not be challenged. 
However perh~ps the result would have been different had the conviction 
been void, under Greek lav a.s well as under English Le,v. 
Finally in actions arising out of questions of title to property 
an exception appears to exist in favour of a bona fide purcha.sor. 
Thus in Bidd1e v. Bond (1865) 6B & S 225 the Court held that a bona 
fide purcha.sor obtains a good title to goods, even if as a result of a 
void distress. Conversly in Lock v. Selacod (1841) 1 QB 736 goods 
vere distrained by a warrant which vas bad on its face, and it vas held 
that no title passed to the plaintiff even though the warrant vas merely 
voidable on the ground that he vas not a bona fide purchaser. 
These exceptions exist to obviate extreme injustices. In 
general it is clear, dispite the decreased importance of collateral 
attack that this is an area of lav vhere the consequences of the void I 
voidable distinction are strictly applied by the Courts. 
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The Distinction between Judicial and Administra~.i~ Acts 
It is sometimes held that, in collateral proceedings the 
jurisdictional concept applies only to judicial decisions, and thnt 
therefore ADI-IINISTRATIVE acts are subject to collateral review for all 
defects (38). If' this is so then the importance of the distinction 
between voidness and voidibility is reduced. 
It is submitted that for three reasons thi a vie'W' is incorrect. 
Firstly, it is difficult, in this context, to draw any distinction 
in principle between ~udicial and administrative acts. In other areas 
such a distinction may be useful, as regards for example, privilege in 
defamation, or the application of' the rules of natural justice. This 
depends upon the meaning given to "judicial" in each context. Ho'W'ever 
as regards the ultra vires doctrine, and the scope of' review, the some 
rationale governs both type of' power. In each case a discretion is 
given to an official, circumscribed within a statutory limit, to make 
a decision affecting individuals. A real distinction however exists 
between these acts, and ministerial acts, which involve little or no 
t 
discretion. Since the actor has a duty to perform an act without a 
power to choose a solution from a range of alternatives. the distinction 
between mere error, and ultra vires does not arise. All defects are 
jurisdictional and an action in tort should alW&\Y'B lie ( 39). 
In the case of' powers involving choice or discretion a common 
rationale governs judicial and administrative acts. In each cape a 
dise1·etion is on-:;ruste:i to an official, so that his decision will be 
treated as effective by other branches of government (40). The notion 
of discretion or choiae would be meaningless if' his decision were only 
enforceable if' free from error. Thus Lord Sumner in R. v. Nat Bell 
Liquors (1921] A.C. distinguished error from ultra vires, and made 
it clear that error as such does not affect jurisdiction. The difference 
between judicial. and administrative acts is superficial in this context. 
A judicial act is one where objective standards for the exercise of' the 
discretion are provided, or perbJlps where a minimum f'o:nnal procedure is 
laid down ( 41). An administrative act differs tram this only in degree, 
involving greater treedam of discretion, and a less circumscribed choice 
of factors to apply (42). The two types of power tend to merge, but in 
both it is submitted tbat error and ultra vires should be distinguished, 
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although error is less likely in the case or an administrative decision 
because of the absence of objective rules and standards to be applied. 
The jurise.ictional. principle iD the same bovever in each case. 
Decisions beyond the area of discretion are unenforceable and thus 
proTide no defence to a collateral action. 
The distinction is &CIJiletir.les defended upon the narrover basis of 
res judicata, it being argued that a judicial act vithin jurisdiction 
is unempeachable collaterally because it is res judicata, and that B8 
this doctrine applies only to judicial fUnctions (43) there is no 
obstacle to collateral impeachment of administrative decisions (44). 
However this is strictly as misuse of the term res judicata, since the 
doctrine is narrower than that of collateral challenge, applying only to 
the original partes, and preventing the same issue being litigated tor 
a second time once determined by a Court acting within its juristiiction 
(45). ThUG in Re Waring[l948]Ch 221 a decision ot the Chancery division 
the ratio of which vas later overuled vas rea judicata to prevent the 
parties from contesting it in tbe lie;ht ot the change in the lav. 
This did not however prevent a person vbo vas not party to the original 
litigation trom obtnininr. a contrary ruling in respect ot the same 
property. 
The difference between conclusiveness fOr collateral reviev purposes 
and res judicata ho.a been recognised in the United States (46) and in 
this country the tvo decisions in I.R.C. v. Sneath [1932] 2 KB 362 and 
I.R.C. v Pearlberg [1953] 1 ALLER 388 illustrates the independence 
ot the tvo notions. In Sneath an assessment by the Income Tax COJIIIIliso-
ionera vas held by the Court of Appeal not to constitute res judicata 
to prevent a contrary decision being uade in respect or later years. 
Lord Harmsvorth M.R. (at 380) and Greer L.J. at 366, denied that the 
!Unction or the Commissioners vas judicial fOr this purpose, but thought 
that aa regards the instant year the decision vould be "conclusive and 
tinal". In Pearlberg a similar decision vas held to be unempeachable 
unless the resul.ationa £0Verning appeal vere tolloved. The question ot 
administrative or judicial vas nat. discussed but DenniDE: L.J. said (at 
389) t''l'be debt bec:aae absolute and conclusive, and ita lesal effect 
cannot. be denied". 
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Thus conclusiveness dbes not depend upon res judicata, but simply 
upon the existance of a legally effective decision, which may be 
voidable in direct proceedings. 
Secondly the authority supporting the distinction between 
judicial and administrative acts is insufficient. Only tvo co.ses clearly 
support this proposition and in each the point was obiter. 
In Everett v. Griffiths [192~ A.C. 631 the Defendant Chairman of a 
board of guardians signed an order tor the reception of the plaintiff in 
a lunatic asylum. In an action for negligence the House of Lords held 
that the defendant having acted reasonably and bona fide, vas not in 
breach of duty. Although the distinction between judiction and 
administrative acts were discussed, it vas in the context of the rule 
allowing immunity from personal liability to a person exercising 
judicial functions as long as he acts in good faith;vithin jurisdiction. 
This it has been suggested above is_not to be regarded as collateral 
attack. The general question of collateral empeachment of administrative 
did not therefore arise, although it vas assumed that the defendant vas 
acting judicial.l.y (at 678 and 687). 
In Eleko v. Government of Nigeria [1931] A.C. 662 the Pri"VY' Council 
refused to issue Habeas Corpus to secure the release of the applicant 
whose deportation had been ordered by the Governor of Nigeria. The 
Plaintiff contended that certain tactual conditions precident were not 
present. Lord Athin (at 670) said "The Governor acts solely under 
executive powers and in no sense as a court. As the Executive he can only 
act in pursuance ot the power given to him at law". This dictum does not 
support the general proposition that any error nullifies for the purpose 
of collateral attack. It has been established that the extent of the 
discretion entrusted to the Home Secretary in the field of Deportation 
is such that unless he acts mala tide (._7) the grounds upon which he 
acts cannot be reviewed. Hovever his order is reviewable !'or vires, ( 48) 
if, for example the proposed deportee is not. an alien (49) and this 
jurisdictional fact situation is common to all kinds of power. Thus 
Lord Atkins dictum should be regarded as referring only to u1 tra vires, 
in which sense it is unobjectionable. 
Secondly although Habeas Corpus, conceptua.lly ranks as a means of 
collateral attack. being directed to the detainer to show existing 
authority for the detention its scope as shown above is such that, like 
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the declaration it operates aa a direct remedy, lying for errors of lav 
and fact and for non. jurisdictional procedural defects to both 
adminiatrati ve and inferior judicial bodies (50) . Thua l!eo.beas Corpus 
beinr, a remedy sui generis and of anomolous scope is no gui~ to the lir-.ito 
of collateral attack. 
'fuirdly the Courts in the context. of collateral reviev define. 
judicial viclely to contrast, not vith adJninistrative poveru, but vith 
ministerial acts. Thus "judicial'' tor thia purpooe ruay include vhat io 
in other contexts, such as natural justice. regarded as un executive 
act. Indeed in natural justice caoes, the diotinction between judicial 
and adJDiniBtrati ve appears to have been discredited (51) and perhe.ps 
by analogy the same is true of certiorari. Certainly in both theoe 
areas the meaning of judicial baa been, arter excessive reliance on 
formalism in the 193o's (52), progrenaively widened to embrace an 
increasing range of statutory pavers the defining criterion selectee 
by the Courts being that ot the ertect of the decision upon individual 
rights (54) the term ''rights" beiug interpreted liberally, rather than 
in a Boht'ttldiiU'l sense to emb:ro.oe vbat Lord Denning in Schmidt v. Bane 
Otfice [1969 J l ALLER 904 described aa "legitil:Jate expectations". The 
only qualification or this vide approach is t~1et a decision involvinc a 
vide discretion unfettered. by the neec! to make objective findinc:s ma~· 
not be judicial (55). 
'l'his approach he.s been applied in the context of' collateral attack ., 
without the qualification preventing wide discretions from bein~ 
"judicial,. tor this purpose. Thus in Everett v. Griffiths Lord 
Atkinson said "Whether a proceeding is a judicial proeeed.iog or cerely 
an administrative proceeding depends more upon vhat is authorised to 
be done by the named authority, vhat is done, and the effect or the 
act upon the rights and interest of others •· at 682. 
May C. J. in R v. Dublin Corporation [ 1878 J C: LR lH 371 at 376, held 
the same viev "A judicial act seems to be an act done by competent 
authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances imposing liability 
and attectiu£ the rights or others. 
In Partridge T. G.M.C. (1890) 25 QB the distinction b6tveen judicial 
and ministerial. tunctiona was applied in an action in tort against tlle 
Medical Council tor erroneously removinp: the Plaintitts name fran the 
/ 
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Register. It was held that since the defendants powers were ''discretion-
c.:ry" and not ministerial they vhould be treated as judicial and thus 
would be collaterally unimpeachable. 
The only authoritative statement to the contrary was made by 
Lord Pearce in Anisminic, where in deciding that a determination by the 
Foreir;n Con:pensation Commission \;as a nullity and so not protected by 
a Privative clause, he distinguished Smith v. East Ello¥ R.D.C. where 
a. Compulsory Purchase Order was held to be protected. by a similar 
clause, on the ground that the latter case concerned an executive 
act and was possiule governed by different principles in the context 
of the distinction between wid and voidable. However if this 
distinction is acceptable, the implication of the dictum appears to be 
that Executive acts may be merely voidable in Bituations lThere judicial 
acts are void, which is the reverse of the proposition at present under 
consideration. 
It is submitted therefore that the application of the void voidable 
distinction t.o judicial acts is misconceived. There is no adequate 
policy reason for this, the authorities in support are indecisive a.nd 
can be distinguished, and the meaning of "judicial" is wide enough·i 
to embrace all decisions which involve the distinction between ultra 
vires and error. 
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CJIAPI'En 10. FACTORS PRECLUDING RF.LIEF 
---·--· -· ---- -·-·- ---- -- ---- --- --- .. -·· 
1. Waiver 
It is sometimes held thet a decision outside jurisdiction, being a 
nullity cannot be cured. by consent, nor by estoppel since this would 
result in the powers of a public authority being extended beyond the 
intention expressed. by Parliament (1). Nor car. estoppel prevent the 
exercise of statutory duties or powers (2). A defect 'Which does not 
go to jurisdiction can however (3), "Le waived. 
Tvo situations arise. Is a person~ who consents to an invalid 
act, debarred from challenging its validity at a later stage? Secondly 
is an authority who seeks to rely ur~n an invalid decision later estopped 
from denying its validity? 
Prima facie the answer to ~oth these questions dependn upon the 
void, voidable distinction. If the decision is a nullity. then 
nothing exists to constitute the subject matter of the consent or 
estoppel, and thus in neither case can validity be given to a nullity (4}. 
However, policy considerations militate against so arbitrary e. solution, 
particularly 'Where an official seeks to avoid responsibility for an 
ultra vires act which has been relied upon by the individuals concerned. 
In the case of weiver by the injured party the decisions are 
inconsistent. Reliance is frequently placed upon the proposition 
that a nullity cannot be waived, particularly in cases involving recourse 
to a right of appeal (5}. 
Nevertheless there are decisions allowing jurisdictional defects 
to be waived, even though for other purposes the decision was treated 
as void (6). 
The Courts have sometimes justified this by dralring distinctions 
bet•een different types of jurisdictional defect, employinr, the concepts 
of 11total'' or "general'' want of jurisdiction, and "contingent,. want of 
jurisdiction (7} of which only the latter group are curable by consent. 
Thus in Essex Incorrorated Church Union v. Essex c.c. [1963] A.C. 8o8, 
Lord Reid (at 820} asserted the ''tundamental principle that no consent 
can confer upon a statutory body power to act beyond its jurisdiction 
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nor estopp the consenting party from subsequently challenging the 
jurisdiction'' (at 820). However, Lord Devlin (at 834) limited this 
to defects of general jurisdiction which he equated with power to 
enter the enquiry. In as far as these decisions sugeest that an 
ultra vires act can be voidable, they are clearly inconsistent with 
principle. However, Lord Devlin's distinction appears to reflect 
the "pure theory" of jurisdiction under vhich defects in the course 
of the inquiry are not jurisdictional and so produce at most, a 
voidable decision. 
Tbe distinction between waivable defects and others is 
sanetimes based upon a different principle, that a party can vai ve 
jurisdictional requirements imposed for his ovn benefit, whereas 
others cannot be waived at all (8). 
This is more convincing, as it allows for the explanation that 
certain jurisdictional requirements are in themselves dependent upon 
consent. Thus if a person consents, either before or after the 
decision to a failure of natural justice, the decision is valid, not 
because of waiver as such, but because no jurisdictional defect hall 
occurred. Thus statutes allow jurisdiction to be conferred by 
consent ( 9) and there is DO reason why requirements which exist, not 
in the public interest as such, but merely to protect individual 
· parties, should not be removed by consent of the party concerned. 
Thus in the case of the audi alteram partem rule, a person with full 
knowledge of the charge against him can refuse his opportunity to be 
heard without invalidating the decision (10). There is no reason why 
this should not be achieved retrospectively. It is submitted that this 
principle provides an explanation of Durayapah v. Fernando [1967] 
2 ALL.ER 152. The Privy Council refUsed an application to set aside 
a decision ot the Minister dissolving a Municipal Council upon the 
ground that the decision vas merely voidable, and that the applicant 
the l~or was therefore unable to rely upon its invalidity since the 
Council themselves had taken no steps to challenge it. It is suggested 
that the question of voidness and voidability should be irrelevant here. 
The decision was valid because the Council had by implication, consented 
to the absence of a hearing, and therefore the audi alteram partem rule 
had not been violated. 
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Clearly this cannot apply to all kinds of jurisdictional defect. 
The waiver cases, do support a distinction based upon the purpose of 
the jurisdictional requirement. Possibly the rules of natural justice 
and certain procedural requirements as to the serving of notice and the 
giving of reasons can be construed as depending upon the absence of 
consent. Subject matter, fraud, qualifications of' the tribunal 
being matters where the public interest predcminates should invalidate 
irrespective of consent. 
Apart from this, waiver decisions can be regarded as based upon 
the Court's power to re~e a remedy in its discretion. As Farwell J. 
pointed out in R v. Williams [ 191g i KB6o8, the Court may refuse 
a remedy upon various grounds, whether the decision is void or 
voidable without affecting the validity of' the decision. Thus in ex p. 
Zerek ( 1951] 2 KB 1 at 11 the Court refused to avard certiorari to 
quash a decision of a Rent Tribunal reducin~ rent for the applicants 
premises. Nevertheless the Court assumed that the alternative course 
would be open to the Landlord of' suing in contract for arrears of rent. 
This makes it clear that although refUsal of a remedy may result 
in a void decision being unchallengeable, and therefore that the 
nullity is in a sense relative, nevertheless the decision has no legal 
effect, unless a positive rule of law, such as that allowing the 
Court to wi thold a discretionary remedy, prevents an applicant from 
taking advantage of the nullity. 
The problem ot consent arises in acute fonn where the official 
making the decision seeks to rely upon its invalidity in order to 
substitute a nev decision fo~ the one concerned. This is sometimes 
treated as a matter of res judicata. and there is some doubt as to 
vhether this doctrine applies to administrative as opposed to judicial 
bodies (11). It is submitted, hovever, that res judicata has no 
application to this situation, being concerned only vith cases where 
a court is requested to reconsider a decision or a finding already 
made by an authorised body ( 12) • Thus in Punton v. Minister of' 
Pensions (No 2) the Court of' Appeal retused to substitute its decision 
upon a superannuation question tor that of a statutory tribunal acting 
within its jurisdiction, e"Ven though the tribunals decision was vrong 
in lav. Certainly the application of res judicata depends upon the 
jurisdictional principle and therefore upon nullity (13). 
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The problem of estoppel against the deciding body vas raised 
by Lord Evershed in Ridge v. Baldvin [196~ 2 ALL ER at 89. The 
applicant had been dismissed from office and appealed to the Home 
Secretary vho rejected his appeal. "What would have been the situation 
had the Secretary of State allowed the appellant's appeal and held 
that he should be re-instated as chief constable? Would it have been 
open to the Corporation to refuse to give effect to such decision on 
the groupd that the proceedings ... before the vetch committee had 
been a nullity?" His Lordship, classif'ying the decision in question 
as voidable, regarded this as necessary to avoid such an inconvenient 
result which might flow from the proposition. upheld by the majority, 
that an appeal from a void decision is in itself a nullity. 
Similarly in Criminal cases~ where a conviction is set aside an 
appeal. f.oJI"' failurE> to comply with procedural requirements or for 
breach of natUral justice, it has been held that the conviction vas 
voidable only, in order to preserve the double jeopardy principle, 
and to prevent the court from issuing a venire de novo {14). 
In the context of administrative acts the void, voidable 
distinction appears to govern the problem of whether an authority 
Which performs an invalid act upon which an individual relies is 
estoppel fran relying upon the invalidity, and trom making a second, 
inconsistent determination. Thus in Rhyl R.D.C. v. Rhyl Amusements 
Ltd. [195~ 1 ALL.ER 257, it vas held that tha Local Authority 
could not be estopped from relying upon the invalidity of a lease 
which it had granted some years previously, and which had been relied 
upon by the parties concerned. The lease was ultra vireE\, and the 
doctrine or estoppel could not be relied upon in contradiction to 
statutory limitations of paver. Similarly in Southend-on-Sea 
Corporation v. Hodges01i (Wickford) Ltd., the Borough Engineer had 
informed the respondent that planning permission would bot be 
required for a proposed development. Subsequent~v an enforcement 
notice vas served upon the respondent, which was upheld by the 
Divisional Court upon the ground that the Engineer had no authority to 
bind the Council, and that therefore the doctrine of estoppel was 
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inapplicable. The Council could not be estopped from exercising 
its statutory duties and discretions. Both these cases depend upon 
nullity. Aa Cassells J. said in Minister of Agriculture v. Hatthevs 
(above) an ultra vires Act performed by an official or his servant 
cannot in lav be an act of the official concerned, and therefore 
neither consent nor estoppel can operate in the face of a statutory 
restriction of power. 
Where the decision taken is within jurisdiction but erroneous 
it is merely voidable, and estop:pel may therefore prevent reliance 
upon the defect. This was the solution reached in the rec.ent 
decision of Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster (City) Borough Council 
[l970] 3 WLR 732. An official of the authority had represented to 
the applicant that his proposed development would not require planning 
permission. In reliance upon this the applicant had encurred 
expenses in connection with his project. It vas held by the Court of 
Appeal that the authority was bound by the decision of its officer, and 
therefore could not serve an enforcement notice against the applicant. 
The Court held that the Official vas authorised to make a binding 
determination as a result of S64 of the Tovn and Countr.,r Planning Act 
1968 whiCh permits delegation of planning decisions to officials of 
the planning authority. Althour~ such delegation is required to be 
in writing the authority could not rely upon the absence of this 
formality since it had been a longstanding custom to permit such 
officials to decide certain planning questions, and this custom, 
amounting to an implied delegation cured any irregularity. Thus the 
defect vas treated as one not affecting jurisdiction (15). However, 
Lord Denning M. R. was prepared to hold upon wider grounds that , 
independently of the statute, the longstanding practice by' 'Which the 
authority accepted the decisions of its officers upon certain matters 
amounted to implied delegation arising out ot the concept ot "ostensible 
authority". '!'his is inconsistent with the reluctance of the Court in 
earlier cases to imply authority to sub-delege·:_e. the power to make 
decisions affecting individual rights particularly where the decision 
concerned is judicial in character (16). It is also inconsistent 
vith the general principle that estoppel, of which ostensible authority 
is a category, cannot confer jurisdiction. Sachs t. J.'a judgement 
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based upon the combined effect of the statute and the practice is to 
be preferred. 
It is submitted that the void, voidable distinction is relevant 
to the question of estoppel. A nullity cannot be cured by estoppel, 
but there is no reason why an authority should not be estopped from 
relying upon a defect in its decision, as long as that decision is 
within the power conferred b-:,r statute. 
Nevertheless this has the unsatisfactory result that an 
authority may be in a position to rely upon its own illegal act, and 
that the individuals only protection against this, is the technical 
distinction, particularly fine in the case of procedural irrer,ularities, 
between jurisdictional defects, and error within jurisdiction. However. 
there is authority that the Court may in its discretion refuse to 
issue certiorari, where the party seeking the retne(lv has benefited 
from the order that be seeks to impugn (17). This may also apply in 
the case of the declaration. 
As in the case of waiver, therefore the rules governing estoppel 
are most appropriately treated in the context of the Courts' discretion 
to ref'u.se a remedy. Where this is not involved~ the void, voidable 
distinction governs both situations. 
2. Locus Standi 
In Durayapah v. Fernando [ 1967] 2 ALL.ER 152 the Privy Colmcil 
employed the distinction between void and voidable in order to 
determine Whether a party, other than the sUbject of the decision , is 
entitled to challenge it. A 1-hlnicipal Council in Ceylon was dissolved 
by the Minister ot Local Govermnent in breach of the audi alteram partem 
rule. The Council as such took no steps to challenge the decision, 
but the applicant the Mayor, sought certiorari. It was held that 
although the decision wa.s invalid, it wa.s merely voidable, and thus could 
Only be challenged by the party primarily affected, in this case the 
Council itself. 
Lord Upjohn (at 158) distinguished between decisions which are a 
complete nullity which can be challenged by any person ··having a 
legitimate interest'' in the matter, and those which are voidable at the 
instance of the person against whom they are made. He further 
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complicated the issue, by regarding even e voidable decision as void 
ah initio against the party concerned. From this it can be inferred 
that if the decision is set asiee by the person concerned the 
quashing is retrospective. The Judicial CODllri ttee purported to 
follow Ridge v. Baldwin [ 196~ 2 ALL.ER 66 regarding the majority 
view in that ease as supporting the proposition that breach of the 
audi alteram partem rule makes a decision only voidable. The 
.judgements of Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin certainly support this, 
but it E submitted that the majority here vas constructed by a 
misreading of Lord l·1orris' speech. Lord 1'-!orris (at 4oh) expressly 
stated that the purported dismissal vas void and of no effect. In 
commenting upon the distinction between void and voidable, his 
Lordship simply referred to the necessity in such cases to obtain a 
ruling from the Court if a purported decision vas questioned. 
otherwise as mentioned above, the de facto pvsition would prevail 
"If in that situation it vas said that the decision is voidable, that 
was only to S&¥ that the decision of thE: Court vas awaited'. (at 110). 
The position with regard to third parties did not arise in that case. 
Voidability in Lord Morrie' sense would apply to all decisions and as 
WaCie points out (18) reduces "voidable" to a mere platitude. 
However the Privy Council clearly recognir.ed the possibility of tvo 
kinds of decision with different effects since they made it clear 
that if the decision were a complete nullity the Council and therefore 
the Mayor would still be in office. Wade treats the problem of third 
party application arising in such situations as one properly to be 
solved by applying rules about locus standi for the various remedies. 
It is however clear that the Pri ..,Y Co\mcil recognised locus standi 
rules, but did not regard them as material, since it vas expressly 
stated that even where a decision vas a nullity it could only be 
contested by a person having SOJ:le legitimate interest (at 158). 
Moreover, the Mayor would have sufficient locus standi, certainly for 
certiorari (19) and perhaps for a declaration. 
The rule that a voidable decision involves restrictive locus 
standi rules in its ovn ril!)lt can be interred from this case. 
Ahehurst ( 20) regards acquiescence by the person primarily effected, 
as curing the denial of natural justice, and thus a third party is 
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barred from a remedy, not becau.~e of locus standi, or because of 
voidability, but because the defect no longer exists. It he.s been 
suggested above that this rationale is convenient on~v vherethe 
defect consists of absence of a hearing or lias, r.atters essentially 
concerned with the rights of the effected individual, and that it 
does not constitute a general solution to the problem of consent to a 
void decision. 
The Privy Council vere probably wrong in treatinp. Ridge v. 
Baldwin as authority that breach of the audi a1. teram partem rule 
produces a voidable decision (21). The two fUrther issuen remain 
however. Firstly can a voidable decision be quashed onl~r by the 
party directly concerned? Secondly is such quashinr full retrospective? 
Restrospectivity will be considered below (22), but on the question of 
locus standi, it is submitted that apart from this decision no authority 
exists in favour of any narrower locus standi rule governing 
voidable decisions, than the nonnal locus sta.'P'ldi rules applicable to 
each remedy ( 23) • 
Thus in Attorney General of ·.Cambia· · ·· v. N. 'Jie [l961J A.C. 
617, the Judicial Committee stated (at 634) that the tenn ''a person 
aegrieved'. by a decision, which in this case vas not ultra vires, but 
subject to appeal., vas not confiued to a person '\mo had had a decision 
gi. ven against him'' but includes ''a person who ho.s a genuine grievance 
because an order has been made vhicll prejudicially affects his interests". 
In Maurice v. L.C.C. [196~ 2 QB 362 a householder who antici~ated a 
loss of amenity as a result of the defendents decision to construct a 
block of flats in the vicinity vas held to be ' a person aggrieved" in 
order to exercise a statutory right of appeal. 
These decisions are not strictly in point as they concern express 
statutory formula which provide a right of appeal on the merits. 
However, in certiorari cases, a vide concept of locus standi has 
been employed without reference to the void, voidable distinction. 
In R v. Hendon R.D.C. ex p. Chorley [1933] 2 KB 696, certiorari issued 
at the instance of an adjoining landowner in respect of a grant of 
planning permission vi tiate_d by bias. Although it is uncertain 
vhether bias affects jurisdiction, (Lord IIevart appeared (at 702) 
to think that it did) and there is sane authority that a biased 
decision is voidable only (24) the effect of nullity or voidability 
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was clearly treated as irrelevant. In R v. Bradford upon Avon 
u.n.c. [ 196~ 1 WLR 1136, the Court held albeit with sane doubt, 
that certiorari can be moved against a planning decision in respect 
of land adjoining the Righvay by e. person other than the owner, in 
this case a user of the P.ighwa.v. Although the grounds upon which 
the decision was enpeached were jurisdictional, 
between this and ether grounds for certiorari vas 
i~ ex p. Peachey [ 1966J 1 QB 38o, Where it was 
a distinction 
not made. Finally 
assumed that the 
rules governing locus standi for the various remedies were the same, 
the decision vas held by the Court of Appeal to be voidable only, 
but nevertheless Denning L. J. excluding only ''mere busybodies'' said 
that the Court "will listen to anyone "'hose interests e.re affected 
by what has been done" ( at 401) • 
Conversly in declaration proceedings , a narrow locus standi 
rule has been employed even upon the assumption that the decision 
concerned was ultra vires and void ( 25) • 
It is submitted therefore that the rules governing third party 
rights, are independent of the void and voidable distinction. The 
Court may in its discretion refuse a remedy to third parties upon the 
basis that they do not possess a sufficient interest in the matter. 
One factor Which the court may take into consideration in this context 
is whether the person primarily affected bas acquiesced in the decision. 
If for example the owner of a piece of land does not contest an ultra 
vires compulsory purchase order in respect of that land, it is open 
to the Court to consider in its discretion whether to allow a remedy 
to a licencee, or to an cnn:.e1 of an easment over that land. It makes 
no difference whether the decision is void or voidable, except to 
the extent that if the decision is a nullity and ultra vires this may 
justif'y the Court in giving a wider ambit to the locus standi rules, 
since, assuming that a voidable decision does not have retrospective 
effect, whereas a declaration of nullity is, ex bypoth~t retrospective, 
a larger class of persons and legal relationships are likely to be 
ettected by a void decision. It is suggested that the reasoning in 
Dura.yapah v. Fernando is relevent to this (26) question alone. 
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The Discretion of the Court 
In a small number of cases the distinction between void and 
voidable has been in order to justifY the Court refusing a remedy in its 
discretion. Lord Evershed, (dissenting) in Ridge v Baldwin ~964 A.C 
40 at 91, justified his opinion that breach of the audi alteram partem 
rule results in a decision that is voidable only, upon the basis that 
this allows the Court to exercise a discretion whether to quash the 
decision. His Lordship, inconsistantly with the main current of 
authority thought that the principles of natural justice should be 
enforced only where their is "a real miscarriage of justice" (27). 
Thus in Ridge v. Baldwin, had the applicant's appeal to the Bane 
Secretary been successful., and his reinstatement ordered, the Watch 
Committee could not have contested the decision upon the ground that 
the appeal based upon an invalid decision vas itself a nullity. 
Similarly in Peachey (above) Lord Denning, holding that the valuation 
list vas voidable only vas prepared to retrain tram quashing it until 
a new list had been prepared, although Salven L. J. doubted whether 
this vas possible. 
It is submitted that, as in the case of locus standi the 
discretionary element exists only in the context of particular remedies. 
Certorari, mandamus and the declaration are discretionary remedies. 
~e Court exercises its discretion to refuse them in appropriate 
circumstances, whether the decision is void or voidable and sometimes 
after an express holding that the decision is without jurisdiction. (28) 
However, the discretion in these cases is exercisable upon 
extablished grounds and to allow a more general discretion upon the 
basis of voidability is therefore retrogressive. T1lus if the reoedy 
sought is discretionary then the Court may refUse it whether the 
decision is void or voidable (29). It the remedy is not discretionary 
then the plaintiff is entitled to it, upon showing that the decision is 
defective and complying vith the other rules governing the remedy. In 
practice however the only non discretionary remedy is a collateral 
action in tort Which is applicable only where the decision is void. 
Thus in all cases where the decision is voidable, the Court is able to 
exercise a discretion, and if a direct reme~ is chosen this discretion 
can be exercised even where the decision is void. 
However in three situations the distinction between void, and 
voidable becomes directly relevent to the Courts' discretion. 
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Firstly there are situations where a declaration has been refused 
I 
upon the ground that the power concerned has been entrusted to a 
person who has made a decision which is valid though voidable. The 
Court here is entitled to refuse to issue the remedy on the ground 
that it serves no useful purpose, there being no machinary available 
for setting aside the offending decision (30}. 
Secondly there have been cases where certiorari has been refUsed 
upon the ground that the decision is void and can therefore be ignored 
and collaterally impeached. This does not of course mean that 
certiorari will not lie against nullities at all, but merely that if 
a more convenient procedure is available the court will withold the 
order. 
Finally, a least in the cases of certiorari and mandamus even 
if the remedy is re:f'u.sed, this will not give the decision validity 
if it is one classifiable as void. The applicant will still be able 
to ignore it, to resist enforcement proceedings, and perhaps to brine 
an action by a means which does not involve the discretion of the 
Court. Thus in R v. University of Aston ex p. Roffey 1969 the 
applicants, students expelled from the University in breach of the 
audi alteram partem rule, were re:f'u.sed certiorari in the discretion 
of the Court. It is suggested that, had they then ignored the 
decision and treated themselves as members of the University, they 
might have succeeded in an action in tort against any person who 
attempted to remove them tram the University premises. In Bx ~te 
Zerek (above) Lord Devlin suggested that if a landlord failed to 
obtain certiorari to quash a decision of a rent tribunal he might 
still achieve the same result by an action in contract. Only if the 
decision were voidable would refusal to allow collateral attack be 
justified. 
This emphasis on choice of remedy is not a merit in our law. 
It is suggested that if a decision is void for lack of jurisdiction 
the Court should always say so. The rules governing the discretionary 
remedies should take into account·the public interest in ensuring 
that inferior bodies act within their powers, and comply with basic 
procedural standards. It is however necess&rJ to preserve an element 
of discretion to refuse to assist an undeserving applicant even here, 
and thus a de facto limitation upon the concept of absolute nullity 
must be accepted. As Wade points out, if no remedy can be obtained 
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against a decision it must be in effect treated as valid. The 
availibility of a remedy depends upon the identity of the person 
claiming it, upon his conduct, and upon the discretion of the Court. 
In this sense it is meaningful to regard nullity as a relative 
concept. (31) However to state that a legal relationship is de 
facto effective unless disturbed by a Court is a truism applicable 
to all such relationships. The particular element of enforcement by 
executive machinary of a decision which is not challenged, or ~here 
a remedy is refused, makes the concept of nullity less convincine 
in the area of law. 
Nevertheless the rules governing waiver, locus standi, and 
discretion are analytically seperable from those governing the 
consequence of the decision. A nullity gives rise to no legal 
consequences, unless a competinB rule exists, to prevail over this 
principle. Thus an individual need give no recognition to a void 
decision untill all means of challenge both direct and collateral 
are exhausted. Ultimately the aid of the Court will be required, 
and the distinction between void and voidable should act as a quote 
to choice of remedy, and to the Court when investigating the 




In Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [196~ A.C 147 
the effect ot a privative clause was treated by the House of Lords as 
based upon the distinction between a void and a voidable decision. 
Their Lordships, held that a statutory provision enacting that "the 
determination by the commission of any application made to them, under 
this act shall not be called in question in any court of law" does not 
extend to a determination that has no existence because it is a nullity. 
(32) This in conjunction with the proposition also upheld by their 
Lordships is a doctrine with wide implications since the only defect 
which is certainly not capable of producing nullity is patent error of 
law. The reasoning of the House of Lords is on the face ot it 
convincing. If a privative clause can prevent even jurisdictional 
detects from challenge, then the notion ot an inferior body vi th a 
limited jurisdiction becomes meaningless. (Per Lord Wilberforce at 208). 
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The Courts vhen they restrict the application of a privative clause to 
defects vithin jurisdiction are simply observing Parliaments' intention 
''What vould be the purpose of defining by statute the limit of a 
tribunals povers, if by means of a clause inserted in the instrument 
those poers could be safely passed11 • (Per Lord Wilberforce at 208). 
In this context the notion of nullity is a convenient linguistic 
device to apply to the construction of the provative clause. 
However, it is doubtful whether this reasoning is more than 
technically respectable. Firstly from Lord Reids general summary 
of the main categories of defects producing nullity, it is clear that 
these constitute limits to jurisdiction, not i.l!lposed by Parliament but 
by the Courts. The rules of natural justice are an obvious example. 
Secondly it is doubtfUl whether Parliament intended the privative 
cl&UJe to be thus narrowly construed, as protecting only errors vi thin 
jurisdiction, since one result of this decision was the enactment of 
:~ of the Foreign Compensation Act 1969 vhich purports to protect even 
jurisdictional defects f'rom judicial reviev. The effect of S3 vill be 
discussed below. The reasoning employed by their Lordships constitutes 
a device to obscure the fact that the Courts are prepared to violate 
the spirit if not the form of Parliamentary Sovereignty {22). 
The principle that a privative clause vill not protect a nullity 
has been vell established in the field of judicial reviev of inferior 
courts proper ( 34). In ex p. Bradlaugh ( 1878) 3 QBD 509 Mellor J. 
said 
"It is vell established that the provision taking a~ the 
certiorari doeanot apply vhere there vas an absence of jurisdiction. 
The consequence of holding otherwise vould be that a magistrate could 
make any order he pleased without question". 
I4A~ tiO'r I)UIII Al',l-IED 
It is therefore surprising that this princ1ple~in all administrative 
contexts extending as it does to any form of clause purporting to 
prevent reviev of "decisions" "orders" "schemes" or "determinations'' 
where it can be said that the act referred to does not exist. The 
Courts have tended to approach each type of formula as a separate 
question of construction. Thus in R v. Minister of Health ex p. Yaffe 
[1931] A.C at 503 the House of Lords thought that a local authority 
scheme could be reviewed despite a provision giving it e:tfect "as if 
enacted in the Act" if the scheme vas in conflict or inconsistant vith 
the Act that authorises it. The defect in question involved a failure 
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to comply with the procedure required by the Act. The House of Lords 
held however that any defect which existed had been cured before 
confirmation by the Minister exercising his power of amendment. 
This suggests that the Court did not regard the original scheme as 
void ab initio for if it was a nullity the Ministers confirmatory 
powers would not be exercisable. In Institute of Patent Agents v. 
Lockwood [ 1894] A.C 347 the House of Lords held (obiter} that an 
invalid piece of subordinate legislation was protected by this phrase, 
which would otherwise be meaningless, and apart fran reference to the 
possibility of a conflict between the Act itself and a rule purported 
to be made under it the notion of jurisdiction was not employed. 
Similarly in Smith v. East Elloe, Webb v. Minister of Housing (above) 
·and Woollet v. Minister of Agriculture (~955] lQB 103) a clause 
preventing challenge in the Courts atter six weeks was held to prevent 
at least direct challenge to a decision which in the latter two cases 
was regarded as a nullity. It was in addition found necessary to 
enact Sll of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 which prevents certain 
privative clauses from being effective to prevent review by certiorari 
or mandamus. This section, it appears is necessary only to allow review 
of patent error of law. However this is consistant with other provisions 
in the Act ( 35). 
Nevertheless in ex p. Gilmore [1957 J lQB 574 the Court of Appeal 
made it clear that a privative clause does not apply to a nullity. 
Parker C. J. said 11The ordinary reme~ by way of certiorari for lack 
ot. jurisdiction is not counted by a statutory provision that the 
decision sought to be quahsec.t is final. Indeed that must be so since 
a decision arrived at without jurisdiction is in effect a nullity. 
This however is not so where the remedy is evoked tor error of law 
on the face of the decision. In such a case it cannot be said that 
the decision is a nullity". 
Denning L. J. said that even an express "no certiorari" clause 
cannot be used to allow tribunals to exceed their jurisdiction. 
Until Anisminic therefore the relationship between Privative clauses 
and ~~ity was not clear, despite a consid6rable weight of Nineteenth 
century authority. 
It remains to be determined whether the reasoning in Anisminic is 
applicable to all privative clauses. 
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Firstly their Lordships distinguished Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C. 
where a privative clause was held effective to prevent review of a decision 
vitiated by fraud, on the grounds that this was an administrative, not 
a judicial decision. It is difficult to see the significance of this, 
since in the context of collateral attack, the authorities that draw 
such a distinction appear to treat administrative decisions as more 
rather than less, capable of being nullities than judicial decisions 
(see Chapter q above) • However in Smith v. East Elloe R. D.C. a 
different type of clause was involved, one permitting review within 
a specified time, and secondly it appears that a majority of their 
Lordships thought that the defect in question did not result in nullity. 
Certainly the rationale of Anisminic was applied to a Court Protection 
Scheme in Webb v. Minister of Housing and Local Govermnent, where a 
scheme was successf'Ully impeached, in a collateral form of attack, 
despite the existance of a privative clause. 
It is suggested that there is no reason why the nullity principle 
in this context should not apply to all kinds of decision. 
Any clause which refers 'to "decisions" , "orders 11 , "schemes" or 
"acts" is prima facie subject to the Anisminic principle. However 
as the decision in Anisminic vas based upon the presumed intention of 
Parliament, sui table statutory language can of ..course prevent review 
of even a void decision. As a result of the decision in Anisminic a 
sutable clause vas inserted into 63 of the Foreign Compensation Act 
1969. 'l'his provides for review of a decision of the CODDilission by way 
of a case stated to the Co\D"t of Appeal, and that, subject to this , 
"determinations of the CODDilission are not to be called into question in 
any Court of La.v except upon the ground of lack or natural justice.''. 
The Act goes on to state that for this purpose, "determination" includes 
11 a provisional determination 11 and anything that purports to be a determ-
ination. !~his indicates that even a nullity is protected by this 
provision. (Even if this is not so, S3 expressly gives the trib\Dlal 
power to "determine any question, as to the construction or 
interpretation or any provision" of the governing Order in Council.) 
This, with the curious saving tor natural justice appears to be 
the most comprehensive privative clause yet introduced in an English 
Statute. It may be regarded as euisdem generis vi tb the "conclusive 
e·ridence clause" which makes the confirmation of an order "conclusive 
evidence that the requirements of this Act have been complied vi th, 
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and that the order is duly ma.de, and is within the powe:&·s of this act". 
In ex p. RinBer (1909) 73 J .P 436 this has been held to exclude a:n:y 
inquiry into vires. In Yaffe's case (above) this claus~, vas· 
contrasted with the "as if enacted clause" mentioned above. upon the 
basis that the fo~Lr, but not the latter prevents juris~ictional 
defects from challenge (at 532-533). However it may b~ possible to 
argue upon the basis of 4-nisminic that the "order" refer1·ed to in such 
clause must exist in law before the clause can take eff'~ct. This was 
the view taken in Corporation of Waterford v. Murphy [ lY:.?<il 2 IR 165 
where a conclusive evidence clause was held not to protect a voiu by-
law. It is submitted that this view is untenable sine''• assuming the 
eqU6.tion of' lack of jurisdiction with nullity, the claut.~c, to have any 
meaning at all, must refer to a de facto order. 
illegal order would be outside its ambit. 
Thus only a manifestly 
Authority conc~rning the effect of nullity upon privative cl~uses, 
is plentiful in Commonwealtl;l jurisdictions where in Canudu at any rate 
the nullity principle is carried its logical conclusion, drastically 
restricting the effect of' such provisions. Thus Sutherland s~s "It 
may well be asked if' there is any type of clause which could be devised 
to exclude judicial review beyond any question. A court m~ alw~s s~ 
that the "decisioo'1 is not a decision because it was mado without 
jurisdiction. The result is that no type of' depri vatory clause can 
exclude review for the simple reason that it has no application". Thus 
in decisions arising out of' the interposition of' statut<.~ry ::.abour ~oards 
to determine collective bargaining questions, camprebenuive privative 
clauses expressly excluding each supervisory remedy havo been held 
inapplicable, and sometimes ignored, (37) where the defect is regarded 
as jurisdictional and so producing nullity ( 38). Moreo._r the categories 
of jurisdictional defects have been broadly defined to include rulings 
on evidence (39) miscellaneous procedural defects (40), error ot law (41) 
and the device ot jurisdictional tact, liberally empleyod ( 41) • Thus 
Laskin (42) regards "Jurisdiction" as ''a sort of' comforting conceptualism 
which in its designation carries its own condemnation <.~r labour board 
action". 
However even here a privative clause which explicit.lJ covers 
jurisdictional defects must be recognised as effective &a11less it can be 
treated, (in Canada) as :Unconstitutional (43). 
In Australia the drastic consequences of such a doctrine have been 
limited by allowing judicial review, only in cases of manifest lack of 
jurisdiction (44}. In R v. Murrey. 1949 77 CLR 387, Hemdes J. said 
(at 454) Even if there is excess of jurisdiction the privative clause 
protects the decision since the tribunal has not manifestly disregarded 
its jurisdictional limits. This principle embodying as it does a 
compromise solution where the Courts wish to preserve their powers of 
review in the face of a privative clause has been recognised in Canada. 
(45) As far as English Law is concerned, it is possible to construe 
dicta in isolated cases as reflecting a similar principle. Lord 
Radcliffe in Smith v. East Elloe (above} referred to an order with the 
"brand of invalidity upon its forehead" and the reference of Lord 
Herchell in Lockwoods case to a rule which was in conflict with the 
parent act, may be based upon a similar idea (46). novever this 
approach, which has been criticised above (see Chapter 3}, is 
inconsistant with Anisminic. It is submitted that the proper basis for 
defining the scope of privative clauses is to systematically categorise, 
without reliance upon an a priori conceptual definition of jurisdiction 
which defects should produce nullity. The arbitrary "commencement of 
inquiry" test has been advocated as a solution to the problem i~ 
Canada (47). It is submitted that this is unduly restrictive, and 
that the "ostensible authority" doctrine capricious and uncertain in 
its application. 
There remains one type of privative clause which may not be 
governed by the nullity principle. This, now a standard form in 
statutes concerning interference with ownership or use of land, provides 
for challenge to "orders" or "schemes" upon limited grounds including 
ultra vires, and within a specified period, thereafter providing that 
the decision is not to be challenged in any legal proceedings whatsoever. 
(4b) 
Prima facie a nullity would not be covered by this formula, 
referring as it does to an "order" or a "decision". However it is 
suggested that two considerations militate against this. 
Firstly this fonnula providing a statutory regime for challenge 
can be construed as constituting an exclusive procedure which thereby 
displaces the nonnal remedies of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and 
declaration. The prerogative orders are not necessarily displaced by 
the existence of an alternative remedy, but will be exclu4ed if the 
statutory procedure is re~ded as exclusive. This both within the 
six weeks time limit and after its expiry no other remedy can be 
utilized. Thus in Woollet v. Minister of Agriculture [1955] lQB 103, 
the Court of Appeal refused to issue a declaration that a certificate 
issued by the Minister vas invalid after the lapse of six weeks. It 
was held that the certificate even :..f defective was not a nullity, but 
that even if it was "no certificate at all" the Court could not 
intervene. Jenkins L. J. said, (at 129) "Para 16 inposes en absolute 
bar to all litigation, inclu~~ng litigation designed to establish ...• 
that the certificate is a nul.lity''. 
Smith v. East Elloe R.D.c .• (above) supports this, there being 
majorities (albeit of differing composition) in support of the 
propositions that no challenr,e was possible after the expiry of six 
weeks. and that even within th11t period review was confined to the 
grounds specified in the Act. However, it is not clear that the 
majority regarded the decision concerned as void, and Lord Samervill 
(dissenting) was prepared to allo'! challenge upon grounds not covered 
by the statute. The criticism made of this dechion in Anisminic 
(above) and by Lord Denning in Webb v. Minister of Housing (above) 
suggest that this decision will no longer be treated as authority for 
any general rule of law. 
Secondly the six weeks time limit may be regarded as analogous 
to a statute of limitations ,providing a procedural bar to all 
litigation independently of' questions of ultra vires. This analysis 
is convincing only if the specified grounds for challenge within the 
time limit can be construed as extending to all defects that are 
normeJ.ly reviewable. If this is not so, then either (according to 
the majority view in Smith v. East Elloe) other defects are not open. 
to review at all, and thus the clause must be construed as a privative 
clause proper. or the grounds not so covered are reviewable quite 
independently of the statutory fonn.ula, and therefore, it is submitted 
not governed by the six weeks limitation period. 
The weight of authority supports the view that the fomul.a prevents 
all challenge, both direct ( 49) and indirect {50) af'ter the lapse of 
time. Each remedy, including an action in tort he.s its own limitation 
period. The effect of this type of formula is merely to substitute, 
tor obvious reasons ot convenience in view of the reliance that must 
be placed upon decisions affecting land, a general time limit. It 
is susgested that the Courts m~ take this approach in distinguishing 
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this sort of clause from those governed by Anisminic. 
Hovever a compromise solution can be found based upon the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeal in Webb v. Minister of HoWJing and Local 
Government (above}. The facts of this case have alread:,· been examined. 
In this context it is relevant to show that the Court vas prepared to give 
same effect to the limitation clause, which we.s construed to prevent all 
direct reviev to the scheme or order to which it referred. Nevertheless, 
as the scheme vas a nullity, it could have no leual effect except in as 
far as the express terms of the clause required otherwise. Thus 
collateral acts, done in reliance upon a nullity can be impeached unless 
they are themselves protected under the provisions of a privative clause. 
The Webb case, well illustrates a fundamental aspect of the concept 
of nullity. Even though the rules discussed in this chapter, consent, 
locus standi, the discretion of the Court and privative cle.uses, in 
practice ~ prevent challenge to an othcruise void decision, or m8\f 
result i_n the nullity of the decision being relative, the decision 
itself has no legal consequences, unless one of these specific rules 
necessitates treating it as effective. This is particularly important 
in the context of collateral attack in its various forms, since here, 
outside the capricious spheres of the prerogative and equitable remedies, 
these competing rules do not operate. Apart f'ron the ordinary limitation 
period and rules governing each specific cause of action, vhi ch rarely 
involve the discretion of the Court, if recognisea damage is caused as 
a result of reliance upon a void decision, the individual will have a 
remeczy. Where the decision is, on the other hand, voidable the converse 
position exists, and unless the Court is prepared to grant a remedy the 
decision remains effective for all purposes. 
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CHAPTETI 11. 
In Durra.yapah v. Fernando (above) where breach of the audi alteram 
parteiC. rule was regarded as producing a voidable decision, the Privy 
Council thought that as against a person entitled to set aside toe 
decision, it would be treated as void ab initio. This implies that 
the quashing of such a decision by the Court bas retrospective 
effect, and that, as far as the person entitled to intervene is concerned 
all transactions made in reliance upon tho.t decision will be invalidated. 
There is very little direct authority upon this point. It is clear that 
vhere a decision is a nullity, a declaration to that effect will result 
in the failure of all collateral transactions (1). However, on principle 
if a decision is voidable only, it should be perfectly good until quashed. 
The pmpose of the device of voidability is to prevent a decision, which 
is erroneous, but within jurisdiction from being ignored and to allow it 
to give rise to the legal consequences attendent upon it, unless 
someone chooses to challenge it, in which case his election should not 
prejudice ethers who have already relied upon the decision. Thus in 
contract, a voidable transaction passes a good title to a bona fide 
purchasor. In family law, even though a decree setting aside a 
voidable marriage has retrospective effect, the inconveniences arising 
from this have caused the piecemeal introduction of qualifications to 
this rule. 
There are a :cumber of dicta to the effect that the quashing ot a 
voidable decision does not have retrospective effect. Thus in R v. 
Paddington Valuation Officer [1965] 2 ALLER 836, the issue arose whether 
a ratill8 valuation list vitiated by error should be quashed. Lord 
Denning (at 842) supported the contention that mandamus should issue to 
order the compilation of a new list, after which the old one could be 
quahsed by certiorari. His Lordship pointed out that everything done 
under the old list will remain good. ''For it is a general rule that 
where a voidable transaction is avoided, it does not invalidate 
intermediate transactions which were made upon the basis that it was good." 
Thus rates paid under the old list could not be recovered. 
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Similarly in D.P.P. v. Head 1958 1 ALLl:l\ 679 Lord Denninr 
tllought that if a detention order vas voidable the Court vould have 
a discretion whether or not to quasb it (~). and that until this vas 
done the order vould re'lll&in good, and a sup-port f'or all tbet has 
been done under it (3). 'l'his principle can be seen in H v. 
Cc::muniesioner of' Severs for Essex (1685) 14 OJ:W 561, vllere an order 
by the Commissioners charging the applicant to execute re~airs ~as 
~uashed tor bias. It vas held that the order vas voidable only, 
and thua the Court of Appeal vere prepared to set it aside for the 
future, but not to isoue mandamuo to coDpel the Co~issionera to 
reimburse the applicant tor expenses already incurred, since there 
vere, at tbe time of expenditure, incurred Wlder an existiny, legal 
obligation. 
Indeed it the setting aside of a voidable decision vas retrospective, 
this vould conflict vi th the rule that, in the absence ot malice, an 
action in tort cannot be brought againet a person rel:vinr upon a 
voidable decision. 
However Lord Devlin in Ridp v. Beldvin [ 1963] 2 AW'J'l t6 at 
120 vas prepared at least to listen to the contention that the Court 
could, it it quashed a voidable decision, do so on terms that vould 
restore the parties to their original position. 'l"nus the discretion 
of the Court 1111Q" be II!Aterial as far as restitution is concerned if' the 
order to quash has general retrospective effect conoiderable inconvenience 
vould be caused, if, for example, a statutorJ tribunal hOB been 
avardi.ng persons, or compen•ation upon a vrong legal basis over a 
considerable period of' time. 
In viev of' the lack of direet authority, it is necessary to rind 
an analogy in the aim.ilar situation vbere a firat inat&Dce judgement is 
reversed upon appeal. The tvo eituatiollS are not, directly comparable 
since an appellate court can substitute its ovn decision upon the issue, 
whereas a revievi.D.£ court can merely ~uash the otfendinr. order, returning 
it to the tribunal tor IUilendment. 
Ear~ decisions support a rule that a Judgement reveroed is no 
ju46ement , and that reversal 111111ule ab initio. This ill nevertheless 
contradicted by other authoritiea ~aiDing the contradictory 
proposition that a widable judgement being w.lid until quashed cannot 
be treated as tho\16h it had never existed ( 1a). Thus in llood Barra v. 
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Crossman [1897] A.C. 172 it was held by the House of lords that a 
solicitor who as an assignee received payment of costs p~able to 
his client under an order of Court cannot even with knowledge that an 
appeal is pending, upon the reversal of the order be ordered to repay 
such costs. Each of these principles involves injustice if applied 
logically. Retroactivity may convert into trespasses, acts which 
were lavf'ul. when perfonued, and deprive purchesors of title to 
pror~rty. The second principle however results in the proposition that 
a party deprived of property by en erroneous judgement, will lose any 
title to the property which he might obtain upon reversal, if bet-ween 
judgement and appeal the property is transferred to a third party. 
The reversal of a judgement upon appeal has a relating back 
effect in two specific situations. Firstly the doctrine of 
restitution operates, the Court orderinG restoration to a party of 
11 all things vhich he have lost by virtue of the said judgement" or, 
more conunonly in modern times the Court directs specific acts of 
restitution (5) where the writ of restitution orders return of land, 
put into the respondent's possession by the reversed judgement, the 
application of a relati%16 back doctrine results in the respondent being 
called upon to account for mesne profits for the time he had the use of 
the ln.nd ( 6) • 
Restitution applies equally to quashing by certiorari (7). Indeed 
the doctrine in this context originated vhen writ of error vas the 
COJIDlion form of appeal. 
Nevertheless it is impossible to regard restitution as evidencing 
a general doctrine of retroa~tivity. Such proceedings can only be 
ordered against a party to the judgement, and thus are not relevent 
to the central problem that of the effect of quashing upon collateral 
transactions, in particular where third party rights or title are 
involved. 
The second situation is where the principle of lis pendens 
is involved. A purchaser of land subject to a pending legal action 
obtains a title subject to the result of that action. Thus where A 
is given title as against B as a result o:t' a jud8ement in his favour, 
and after an appeal has been lodged conveys the property to a third 
party, the title of that person acquired pendente lite is subject to 
the result of the appeal. Thus if the appeal reverts the property in 
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B, the third party loses hie title. It vas hovever thOUF".ht that in 
equity, if not at common lav the doctrine of a bona tide purchaner 
for value of a legal estate vas applicable, and thus that a purchaser 
vho took vithout notice of the pending appeal vould obtain a good 
title (8) althouph the position vas not clear, (9). It is arguable 
that.di!terent principles should govern title voidable as a result ot 
a contractual defect, t.rom those soverning title obtained as a result 
of a defective judgement, although it suggested thnt here n distinction 
could be dravn betveen a judgement of a Court stricto sensu, and that 
or a statutory tri·bunal or administrative decision mal~ng agency. 
Hovever the Judgements Act 1839 (replaced by the Land Charr,es Act 
1925 made operation of the aoctrine, except vhere express notice vas 
received, dependent upon registration of the lis, vhich vas defined in 
the 1925 act to include 11 &ny actioJ), information or proceeding pending 
in Court, relating to land, or any interest in, or cho.re:e on land, and 
a petition in Banltrupcy". This voucll include an appeal (10). 
Bovever, the tenn ''court" is limited by section 20(1) to proceedings 
in the High Court of Justice, the Chancery Courts ot Lancaster and 
Durham and the Count:; Court. and thus bas no application to administrative 
bodies. Nevertheless en appeal to the Hieh Court against a local 
authority compulsory purchase order could perhaps be registered as a 
pending lis, althoUG1'1 under the existin,; compulsorr purcbaat: 
legislation title does not normally pass until after the expiry of the 
six veeks period for challen~e, and thus the doctrine or lis pendens 
is unneccessary. 
The lie pendens principle is thus of liDited application. However 
it does not apply to personal chattels or cboi'es in aetion (11). 
However in the circumatances vhere the doctrine doe• apply it operates 
to destroy the title or a third pary upon reversal, thus giving a 
limited cphere of retroactivity to tbe quashing of' a decision. It is 
uncertain whether the doctrine ot lis pendens operates to protect title 
before the appeal is lodged. On principle this Bhould not be the case, 
since there i• no lis in exietance. However in Case v. Stacpoole (lel3) 
l Dav PC 1~. Lord Redesdale vas ot the opinion (obiter) that the 
quashing ot a 4eci•ion upon appeal destroyed title ot a third party, 
purchasins trom a party Yboae title vae established by the overturned 
Judeement irrespective ot whether the transaction took place. before 
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or after the appeal proceedings were commenced. This suggests a 
concept of relating back, extending beyond the doctrine of lis pendens, 
and is supported by a number or American decisions holding in effect, 
that a purchaser relying upon a judgement must take subject to the 
rist of it being set aside at a later stage, even though such 
proceedings had not yet been commenced. This applied vhether the 
reversal vas by vay of appeal or review by vri t of error ( 12) • 
However the relating back in these cases l-ras justified by reliance on 
the lis pendens principle, which suggests that, where this is not 
applicable, the setting aside of a decision is not retrospective. 
This principle is supported by English Authority. Thus in Ridge v. 
Baldwin 1964 the applicant vas dismissed from his position in 
breach of natural justice. He wished to establish that his dismissal 
was of no effect in law, in order to preserve the pension rights due to 
him as one who had resigned f'ram his post. Whether he could claim 
arrears of pension vas regarded as depending upon whether the decision 
was void or voidable. Similarly in cases concerning the possibility 
of liability in tort for acts done in reliance upon the existence of a 
legal situation established by a judgement it has been consistantly 
held that no such action can lie, fbr things done before the judgement 
was quashed (13). However in the American case of Harp v. Brookshire 
(1923) 248 SW 177 the Court distinguished between performance of an 
act expressly authorised by the judgement and one made in reliance 
upon the validity of the legal situation established by it. It was 
held that the plaintiff who claimed a right of way over the defendant's 
land could obtain damages for obstruction, even though at the trial the 
Court ehld that he had no right of way, and the defendant's refusal. to 
allow him to cross his land took place before reversal. Thus a 
voidable decision vas given retrospective effect. The same result vas 
reached in the Canadian case ot Lamb v. Kincaid (1907) 38 SCR 816, vhere 
a tribunal held that A vas the owner of a gold placer-claim. The 
decision was reversed and upon appeal title was held to reside in B. 
The Supreme Court of Canada accepted vi thout argument that A was liable 
in damages to B for the tortious extraction of gold between judgement 
and reversal. 
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This reasoning is unsatisfactory in principle destroying as it 
does the difference between a void and voidable decision. If' the 
distinction hes any value it is surely to provide protection for a 
person who relys upon an act which the tribunal is empowered to make. 
If a decision turns out to be erroneous, restitution is an adequate 
remedy for a 'Party 'Who succes:f'ul.l.y obtains its reverseJ.. As in the 
case of other voidable transactions, an third party ru1ould not be 
prejudiced when relyinr. bona fide upon the validity of an act, although 
vhere express notice of a possible defect is received, then protection 
should be given to the party who sets aside the decision. This 
position is, it is submitted, supported by the English authorities. 
However the doctrine of retroactivity appears to have been applied 
upon isolated ocassions. Thus in Wiseman v. Wiseman [195~ P79, a 
vife a~Jlealed, out of time, frora a divorce decree upon the ground of 
procedural irregularity. The decree was reversed, the Court holding 
that although the decree was voidable only her huellands remarriage 
vas thereby nullified. Gordon justifies this decision on its 
particular facts, since on the special circumstar-ces of marriage, relat-
inr back as the only workable solution where two persons claim to be 
married to the same party. As a matter of public policy one marriage 
must be regarded as void, since this is the only possible form of 
restitution (14). Thus exceptions may be admitted as a matter of 
public policy (15). It is cleer that these exceptions are extremely 
flexible and not susceptible to logical analysis, since in Wiseman, 
LordDenning thought that , even though the quashing of the decree 
related back, this "WOuld not operate to render a child of the subsequent 
marriage illec;itimate. "The Child WRB legitimate when born, and the 
doctrine of' relation back bas never been applied so as to render 
unlavf'ul, that which was originally lawful". 
To what extent should such exceptions apply to adndnistrative 
decisions? It is thought that the ns.ture of these rarely calls for 
retroactivity, above that allowed for by_ the doctrine of restitution. 
Thus if a public official is erroneously dismissed from office and 
later suceeds, either upon appeal or by certiorari in setting aside 
the dismissal, acts done by in·.'the inteminr: the person appointed as 
his successor should not be invalidated. Indeed even if the dismissal 
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is a nullity, the doctrine of de facto authority should perhaps be 
called upon to prevent wholesale invalidation of acts done before the 
invalidity was established. Similarly where a decision to grant a 
licence is quahsed, third parties who rely upon the validity of the 
licence·should, until it is set aside, be protected. In the case of 
decisions effectinc; land, quashing shoul.d not invalidate intermediate 
transactions. Indeed estoppel cay operate, in the case of 
irregularity, but not when the decision is a nullity to prevent the 
auth.:~rity from relying upon the invcl.idity of a decision (16). 
It is where a de~ision is void that difficulties arise, since no 
protection can be eiven to acts done in relience upon the decision, 
except through the power of the Court to withold a discretionary 
remedy. Thus where n grant of planning permission is declared void 
owing to the imposition of a ultra vires condition, the applicant and 
by any other person subject to the same conclitions will be liable to 
en~cement notices as being in the position of developers without 
permission (17). Similarly where a pUblic official is dismissed 
without a bearing, when his dismisseJ. is declared void, all acts done 
by his successor will be invalidated. which might include the issue of 
licences to the public, or the appointment of subordinate officials. 
This suggests that the doctrine of ultra vires may be the wronr, 




















Hall v. fihorehN!l U .D.C. (above). 
Kingabridpe Investments v. Minister or Housing (above). 
But see Chapter 10 (above) 
See also DL:les v. Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 H.L.C. 759 at 766 
itcPher~on v. McPe1·son (1935) ALLI.: r;cp. lO!j at lll, 112. 
See caseo cited by Oordon (1950) 74 ~~ 519 
Gordon lac cit 52:.. 
Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Pnrio (1871) LP. 3PC 465 
R v. Wilson (1835) 3 A 4 E 817 
R v. Hellier (l8Sl) 17 QP 229 
Gordon (1959) 75 LQP. 8£1 
See ~llamy v. Sabine 1 De G • J 566 
Johnson v. RefUge Aaourance Co. [1913] l l':E 259 
Wignut v. Buckley 18~4 3 Ch. 483 
Sharp v. Elliot (1685) 6 sw J,sa 
Attica Building ~ Loan Association v. Codvert (1939) 23 R~ 
~ci 483 
~eetminster Colle,.e v. Fry (1905) 91 BW 472 
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co. above 
'Williams v. Smith (1863) 14 CB (U.B.) 576 
F'LilliJIB & Eyre (1870) LR 6 QD 1 at 22 
74 LO..R 546 
Menvi1' s Case (1581.) 14 Co Re:p 19 
Drury's Cue (1610) 8 Co Rep 141C 
Welle v. ~inister or Housing (above) 
Southend-on-sea Corporation v. Jiadgeaaon ('Wickford) Ltd. (above) 
See Chap. 6 CP.boft ) 
CONCW§IORS_ 
1. It has been shown that the distinction between voidness and 
voidability is an integral part of a eystem of review based upon 
ultra vires, and that there is sufficient, although in the ease of 
natural. just icc, not eonclus i ve authority that most reviewable 
defeeto produce nullity, and so can be subsumed under the general 
head or ultra vires. Conceptual formulae providing a general 
definition of_j~i~~ictional detects are unnecessnry. 
2. Tbe dividinp, line between void and voidable decisions should 
lie between-- ''acting for an ilnproper purpose'' and ''taking irrelevant 
factors" into account. Tbe latter class ot detect should not 
produce an ultra vires decision but ehould be treated as error in 
lav and result in voidability. This reconciles the decision&, 
avoids the difficulties raised in the AniBDinie case, and allows the 
Courts a greater de~1ree of flexibility in determiniDF. the effect of 
a decision vitiated by an irrelevancy. 
3. Nullity althoupp justified by the rationale or the ultra vires 
doctrine has drastic and inconvenient consequences. The Court a have 
utilised the consequences of nullity where convenient but nevertheless 
have violated logic in situations where the rules governinr the 
remedies cannot be reconciled vith the ultra vires doctrine. 'l'hua 
certiorari baa alnys beeD available to "quash" a nullity, and the 
declaration vill probably lie to voidable decisions. Rules governing 
locus stancH and the discretion of the Court have also preventing the 
full application ot the doctrine ot nullity. 
4. Rovever in tvo areas the 4btinction i a used to pro4uce a 
reasonable solution to a problem ot conflicting interests. An action 
in tort Will not lie vbere the ottendin,r; 4ec!eion h voidable. A 
privative clause will DOt protect a void decision. It the catqoriea 
of voidable decisions are vide eDOugh to iaolude "irrelevant coneiderationa'' 
this allovs proteetion to be given to less serious 4eteeta while preveutiD£ 
r:ross abuses ot power trom enjoyiD« any apecial b!munity in tbe Courts. 
5. Thus the distinction between ~idneea and voidability vbere ita 
inconvenient results baTe not been avoided appears to ha'Ye only limited 
utUity. It is submitted that the distinction b so tunc!aiDental ~ 
the ultra vires priDCiple that, in the context ot exiating methods ot 
review it must remain a necessary COD.COIIIIDittant of a system ot control 
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based upon jUrisdiction. With only limited alteration ot existing 
authority the distinction serves as a basis for the construction of 
a rational scheme of classification both of grounds for review and 
remedies. Thus, Natural Just ice, Procedural defects, fraud and 
improper purposes resul.t in nullity for which actions in tort and 
injunctions, declarations and mandamus, are the appropriate methods 
of review. Decisions vitiated by irrelevancy can be challenged 
either by certiorari or by exercising a statutory right of appeal. 
Thus a clear distinction can be made, at the cost of mocification 
of the scope of certiorari, bet\.'een review for vires and for other 
defects. 
6. Criticism has usually been focused upon the inadequacies of the 
existing remedies, to meet the problems of modern adminiRtrative lav. 
However. it is suggested that the inflexibility of the ultra vires 
doctrine is partly to blame for the many technical difficulties. 
The existence in many contexts of devices which militate against the 
strict application of nullity is particularl~· noteworthy, as are tje 
problems of estoppel. 
It is augcested that a broader basts of review be found than one 
based predominantly upon ultra vires. Certainly in a system founded 
upon Statutory powers and invclvine. PariiRmentar; sovereignty there is 
a necessary place for a doctrine of ultra vires, and therefore of 
nullity. However ultra vires can be given a narrou scope b~, limiting 
it to acts or decisions which violate express statutory language, and 
by excluding natural justice, and at least some aspects or abuse of 
power tram the ambit of the doctrine. This involves the introduction 
of a doctrine similar to the notion of "ostensible scope of authority" 
propounded by Rubinstein which although unsatisfactory in the context 
of the present law, is compa.table with a scheme of review which ia not 
exclusively geared to the concept of jurisdiction. The French 
notion of L'Inexistence conforms closely to this suggested ground of 
review involving the assumption that "the judge has gone so far as to 
doubt whether the administration has really taken any decision for him 
to review. The illegality is so gross and fl.agrent as to amount to 
the Ad!:linistration acting completely outside :its jurisdiction (l). 
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In the case of other grounds for review there is no reason vhy 
these should not transcerd the boundaries of ultra vires. The 
French doctrine of detournement de pouvoir is one which is not 
based upon ultra vires, and a similar doctrine in this country 
coupled vith a general right of appeal on points of lals and fact 
fror. Adninistrative bodies would do much to eradicate existing 
difficulties which appear to be largely technical. 
Partial freedom from the doctrine of ultra vires involves the 
opportunity for an expansion of the scope of the rell!edies. the main 
fUnction of which is at present only to quash, or declare void. 
In particular some ruachinary by which the Court can alter or amend 
administrative decisions is desirable. The crude operation of the 
doctrine of nullity in the field of planninr. conditions reveals the 
need for this. In addition there may be scope for a device similar 
to the "Exception of illegality" of European Economic Comnunity Law, 
wherebye an act can be treated as inapplicable to the applicant 
without its general validity beine: destroyed. Finally the reduction 
in importance of the jurisdictional principle could lead to a 
recc :-fdderation of the basis of the tort linbilit~· of public authorities, 
and to the establishment of a separate cause of action based upon abuse 
of administrative povrer. 
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NOTE f. 
(l) See Brown an~ Garner French AdJninist.nti ve Le.v Pll9. 
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